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COUNTERING TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

VOLUME 3: LESSONS FROM THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

Edited by James J. F. Forest

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CONTENTS

Editor’s Note ix
Preface xiii
Acknowledgments xxvii

1 An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Counterterrorism 1
James J. F. Forest

2 Educating the Next Generation of Counterterrorism Professionals 11
Stephen Sloan

PART I: CASE STUDIES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AND COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

3 “Beginning of a War”: The United States and the Hijacking of TWA Flight 847 35
Richard M. Wrona, Jr.

4 The Achille Lauro Hijacking 52
Sean K. Anderson and Peter N. Spagnolo

5 The February 1993 Attack on the World Trade Center 70
Daniel Baracskay

6 Insurgent Seizure of an Urban Area: Grozny, 1996 88
James S. Robbins

7 The U.S. Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 103
Sundara Vadlamudi

8 The Case of Ramzi Yousef 128
Gary A. Ackerman and Sundara Vadlamudi

9 The Attack on the USS Cole 145
Ruth Margolies Beitler
Contents

10 Capturing Khalid Sheikh Mohammad
   Robert N. Wesley
   162

11 The Siege of Beslan’s School No. 1
   Adam Dolnik
   176

12 The Madrid Attacks on March 11: An Analysis of the Jihadist Threat in Spain and Main Counterterrorist Measures
   Rogelio Alonso
   202

13 The London Terrorist Attacks of July 7, 2005
   Tom Maley
   222

14 The April 1995 Bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City
   Daniel Baracskay
   242

PART II: CASE STUDIES OF THE LONG-TERM FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY

15 State Response to Terrorism in Sri Lanka
   Thomas A. Marks
   261

16 Countering West Germany’s Red Army Faction: What Can We Learn?
   Joanne Wright
   275

17 Countering Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Shining Path in Peru
   David Scott Palmer
   292

18 A Long Road to Victory: Developing Counterinsurgency Strategy in Colombia
   Román D. Ortz and Nicolás Urrutia
   310

19 The Wars in Chechnya and the Decay of Russian Democratization
   Thomas Sherlock
   334

20 Italy and the Red Brigades: The Success of Repentance Policy in Counterterrorism
   Erica Chenoweth
   352

21 Lebanon, Hizbollah, and the Patrons of Terrorism
   Richard M. Wrona, Jr.
   366

22 Turkey and the PKK
   Lydia Khalil
   388
Contents

23 Israel's Struggle against Palestinian Terrorist Organizations 408
   Joshua L. Gleis

24 Fighting Fire with Fire: Destroying the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 430
   Brian Fishman

25 State Power and the Progress of Militant and Moderate Islamism in Egypt 443
   Sherifa Zuhur

26 Counterterrorism Policies and the Revolutionary Movement of Tupac Amaru: the Unmasking of Peru's National Security State 463
   Vera Eccarius-Kelly

27 Moro Insurgents and the Peace Process in the Philippines 485
   Robin L. Bowman

28 Terrorism and Uzbekistan: The Threat and the Response 508
   Dr. Joshua Sinai

29 India's Response to Terrorism in Kashmir 514
   Behram A. Sahukar

30 Combating Terrorism in Nepal 532
   Thomas A. Marks

31 Japan and Aum Shinrikyo 549
   James M. Smith

32 The Struggle with Violent Right-Wing Extremist Groups in the United States 569
   Eric Y. Shibuya

Select Bibliography and Resources for Further Reading 581
Index 603
About the Editor and Contributors XXX
EDITOR’S NOTE

Governments have been countering the threat of terrorism and insurgency since the establishment of the Westphalia system of nation-states. However, the rapid evolution of science and technology over the past 100 years—from the invention of dynamite to commercial air travel and the Internet—has enabled new forms of terrorist and insurgent activity. It is thus likely that further technological advances over the next 100 years will yield similar results, as today’s terrorist and insurgent groups have proven to be adaptable, learning organizations. This three-volume set, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, seeks to encourage the development of learning organizations among national security professionals by examining what we currently know about the strategic application of hard and soft power in countering the sources and facilitators of terrorism. As a collection, the thematic essays and focused case studies represent an ambitious effort to capture existing knowledge in the field of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and draw lessons (from successes as well as failures) that will inform new, adaptable strategies to counter the new threats that—judging from historical trends—will no doubt emerge over the next century.

At the outset, it is necessary to address why this publication covers both terrorism and insurgency, as there is confusion about these terms among many in the academic, media, and policymaking communities. In some countries that have faced the threat of violence for many years—including Colombia, Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Turkey—societies have grappled with additional terms like “paramilitaries” and “freedom fighters,” but the general view reflected throughout the chapters of this publication is that all groups or individuals (including insurgents) who engage in the act of terrorism can be considered terrorists. In essence, the act of terrorism defines its perpetrator as a terrorist, regardless of the ideological motivation behind such acts.

According to the Department of Defense, terrorism is defined as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological,” while insurgency is
Editor's Note

defined as “an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. . . . [and which] seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country.” In teaching my classes on these topics to future U.S. Army officers at West Point, the distinction I make is that insurgents can and do use terrorism (among other forms of violence), but insurgents are but one type of violent nonstate actors who may choose to use terrorism. In other words, not all insurgents use terrorism, and not all terrorists are part of an insurgency. Further, while the use of violence by insurgents to target governments is driven by a particular ideology, terrorists use violence against a range of targets (including governments) to advance their ideology.

