The summaries provided in this annotated bibliography are the work of individual researchers and do not represent the views of the Combating Terrorism Center, the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. This work is not for citation or reproduction without permission of the Combating Terrorism Center.
PREFACE

This annotated bibliography was constructed in cooperation with MAJ Reid Sawyer and MAJ Joanne Moore, with significant contributions from 2LT Bre Millard and Mr. Jeff Couch. It reflects a collective effort to provide a user-friendly introduction to the growing body of research and literature on terrorism and counterterrorism. Thus, the annotations contained in this bibliography attempt to avoid the use of jargon or overly academic language.

There are three parts to this bibliography:

- Part A contains 411 bibliographic entries organized by author’s last name
- Part B provides a detailed index of the entries organized by topic
- Part C provides a detailed index of the entries organized by country

Also, users may search the entries using the electronic version of this bibliography, which is available from the website of the Combating Terrorism Center: http://ctc.usma.edu

Updated versions of this bibliography will be posted to this website to incorporate newly published materials on the subjects of terrorism and counterterrorism.

For more information about this and other initiatives, please contact us at:

Center for Combating Terrorism
Department of Social Sciences
United States Military Academy
West Point, NY 10996
(845) 938-8495

Finally, your comments and suggestions for revising this document are welcome, and can be directed either by mail to the address above or by e-mail to james.forest@usma.edu.

James JF Forest, Ph.D.
West Point, NY
March 22, 2004
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PART A: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ENTRIES


This article examines issues of accountability in the Chechen war. Abraham argues that the West's response to the conflict has been contradictory, and international efforts to put an end to the atrocities have been limited to non-binding resolutions which deplored humanitarian law violations in Chechnya and called upon the Russian government to immediately establish a national, broad-based commission of inquiry and to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of human rights and breaches of humanitarian law. However, Russia has refused to implement the resolution's key provisions. Reluctance to deal harshly with Russia compromises the international commitment to protecting human rights and denigrates the credibility of international bodies. Abraham argues that the international community must insist on a credible, impartial, and transparent accountability process. Ensuring truth and justice is necessary to building long-term peace in the region.

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Countries/Regions: Chechnya, Russia


In this opening discussion, the author describes the purpose of his book as an effort to interpret and synthesize Islamic text and history to clarify the concept of jihad. He points to the failure of today's Muslim rulers and governments to create a sustainable representative system of government or cooperate in restoring the caliphate. Many Muslims are convinced that they cannot rely on their government leaders - who are seen today as unrepresentative, undemocratic, and evasive about the needs and demands of the community - to protect their faith. Jihad is permitted against the infidel; it is compulsory against the apostate - he who turns back after guidance has been shown him - and against all those who support an apostate Muslim state (including Christian Europe and the United States).

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In this chapter, the author describes how Islam originally came to the Indian subcontinent at the beginning of the eighth century, "beginning a complex relationship that expressed itself in war, culture, civilization, dialogue, dress, ethics, literature, law, mysticism, philosophy, suspicion, myth, segregation, integration, fantasy, and nightmare." This chapter also tells the story of various Muslim military conquests of central India in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. However, according to Akbar, the spread of Islam in the region can be attributed more to the influence of Sufi mentors on several rulers rather than to the success of these Muslim
conquests.

### Topic 1: Religion and Conflict
### Topic 2: Historical Context

**Countries/Regions: India**

(4.) **Al Qaeda Training Manual (selected portions). Available online at:**
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm

The U.S. Department of Justice website offers an online version of this manual, which was located by the Manchester (England) Metropolitan Police during a search of an Al Qaeda member's home. The manual was found in a computer file described as "the military series" related to the "Declaration of Jihad." The manual was translated into English and was introduced in 1998 at the embassy bombing trial in New York. The Department is only providing text from the manual because it does not want to aid in educating terrorists or encourage further acts of terrorism.

### Topic 1: Terrorist's Movements and Psychology
### Topic 2: New Threats
### Topic 3: Religious Ideology

(5.) **Alexander, Yonah and Dennis A. Pluchinsky, eds., European Terrorism: Today and Tomorrow. New York: Brassey's Inc., 1992.**

This edited volume examines the recent history of terrorists in Europe and what the international community can and should do to cope successfully with the challenges of future terrorism. Chapters include an analysis of the organization and operations of the RAF as well as Middle Eastern activity in Europe in the 1980s; a profile of the 17 November group in Greece; a review of Italian terrorism and its international links; and a comparative analysis of the current national, regional and international efforts at combating terrorism in Europe. In the latter chapter, the authors argue that one democracy's terrorist is another democracy's terrorist, and call for greater transnational collaboration in counterterrorist activities. They also recommend a Europewide criminal justice system and a common information and legal infrastructure for tracking and apprehending terrorists. As Europe moves toward greater economic and political integration, new vulnerabilities will require greater counterterrorist cooperation than ever before.