While such distinctions may seem academic to most readers, they are actually quite important when formulating strategic, tactical, and policy responses to the threat posed by terrorism and insurgencies. As described in Volume 1 of this publication, strategies and tactics for countering insurgency are an important aspect of our knowledge base on countering terrorism, and vice versa. In both cases, experts have emphasized that the use of force to counter an organization whose objectives resonate with a larger disaffected population yields limited (if any) success. Instead, it is argued, the ideology, political, and socioeconomic aspects of an organization—through which it derives its financial support, recruits, and sympathizers from amongst the local population—must be addressed. In other words, the use of hard power in countering terrorism (including insurgencies that employ terrorist tactics) must be complemented by elements of soft power.

The link between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is also informed by recent analyses which suggest that the al Qaeda movement can be described as a global insurgency, seeking to replace the existing Westphalia-based system of nation-states with a global caliphate in which Islamic law reigns supreme. Recent terror attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, and Cairo, as well as disrupted terror plots in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, are all seen as examples of how individuals and groups around the world have been inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology to commit violence as part of a strategy to change the policy and behavior of these nation-states. In other words, it is argued, al Qaeda uses terrorism tactically and operationally to advance its global insurgent strategy. When described in these terms, the U.S.-led global effort against al Qaeda can be considered to be fighting both terrorism and insurgency. Thus, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses the many challenges that stem both types of threats to our security.

Another source of confusion in the study of terrorism and insurgency involves disagreement over the proper spelling of certain groups (or, rather, the spelling of the transliteration from the original language into English). For example, a brief survey of the literature reveals that a certain Lebanese militant group can be spelled Hizballah, Hezbollah, Hizbullah,
Hezbollah, and Hizbollah. For these volumes, we have standardized the spelling of certain common names across all the chapters, such as al Qaeda (because this is how several agencies of the U.S. government are now spelling it), Hizbollah (because this is how the group spells it on their English language Web site), and Osama bin Laden (rather than Usama). Finally, it is important to note that while many chapters discuss aspects of the “global war on terrorism (GWOT),” we recognize that this term has fallen out of favor among many in the academic and policy communities. However, there currently is a worldwide effort to reduce the capabilities of globally networked terror movements like al Qaeda, and in the absence of an equally useful short-hand reference for this effort, GWOT serves an important role.

At this point in the development of the global counterterrorism effort, it is particularly important to pause for reflection on a number of critical questions. What do we know about effectively countering terrorism and insurgencies? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns? What do we need to learn in order to do these things more effectively? Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses these and related questions, and in doing so contributes to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the common threat and how it can be defeated. Chapters of this publication address many different aspects of the unconventional warfare puzzle, examining the most important diplomatic, information, military/law enforcement, and economic/financial dimensions to regional and global cooperation in countering terrorism and insurgency, and providing specific examples of these dimensions in practice.

Authors in the first volume address issues of important strategic and tactical concern, organized around the primary instruments of power through which nations pursue their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. These instruments can generally be described as either hard power (the use of force by military and law enforcement) or soft power (including diplomacy, information, and intelligence). The second volume provides a variety of insights on how to assess and combat the sources and facilitators of political violence, including state-sponsors of terror, authoritarian regimes, criminal network activity, border insecurity, and the global struggle for influence among societies. As highlighted by several authors in this volume, the community of responsibly governed democracies faces uniquely complex challenges in combating terrorism and insurgencies while maintaining civil freedoms. And contributors to the third volume offer in-depth analyses of historical events and lessons learned in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Each volume contains a preface and introductory chapter, describing the contributed essays and providing an intellectual background for the discussions that follow.
Editor’s Note

This project is the final installment of an ambitious trilogy published by Praeger Security International. The first of these—the three-volume The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (published in 2005)—intends to help readers understand the nature of the threat by exploring what transforms an ordinary individual into a terrorist. This was followed by the three-volume Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (published in 2006), which explored the ongoing efforts in the United States to secure our borders and ports of entry, and to protect our public spaces and critical infrastructure from future terror attacks. The volumes of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century complement these earlier publications by focusing our attention on the broad, worldwide effort to actively confront those who threaten or use political violence against our communities. Together, these nine volumes are meant to provide a central, authoritative resource for students, teachers, policymakers, journalists, and the general public, as well as stimulate new ideas for research and analysis.

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PREFACE

The chapters of the final volume of *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century* provide dozens of case studies from which students and scholars can draw useful lessons and insights to further the study of critical challenges in the global security environment. Readers will undoubtedly note that some of history’s prominent terrorist groups are not addressed in these chapters, such as Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah, the Basque separatist group *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* in Spain, and the Irish Republican Army (and its ideological cousins) in Northern Ireland. A number of books and articles have been published on these and other groups, and many are summarized in the new *Annotated Bibliography of Research on Terrorism and Counterterrorism* published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (available online at: http://ctc.usma.edu). However, in order to manage the overall size of this volume, it has proven impossible to be all-inclusive. Instead, the topics selected for the volume are meant to offer a significant amount of geographic diversity: all the major regions of the world are covered in these chapters, and each country represented in this volume has had significant experience countering terrorism and insurgency.

As with the other two volumes in this book, an introductory chapter is provided in order to frame the discussions that follow. In addition to a brief review of concepts and the existing literature, this chapter also provides a discussion on the value of comparative analyses in general and specifically within the context of studying terrorism and insurgency. Next, Professor Stephen Sloan, who has studied and written about terrorism for several decades, provides his thoughts on necessary changes in counterterrorism education. He addresses the historical context of terrorism studies and why such studies had such a slow and sometimes tortuous path in finding their place as a discrete specialization within both the social and hard sciences. Based on that assessment, the chapter then examines the state of the counterterrorism art as it stands today and suggests what critical questions and areas of investigation must be addressed in order to meet both the short and longer-term evolution of the strategies and tactics.
of terrorism. The discussion then focuses more specifically on the elements necessary to evolve the new educational programs that are required to assist the counterterrorism specialist in the academic, public, and corporate sectors to not only achieve the necessary corpus of knowledge, but also disseminate it to those who are on the frontline in combating terrorism. Together, these two introductory chapters frame the case studies offered in this volume and highlight their contributions to the study of countering terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century.

The volume is then organized around two types of case studies: examinations of discrete events and discussions of a state’s multiyear struggle with terrorism and insurgency. In both sections, authors were asked to provide a brief overview of a particular terrorist event or group (including motivations, aims, organizational strength, leadership, and prominent attacks), and then address how the state responded, what successes or failures resulted, and what lessons (good or bad) we can draw from the case study that can improve our understanding (and practice) of counterterrorism in general. In their analyses of these events, authors were also asked to address topics such as intelligence gathering, surveillance, communication, hostage situations, guerilla warfare, policymaking, legal and ethical considerations, and long-term implications.

**PART I: CASE STUDIES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AND COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS**

The section begins with a case study by Rick Wrona, a U.S. Army officer and a faculty member at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, in which he analyzes the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985. He writes that this event highlighted an atypical aspect of terrorism—instead of sowing fear among their target audience, the terrorists generally succeeded in convincing spectators to sympathize with the hijackers’ cause. After providing a brief historical overview of the Lebanese civil war, the rise of Hizbollah, the Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah (AMAL, or “Lebanese Resistance Brigades”), and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the actions taken by Israel (particularly, the prisoner exchanges that preceded the attack on Flight 847), Wrona describes the events that transpired in June 1985 and the role played by different governments, including Algeria, Israel, Iran, and Syria. Two noticeable differences separated the TWA 847 crisis from earlier hijackings, and particularly from the contemporary hijackings by Arab factions in the Middle East. First, TWA 847 received more media attention and direct media involvement than any previous hijacking. Second, the hostages’ role in the media coverage of the hijacking was something not previously seen in similar events. Finally, Wrona highlights a number of lessons that can be
drawn from this event that inform counterterrorism strategy, particularly in viewing terrorist acts as combat, not as crime.

Another hijacking is the focus of the next chapter by Sean Anderson of Idaho State University and Peter Spagnolo of the Government Training Institute in Boise, Idaho. In October 1985, Palestinian fighters took control of the *Achille Lauro*, a cruise ship owned by the Italian government. Although there had been numerous aircraft hijackings during the early 1980s, the taking of a civilian passenger ship was unprecedented. Consequently, the security measures on the ship were lax: only a passport was required to buy a ticket, there were no checks of luggage, and very little observation of persons embarking other than to ensure that they were paid passengers. After describing the events that took place during this hijacking, the authors provide a brief overview of the pursuit of the culprits and the political fallout in Italy, Israel, Egypt, and the United States, and note that at the time these actual events were unfolding, disagreements over how to interpret and assess the crisis caused significant rifts and conflicts among allies both in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as in the Arab world. They conclude that it is impossible to rule out that events similar to the *Achille Lauro* hijacking will not be repeated in the twenty-first century.

Next, Daniel Baracsckay of Valdosta State University provides an analysis of the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York. He notes that this event warrants analysis for several reasons. First, it signaled a turning point in American history; where beforehand, terrorist attacks were waged primarily on foreign soil, the events of February 26, 1993 revealed that Americans no longer enjoyed immunity from this form of violence. Second, the WTC bombing indicated that foreign terrorist organizations can successfully penetrate American borders with a significant attack that embodies a political and religious plot for restitution against American presence overseas, particularly in the Middle East. Third, the attack signified the expanding nature of ad hoc terror groups that come together exclusively for violent purposes and exist as organizations that are linked together by the like-minded ideologies of their extremist members. Finally, the event in 1993 was a precursor to the September 11 attack on the two World Trade Center towers 8 years later, indicating that al Qaeda may seek to revisit targets until it succeeds in destroying them. Overall, the implications and lessons from this incident suggest that time and cooperation, both domestically and internationally, will create a more unified front to combat terrorist behavior.

Attacks on a country’s major urban centers are not uncommon, as Jim Robbins—a professor at the National Defense University—observes in the next chapter. His analysis of the Chechen attack on (and takeover of) the autonomous region’s capitol city, Grozny, in August 1996 reveals the challenges that urban guerilla warfare pose to a nation’s government and
Preface

military leaders. In one of the few cases of an insurgency prevailing in an urban takeover, Chechen rebel forces took the city in a matter of days and were able to hold it for several years. However, he notes, the reason for the Chechens’ success had less to do with their battlefield prowess than the unwillingness of the Russian government to pay the costs necessary to take the city back. Thus, Robbins concludes that the 1996 Battle of Grozny is a cautionary tale for countries involved in counterinsurgency operations under conditions of difﬁdent leadership and weak public support at home.