### Topic 1: Case Studies
### Topic 2: Historical Context
### Topic 3: Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective

**Countries/Regions: Europe**


In their short briefing book, the authors describe al-Qaeda's organizational structure, ideology, objectives, and sources of financial support, as well as a brief annotated timeline of key events, from 1979 to September 11th, 2001, related to the formation and development of al-Qaeda. The book has a variety of interesting appendices, including statements and declarations made by bin Laden, court transcripts, statements from U.S. policymakers on terrorism, and UN Resolution 1267 (1999) regarding the Taliban's provision of sanctuary for
international terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. A bibliography of 130 references offers opportunities for further study and research. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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The author explores the irony that religion is a source not only of intolerance, human rights violations, and extremist violations, but also of nonviolent conflict transformation, the defense of human rights, integrity in government, and reconciliation and stability in divided societies. He focuses on the potential role of religion as an agent of peacebuilding, a term which encompasses a broad range of activities such as conflict prevention and management, the transformation of conflict through mediation, the implementation of negotiated settlements, and the longer-term rebuilding of civil society and democratic institutions. Appleby draws several lessons from his review of cases such as the Sant'Edigio in Mozambique, the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Afghanistan, NGOs in Cambodia, and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Religious actors stand the best chance of being effective as facilitators of peace processes and as mediators when they are perceived as acting independently from the state, on their own authority, and beholden to no larger governmental, cultural, or religious power. However, without the benefit of logistical, technical, political and diplomatic support from governmental or intergovernmental agencies, they cannot be expected to succeed in either bringing parties to the negotiating table or providing the incentives for disputants to strike a deal and live by it.

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Countries/Regions: South Africa, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Cambodia


In this chapter, Armstrong describes how the achievements of scientific rationalism contributed to the rise of three religious fundamentalist movements. The Holocaust led the way for a rapidly strengthening Zionist movement and affected Jewish communities throughout Europe. Protestant fundamentalists in the U.S. flocked to Bible colleges and private universities (e.g., Bob Jones University), where they sought protection from assaults of "enemies of the faith." And in Cairo and other places in the Middle East, an Islamic fundamentalist movement began to take shape, driven by the humiliation many Muslims felt at being colonized by the European powers and by what some perceived as a secularist assault on their faith (particularly in Iran, under Reza Shah's modernization program). The author discusses key issues of religious doctrine, social structure, and domestic politics which laid the groundwork for the fundamentalist mobilization of the 1960s and 70s.

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Countries/Regions: Israel, Egypt, United States
The author describes how, by the late 1970s, religious movements had come to challenge the secularists' hold on society's consciousness in many parts of the globe. Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, a new constitution gave supreme power to a faqih (Ayatollah Khomeini) - who would control the armed forces and could summarily dismiss the prime minister - and established a Council of Guardians with the power to veto laws that contravened the Shariah. Israel was also moving toward a more religious national identity, reflected most prominently in the political rise of the ultra-orthodox Haredim. And in the U.S., a new and more extreme form of fundamentalism was emerging in the form of Operation Rescue (and its rabid protests outside abortion clinics), and religious cults or sects (like the Branch Davidians). In her concluding remarks, the author argues that fundamentalists much evolve a more compassionate assessment of their enemies in order to be true to their religious traditions, and that secularists must be more faithful to the benevolence, tolerance, and respect for humanity which characterizes modern culture at its best.

Countries/Regions: Iran, Israel, United States

This chapter focuses on the emergence in the late 20th century of religious fundamentalism, adherents of which have been responsible for many killings, assassinations, and other acts of terror. Even peaceful fundamentalists are adamantly opposed to many of the positive values of modern society - democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peacekeeping, free speech, or the separation of church and state. She notes how fundamentalists eschew modern conventions and adhere to a strict interpretation of their religious principles. As religious fundamentalist will play an important role in domestic and international affairs for the foreseeable future, it is crucial that we try to understand what this type of religiosity means and how best we should deal with it. Her book explores a few of the fundamentalist movements that have surfaced in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam - the three monotheistic faiths.