This analysis is followed by a case study on the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, authored by Sundara Vadlamudi of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. This event was the first major al Qaeda attack against U.S. targets that resulted in a large number of casualties. The meticulous planning, sophistication of the attack (involving near simultaneous bombings), and the number of casualties served as a signiﬁcant wake-up call to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community. The attack brought into sharper focus the danger posed by transnational jihadists, and forced the U.S. government to readjust its counterterrorism policies. The chapter is divided into six sections. The ﬁrst provides an overview of the bombing plot and lists the key individuals involved in the plot. The second section describes the immediate U.S. response to the bombing and the third section provides an overview of U.S. counterterrorism efforts against Osama bin Laden from the early 1990s until the attack in August 1998. The fourth section describes the cruise missile attacks on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, launched by the United States as a response to the embassy bombings. The ﬁfth section examines U.S. counterterrorism policies and efforts after the cruise missile attacks. And ﬁnally, the conclusion highlights some of the lessons learned from the U.S. response to the embassy bombings.

The next chapter, coauthored by Gary Ackerman of the University of Maryland and Sundara Vadlamudi, describes the history, exploits, pursuit, and capture of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, among several other Islamist extremist terror plots. During his relatively brief career as an international terrorist, crisscrossing the globe from 1993 to 1995, Yousef succeeded in attacking one of the world’s most prominent structures, plotting the assassination of several heads of state, winning over dozens of Muslim radicals, and planning what would have been one of the deadliest and most complex terrorist attacks of all time, all the while being pursued by several nations’ law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Yousef has been variously described as a “mastermind” and—at least while he was active—as “the most dangerous man in the world,” monikers that he himself no doubt appreciated; yet much about this chameleon-like and egotistical villain remains a mystery. This chapter describes what is known about
Yousef’s origins and his development as a terrorist, and traces his global exploits of mayhem. At the same time, the authors examine the nature and efficacy of the ultimately successful counterterrorist effort directed toward capturing a man who quickly rose to the rank of the world’s most wanted terrorist. Lastly, the chapter draws lessons from the campaign against Yousef, lessons which can be applied to both current and future counterterrorism operations.

Next, Ruth Margolies Beitler of the U.S. Military Academy provides a case study of the attack on the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy destroyer refueling in Aden’s harbor off the coast of Yemen on October 12, 2000. With 17 sailors dead and more than 38 wounded, the attack shocked the United States and its allies, and brought into sharp relief the relations between Yemen and the United States. Her chapter explores the events leading to the bombing of the USS Cole, the challenges of executing an investigation on foreign soil, and the ramifications of the Cole attack for U.S. counterterrorist policy. Regarding the latter, the investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole indicated clear shortcomings on a variety of levels. First, agencies within the United States must work together to increase the effectiveness of the investigations. Second, the United States must recognize the indigenous capability of a host nation, such as Yemen, and capitalize on those areas where the host nation retains a clear advantage over American investigators. Third, the U.S. government must grasp the flexible and ever-changing tactics utilized by al Qaeda. Overall, by assessing how the Cole investigation was handled, this chapter provides lessons for future investigations and counterterrorism cooperation.

Next, U.S. terrorism expert Robert Wesley describes the hunt for Khalid Sheik Mohammad, the tactical mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, who was captured on March 3, 2003, in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi. This chapter highlights the complex process that led to his detainment and the lessons underlined by this process. His capture serves to emphasize how the United States will be operating in the future to ensure continued progress in disrupting both the traditional leadership and those who replace them. Mohammad’s case study allows for reflection on several counterterrorism issues likely to have an impact on the future of this global conflict. For example, governments must recognize the importance of developing strong international partnering relationships; harnessing the core competencies of joint operations, involving U.S. and host-country organizations; creating and exploiting actionable intelligence; identifying and provoking security mistakes by al Qaeda operatives; and targeting “partner organizations” of al Qaeda.

The next case study by Adam Dolnik of the University of Wollongong, Australia, describes the siege of School No. 1 in the North Ossetian town of Beslan, Russia. On September 1, 2004, a group of terrorists took more then 1,200 hostages on the first day of school in what became the
deadliest hostage crisis—and the fourth deadliest terrorist attack—in history. After a 52-hour standoff, the detonation of explosive devices inside the school triggered a chaotic rescue operation in which 31 terrorists and 331 innocent victims were killed, 176 of them children. This chapter analyzes the myths and facts of the attack, with a clear purpose of identifying the lessons learned. The central focus is devoted to the Russian response, namely, the crisis negotiation approach and management of the tactical assault. In addition, the chapter examines events that occurred before Beslan that in retrospect could have provided an intelligence picture concrete enough to prevent the attack, as well as the media management and investigation aspects of the incident. The Beslan school hostage crisis was an unprecedented terrorist attack, both in its scale and targeting. It is clear that understanding the lessons of Beslan is one of the key prerequisites of designing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies for the twenty-first century.

This is followed by a chapter by Rogelio Alonso of King Juan Carlos University in which he examines the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004, in Madrid. Although Spain had been constantly targeted by various types of terrorism since the late 1960s, violence from the ethno-nationalist Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, or Basque Fatherland and Freedom) being by far the most intense, never before had a terrorist attack in the country been so indiscriminate and lethal. On that day, ten bombs planted in four different trains filled with thousands of commuters on their way to Madrid were detonated between 7:37 and 7:40 a.m., killing 191 people. As it would soon emerge, the killings on March 11 were carried out by a group of Islamist terrorists, some of whom were closely linked to individuals who were also part of the al Qaeda network. The chapter examines the events that led to this terrorist attack, analyzes how and why such an atrocity was perpetrated, as well as its implications for counterterrorism in the country, and concludes with an analysis of the main counterterrorism measures implemented as a response to this tragedy.

Next, Tom Maley of Cranfeld University examines the terrorist attacks of July 7, 2005, in London, England. After describing in detail the events that took place and the subsequent police investigation, Maley examines the motivations of the bombers, concluding that Muslim disadvantage, under-achievement, and under-representation at the hands of Western influence and policies seem to have been key motivational themes; thus, they sought martyrdom operations in their quest to right these wrongs. He then describes the government’s response to the attacks within the context of the UK’s long-term counterterrorism strategy. Operationally, this strategy is based upon four pillars: prevention, pursuit, protection, and preparedness, known colloquially as the “Four Ps.” The first two pillars were designed to reduce the threat, whereas the remaining two pillars focused upon the UK’s vulnerabilities with respect to international
terrorism. Overall, Maley’s analysis provides several important insights into the most likely type of self-organized and motivated terrorist attack we may see in other large Western cities, as well as how to cope with and counter the threat from local al Qaeda-inspired terrorist cells.

The final chapter of this section by Daniel Baracskay examines the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. He notes that this was a significant event for three principle reasons. First, the bombing established that American cities are vulnerable not only to the threats of external terrorist groups, but also to the impulses of internal extremists that are willing to use violence to advance their objectives. Second, the Oklahoma City bombing was the second large-scale assault on a public building in a 2-year period. The use of terrorism as an instrument of destruction is becoming more pervasive in the United States, if not expected. Finally, trends have shown that terror groups purposefully identify large and densely populated urban centers for targets in the United States and intentionally use violence in these cities to gain media coverage. This chapter analyzes the Oklahoma City bombing incident in detail and examines several implications and lessons that have surfaced in the decade following the event.

PART II: CASE STUDIES OF THE LONG-TERM FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

The second section of the volume explores the struggle between nation-states and terrorist groups operating within their borders. The first chapter of this section by Tom Marks of the National Defense University examines the response of the Sri Lankan government to the persistent threat posed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He notes that the LTTE is labeled “terrorist” by any number of governments, but in reality, it is an insurgency in intent and methodology. It has, however, gone from using terror as a tool for mass mobilization to using it as a strategy for insurgency. The success of the LTTE reveals the ability of a radical, institutionally totalitarian movement to recruit, socialize, and deploy manpower so rigidly indoctrinated that combatants prefer death by cyanide or self-destruction to capture. Having gained control of certain areas early on, LTTE was able to recruit manpower at young ages and then guide them in ways that produced entire units comprising young boys and girls who had never known alternative modes of existence. Meanwhile, this case study reveals several mistakes of strategic approach and operational implementation on the part of the government. These began with a persistent failure to assess the insurgency in terms appropriate to framing a correct response, attacking the symptoms to the near-exclusion of the causes of the violence, and misinterpreting that violence once it appeared. To focus upon the tactical acts of terror, then, was precisely the wrong approach.
Certainly repression was a necessary element of state response, but the security forces should only have been an instrument for the accomplishment of the political solution.

Next, Joanne Wright, the Pro Vice Chancellor at Sussex University, provides a case study of West Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF, a.k.a. the Baader Meinhof Gang). Examining the RAF, its motivating ideology, and particularly the West German government’s counterterrorism policies can provide valuable lessons and insights into twenty-first-century terrorism. It can illustrate, for example, how a relatively small and seemingly irrational group can create a physical and psychological impact way out of proportion to size and threat. Perhaps even more usefully, it can illustrate that whatever sympathy terrorist groups do manage to generate among national and international audiences is largely derived from government responses to terrorism. Her chapter suggests that the RAF was able to generate some degree of success and attach some degree of credibility to its analysis of a repressive state in three areas: security force behavior, prisoners and prison conditions, and legislative changes. Overall, the West German experience highlights the need to review the impact of policies on the motivations and support of terror groups within a society.

This is followed by a chapter from David Scott Palmer of Boston University in which he examines the case of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. Beginning in May 1980, the government of Peru faced the first attacks from a Maoist insurgency originating in the Andean highlands known as Shining Path, attacks that expanded dramatically over the decade. By 1990, more than 20,000 Peruvians had been killed, $10 billion of infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed, and some 9 million internal refugees and emigrants had fled their homes. This chapter offers an abbreviated account of the rise and fall of Shining Path. It discusses the conditions contributing to the initial formation and growth of the insurgency, the largely counterproductive responses by the Peruvian government and its security forces, and the key elements of the major strategic and tactical overhaul that turned the tables on the insurgents. The conclusion draws together the lessons to be learned as to how a guerrilla movement could come close to succeeding, as well as how a besieged government could overcome the threat—lessons of possible use to other governments in the formulation of their own counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies.

A similar analysis of counterinsurgency in Latin America is provided in a chapter on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), coauthored by Nicolás Urrutia Iriarte and Román Ortiz of Los Andes University (Bogotá). Traditionally, FARC has been considered to be the oldest guerilla movement in Latin America, with a history of nearly 40 years. It has also proven to be one of the more adaptable movements, as an analysis of their military tactics and financial dealings reveal. The group
had its origins in an essentially rural country with scarce social mobility and deficient political participation mechanisms. However, the long-term evolution of their attack capabilities, the multiplication of its financial resources—particularly resulting from an increase in the demand for cocaine in the new markets of Eastern Europe and the expansion of heroin production in Colombia, which provided FARC with new options to increase the volume of income from drug trafficking—and the renewed capacity to project its political message has turned FARC into a formidable threat. Their research highlights how clandestine networks for exchanging technology and military information between terrorist groups and criminal organizations have offered FARC critical channels through which they could expand their fighting capability, creating enormous challenges for the government’s counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts.

Another insurgency with a considerable history is examined in the following chapter by Thomas Sherlock of the U.S. Military Academy, which explains the origins of the Chechen crisis, assesses the costs to Russian pluralism of the Kremlin’s efforts to pacify Chechnya, and suggests what the West might do to help resolve one of Russia’s most important political problems. Throughout numerous brutal encounters with Russia, Chechen civilian casualties have been high and there is deep animosity throughout the region, rooted in decades of government repression. Sherlock notes that promoting democratization in Russia and working to resolve the crisis in Chechnya are important goals for the West, but it should not oscillate between condemnation and approval of Russian behavior in Chechnya, even in the face of dramatic intervening events, such as the terror attacks of 9/11, which led Washington to adopt generally supportive language regarding Kremlin policies in Chechnya. Putin and Russia’s political elites fear that instability in Chechnya will spread throughout the Caucasus. Meanwhile, the recent, unexpected, and tumultuous “revolutions” on Russia’s borders are viewed as threats by Russia’s ruling elites, who since Putin’s accession to power have been drawn in large part from the security services, and who worry that Russian influence is yet again receding in post-Soviet space. Such perceptions of vulnerability strengthen the desire to treat the problem of Chechnya as a completely “internal” matter. Sherlock concludes that while holding Russia publicly and privately accountable for atrocities committed in Chechnya by Russian and pro-Russian Chechen forces, the West should repeatedly reassure the Kremlin of its support for Russia’s territorial integrity, while promoting even-handed proposals that may effectively compel Russia to negotiate with moderate elements to reach a final solution to the Chechen insurgency.

Next, Erica Chenoweth of Harvard University examines one of the most durable and evasive terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s in Italy—the Red Brigades. Her investigation into the history of this group illuminates the successes and failures of the Italian government in confronting the Red
Brigades, providing several observations that should inform current U.S. policy in fighting insurgency and terrorism. For example, Italian counterterrorism efforts initially failed because of shadowy complicity between elements of the state and right-wing terrorism; refusal of the government to acknowledge the destructive potential of the Red Brigades; knee-jerk reactions resulting in undemocratic policies that raised some ethical considerations; and a failure to appreciate the escalatory effects of intergroup rivalries among terrorist groups. However, according to Chenoweth, the eventual successes of Italian counterterrorism included a unification of intelligence units and a coordination of their activities; creation of special commando forces with training in hostage crises; and finally, the introduction of policies that exploited internal divisions within the Red Brigades and led to the defection of many members.

Rick Wrona follows with a case study on the Lebanese terror organization Hizbollah. After describing the origins of Hizbollah, he examines the group’s ideology and its sponsorship by Iran and Syria. Today, he notes, the organization acts as a political, economic, social, and military leader in Lebanese society. Responding to such an organization is a daunting challenge for the United States and its allies in the region, most notably Israel. As a case study, Hizbollah demonstrates the lack of American consistency when dealing with organizations that resort to terrorism. America’s focus on Hizbollah has been sporadic and, in many instances, poorly timed. Further, American support of the Lebanese regime in the early 1980s had the unintended consequence of turning the Shi’a population against the United States, because support of the regime equated to support of the Maronite factions controlling the government. Likewise, American support of Israel, particularly after the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, came to be viewed by Hizbollah as both an indirect attack on the Lebanese people and direct support for Israeli regional expansion. Hizbollah’s history demonstrates that integration into the political process has simply given the organization more tools by which to achieve its goals, raising questions about the role of democratization in countering terrorism. Finally, the example of Hizbollah demonstrates the power of organizations that combine national, religious, and class appeal successfully. While some terrorist organizations (most notably the European groups of the 1970s) have been unable to expand beyond a small core of radicalized supporters, Hizbollah is the textbook case of an organization that has built a constituency that guarantees the group’s longevity and importance for the foreseeable future.

The next chapter by Lydia Khalil of Georgetown University examines the Partia Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK, or the Kurdistan Workers Party). Founded by a small group of communist Kurdish students of the University of Ankara and led by Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK was originally a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist group attempting to establish socialism in the
Kurdish populated areas of the Middle East. In the late 1980s, the PKK came to focus more on promoting Kurdish nationalism and the establishment of a Kurdish nation-state. Turkey’s fight against the PKK is a good example of how a military defeat of a terrorist insurgency does not automatically translate into permanent peace. Although the group is currently not operating with the full military and political force it had before Ocalan’s arrest, the lack of a political settlement on Turkey’s Kurdish question allowed the PKK to continue hit and run operations against Turkish forces and civilian targets. Clashes between PKK rebels and Turkish security forces have increased since the PKK called off their unilateral ceasefire in the summer of 2004. After a study of Turkey’s different counterterrorism policies toward the PKK, this analysis highlights lessons learned from Turkey’s successes and failures in dealing with the PKK.

This is followed by a chapter by Joshua L. Gleis of Tufts University on counterterrorism measures adopted by Israel in its fight against terrorist organizations. His description of Israeli tactics is particularly interesting. For example, narrow alleys require infantry to move house to house, blowing holes through walls in order to limit the danger to them from snipers and explosives planted in the entrances. His chapter also addresses issues of doctrine, education, preemption, targeted assassinations, and technology, including civilian antiaircraft missile systems, counterterrorism measures implemented on buses, and long-range explosives detectors. He notes that the U.S. armed forces, and particularly the Marine Corps, have joint training exercises with Israeli forces and are learning from Israel’s urban warfare tactics. However, in the intelligence field there is still an extreme lack of trust toward the Israeli intelligence and security agencies. Overall, he concludes, there is much that can be learned from Israel’s long experience in combating insurgency and terrorism.

Next, Brian Fishman of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point provides a case study of Syria’s struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970s. This chapter examines the efforts of Syrian President Hafez al-Asad to defeat several armed groups operating in the streets, many of whom were associated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Brotherhood). Although the focus is on Asad’s campaign against the militant Islamic opposition, it is impossible (and would be entirely improper) to separate Syria’s counterinsurgency policies from Asad’s efforts to build a social and political system that would enable him to dominate the Syrian state. Asad’s strategy for defeating the Brotherhood contained four elements employed by all governments fighting counterinsurgencies: (1) strengthen and legitimate the government, in this case Asad himself; (2) target the insurgent’s support networks domestically and internationally; (3) de-legitimize the insurgents; and (4) use violence to eliminate the insurgents and deter sympathizers. In order to understand Asad’s approach to counterinsurgency, one must understand the social bases
of both the Ba’th party in Syria and the Brotherhood. The chapter begins by reviewing the rise of Asad’s Alawite-dominated Ba’athist regime in Syria and the Sunni Brotherhood-associated movement that violently challenged his authority. This leads naturally into a discussion of the struggle for legitimacy between Asad and the Brotherhood. Overall, his case study is an excellent example of how counterinsurgency in an autocratic state represents the struggle of an individual or party to fend off challenges to its power and legitimacy.

Militant Islamism is also the focus of the next chapter by Sherifa Zuhur of the U.S. Army War College in which she provides a detailed history of Egypt’s long (and recently resurgent) conflict with several Islamist groups, some of which have proved more violent than others. For much of this history, Egypt’s leaders have sought to contain Islam as a political force and suppressed an array of Islamist groups. While officials disagree that their stringent counterterrorist actions could encourage further jihad, she argues, torture and imprisonment of Islamists in the 1960s produced several results in the 1970s: uncompromising radicalism and aims to immediately overthrow the state; or accommodation and commitment to a gradual Islamization of the state, this being the path of the Muslim Brotherhood. Torture and imprisonment in the late 1970s and 1980s led to further organizational development in prisons themselves, including the forming of new radical groups and the spread of “global jihad” or the quest for sanctuary somewhere outside of Egypt. She notes that in recent years, Egypt has accepted moderate Islamism in other dimensions (intellectual and social), but recent acts of religious violence (including attacks in Cairo, Sharm al-Shaykh, and Dahab) have renewed the state’s efforts to counteract the rise of moderate Islamism in its political form.

In the next chapter, Vera Eccarius-Kelly of Siena College provides another case study in which a nation-state’s counterterrorism policies and tactics may have contributed to the strength of a violent insurgency. Her analysis of Peru’s response to the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Revolutionary Movement of Tupac Amaru, or MRTA) reveals a repressive and corrupt national security state. This chapter examines the government’s management of the media, its collusion with corrupt military and police, and its embrace of tactics of intimidation, abduction, torture, and a series of other horrific human rights offenses. She describes several of the major confrontations between the Peruvian government and the MRTA, and offers a detailed analysis of the counterterrorism policies employed during the 1996–1997 hostage crisis at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in the capital city Lima. Several significant insights can be gained from investigating the measures utilized to defeat the MRTA during both the García and Fujimori presidencies between 1985 and 2000. Overall, an evaluation of the Peruvian government’s handling of the MRTA is an important case study of counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism measures in a society with fledging democratic institutions.

A similar case of a fledging democracy battling a terrorism-inclined insurgency can be found in the Philippines, as Robin Bowman of the U.S. Air Force Academy describes. Her chapter addresses the “whys”—goals, motivations, and leadership—and “hows” (including organization and tactics) behind the violent Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines, and their well-documented connections with foreign jihadists, as well as Manila’s responses to its home-grown insurgencies and international terrorism. The country is considered highly vulnerable to foreign terrorist penetration and prolific domestic attacks due to its abundant Christian and Western targets, its fluid borders, weak political institutions and responses, and general lack of governmental reach into the Muslim regions. Bowman begins the chapter with a look at the formation of Moro identity, and how and why this community turned to violence and militancy in order to assert their goals of a distinct and independent Muslim homeland. She then profiles each of the violent separatist movements (particularly the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group) before describing the government’s response. Overall, this chapter offers an interesting case study of political violence.

The struggle for a distinct and independent Muslim homeland is also a centerpiece of the next chapter by Johua Sinai of The Analysis Corporation in which he describes the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its struggle with the secular regime of President Karimov. Uzbekistan is the former Soviet Union’s largest Muslim nation, with a population of 25.1 million people. The government believes that its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies will enable it to avoid the fate of its smaller southern neighbor Tajikistan, which has been engulfed in a civil war since independence. So far, these strategies have not succeeded in rooting out Uzbekistan’s extremist Islamic insurgency because its military campaign has been ineffective and solutions still need to be provided to tackle the country’s internal problems, particularly the lack of full political participation in the form of free, fair, and competitive elections. Sinai notes that an effective response to the radical Islamic insurgency in Uzbekistan must be found and implemented, because this insurgency is part of a wider series of insurgencies facing the Central Asian states that pose a major threat to regional stability, democratization, and economic well-being. However, until Uzbekistan adopts a more democratic course, he argues, there will be few internal or external allies to help it defeat the IMU’s insurgency.

The next chapter addresses another critical insurgency/separatist movement in this region: Kashmir. Authored by Indian Army officer Behram A. Sahukar, the chapter examines origins of the Kashmir issue and the role of Pakistan in sponsoring or supporting Islamic militant groups engaged in terrorist attacks. He explains how the Soviet invasion
Preface

of Afghanistan in 1979 made Pakistan a frontline state in the United States-funded jihad against the Soviet Union, and the infusion of CIA-funded arms, equipment, and other forms of support into Pakistan legitimized the use of Islam to fight an Islamic holy war. The end of the Afghan jihad in 1989 left Pakistan flooded with surplus arms and equipment, as well as a cadre of fighters with experience in a prolonged low intensity conflict. Mujahideen who had completed their successful mission against the Soviets were diverted to Kashmir to continue their fight for Islam in Kashmir against “infidel” Hindu India. Since 1989, separatist violence in Kashmir has been backed by a radical Islamist ideology that aims to annex Kashmir to Pakistan and extend Islamic rule over India. Pakistan considers the issue of Kashmir as the “unfinished agenda of partition,” and remains in occupation of one third of the Indian state. It has tried to take the rest of the state by force several times in the past and failed. However, both sides have now realized that continued hostility and acrimony is counterproductive to the peace and stability of the region. This realization led to the beginnings of a comprehensive dialogue and peace process in April 2003, and a series of confidence building measures. Unfortunately, the jihadi factor and the anti-India military in Pakistan has been a hindrance to any lasting peaceful solution to Kashmir. Sahukar concludes that unless Pakistan abandons its fixation with Kashmir and returns to a democracy, the military and the Inter Services Intelligence agency will continue to fuel a proxy war against India.

Nearby this troubled region, another insurgency has grown in strength and prominence since 1996, led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), in which more than 13,000 Nepalis have lost their lives, many to insurgent torture and murder. The chapter by Tom Marks of the National Defense University describes the socio-political roots of the insurgency and the influence on the CPN(M) by other communists movements, notably Sendero Luminoso in Peru and Maoists in India. In Nepal, the Maoists seized territory over a period of years, enlisting a growing number of recruits until by 2003 the government estimated the movement’s strength to be roughly 5,500 combatants, 8,000 militia, 4,500 cadre, 33,000 hardcore followers, and 200,000 sympathizers. Marks then describes the government’s response to this “people’s war” as anything but adequate. Patrols sent to the scenes of incidents were ambushed, while numerous small police stations were overrun, attacked in the dead of night in assaults initiated with homemade explosives, then overwhelmed by human wave assaults. The police then abandoned outlying stations and consolidated their forces in a defensible mass, and by early 2003, half of all police stations nationwide had been abandoned. Once the police presence was eliminated, the insurgents became the state. Marks also criticizes the Nepalese government for the lack of a political component to its counterinsurgency strategy. He concludes that counterterrorism should be
an important element, but only one element of many in a comprehensive approach, a blend of the violent and the nonviolent that addresses the roots of conflict and creates good governance.

The next chapter examines a unique form of terrorism with roots in Japan, but affiliations in other Asian countries as well. As James Smith of the U.S. Air Force Academy’s Institute for National Security Studies writes, the case of Aum Shinrikyo—a Japanese “new religion” and cult that also embraced and practiced chemical and biological terrorism—and of the restrained and delayed Japanese government response provides significant lessons for those seeking to better understand and respond to terrorism, domestic religion-based terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism. The chapter also illustrates the utility to terrorism of “sanctuary under national law,” and of the acquisition of chemical and biological materials and production equipment under the sanctuary of legitimate business operations. Smith explores important issues of—and consequences from—governmental restraint and the persistent challenge of balancing civil liberties and national security. Finally, the case of Aum Shinrikyo also illustrates the utility of a culturally based analytical framework in examining terrorist groups and political violence, terrorist decisions and actions regarding WMD acquisition and use, and government response options and constraints.

The final chapter of this volume brings us back to the United States, where Eric Shibuya of the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies examines the struggle with violent right-wing extremist groups. After describing several different types of groups, he identifies three trends as most significant when considering the threat these groups pose to the United States. The first is that the use of a WMD in a terrorist attack is clearly not beyond the scope of possibility for violent right-wing actors, in terms of motivation or in (growing) capability. The second trend is the increasing value of the Internet in putting the leaderless resistance form of operation into practice. The Internet has been a boon to the movement by allowing for the creation of virtual communities of interest that are more anonymous and physically disconnected, making investigation and surveillance much more difficult. The third and perhaps most significant trend is the growing statements of common cause between the violent right-wing movement and other terrorist movements. It may be an exaggeration to consider groups like al Qaeda and the Aryan Nations to be part of a single “movement,” but it is certainly true that both groups find common cause in their hatred for the U.S. government. While strategic alliances may be less likely, tactical relationships may increase as both groups find areas of mutual benefit to work together. Overall, this chapter demonstrates that the threat from violent right-wing groups must be included in our national strategies for countering insurgency and terrorism in the twenty-first century.
CONCLUSION

As a collection, these chapters demonstrate the truly global challenge of combating terrorism and insurgency. Further, there is unfortunately a wealth of additional case studies worth exploring beyond what is covered in this volume. Clearly, there is much that any single country can learn from the experience of others in how to meet these challenges in new and increasingly successful ways. Thus, this collection will hopefully stimulate the reader to pursue further research on their own, in order to expand our collective understanding of countering terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century.

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New contributions to the study of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have never been more urgently needed. Each of the chapters in these three volumes is the product of thoughtful research and analysis, and I offer my sincere thanks to the authors for their hard work and commitment to excellence. The insights and suggestions they have provided in these pages will undoubtedly inform discussions and debate in a variety of policymaking and academic settings for the foreseeable future.

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