This chapter centers on the role of ideology in counterculture movements around the world - some focused on economic inequality, others calling for relaxing social restrictions, and still others demanding a return of religion to a central role in daily life. The push and pull between the secular state and religious leaders in Iran had a profound impact on fundamentalists throughout the Middle East, while in Israel a new form of Jewish fundamentalism led to the founding of special schools and institutions, and infused the eventual Israeli annexation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights as well as numerous settlement programs. In the U.S., a Protestant fundamentalist movement continued to grow under the leadership of
ideologues such as Billy Graham, Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, adherents of which felt that true religion was being destroyed and if Christians did not fight back, there might not be another generation of believers.

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(12.) **Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt.** "The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)," in *Networks and Netwars.* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 1-25.

Arquilla and Ronfeldt use the first chapter of their book to introduce what they consider to be the defining pieces of netwar, and thus provide a broad, understandable introduction to this emerging concept. They introduce the three common types of networks, explain their relevance, and explain how the tenets of their term, "netwar," differs from what people commonly associate with cyber warfare, defined instead as "the use of network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology attuned to the information age. They also give a brief overview of how networks might best be combated.

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In this chapter, Ateek provides a brief history of Christianity and of Christians who live in Israel-Palestine, and describes the massive exodus of Christians in the late 1940s through early 1960s. During the late 1960s, a timid Christian church leadership in the area began to assert itself, advocating for the return of Christian villagers to their homes and protesting the treatment of Christian Arabs in Israel. Meanwhile, the Christian church in other parts of the world seemed to enjoy close relations with - and expressed support for - the state of Israel rather than with the indigenous Christians of Israel-Palestine. Finally, the author suggests a new agenda for the Christian church leadership in Israel-Palestine.

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In this chapter, Ateek offers a solution to the conflict that encompasses four dimensions. First, Palestine must be recognized as a land for both the Jews and the Palestinians. Second, Palestinian statehood must be formally established. Third, there must be a variety of necessary changes in attitudes on both sides. For example, Palestinians must acknowledge the holocaust, and Jews must acknowledge harm done to the Palestinians. Finally, the issue of sharing Jerusalem must be resolved.

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This chapter tells a personal story of how Israeli troops entered and occupied the author's hometown as a child in 1948; how they were ordered to leave the city; and how Muslims were deported to Jordan and Christians were dropped off outside the city of Nazareth. While no members of his family were killed by the soldiers, the hardships of their forced removal and permanent exile from their home and life under military law have clearly affected his life. This experience informs four partially contradictory aspects of his identity as a Christian, a Palestinian, and Arab, and an Israeli, and "frames [his] views expressed throughout the remaining chapters."

Topic 1: Religion and Conflict
Topic 2: Historical Context

Countries/Regions: Israel-Palestine, Middle East


The author emphasizes three points in this introductory chapter. First, he argues that too little has been analyzed of the Israel-Palestine conflict from a Christian perspective of the Palestinian's struggle. Second, he describes the important complexities one must consider when defining the groups affected by the conflict. For example, there are about 800,000 Palestinian Arabs living in Israel as Israeli citizens, and nearly 2.3 million Palestinians living outside of the geographically defined Palestine as defined under the British mandate before 1948. Third, he argues that the liberation theology presented in the book is firmly based on the Bible, because "God has something very relevant to say to both the oppressed and the oppressors in the Middle East."

Topic 1: Religion and Conflict

Countries/Regions: Israel-Palestine, Middle East


In his concluding remarks, the author notes how he has tried to offer a Palestinian theology of liberation. He argues that the Christian church should play dual role of prophet and peacemaker, and should establish a Center for Peacemaking in Israel-Palestine. He also argues that a "greater Israel" agenda is unrealistic and dangerous. Military victories will not result in permanent peace. Israeli oppression of others will only heighten their own insecurity and jeopardize the chances for peace. Finally, he argues that forgiveness will play a key role in securing the peace.

Topic 1: Religion and Conflict
Topic 2: Case Studies

In this chapter, the author argues that it has become almost impossible to be objective about the Arab-Israeli conflict because of the political-historical background and the claim of two peoples on the same piece of real estate (about a thousand square miles). His discussion covers many aspects of this background, including modern and historical anti-semitism; the global rise of nationalist movements; the emancipation of Jewish communities in Europe; colonialism by European powers; and the evolution of Zionist movements. Finally, he describes the relationship between the establishment and growth of the Israeli state and "the gradual awakening of Palestinian national consciousness."

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Atran discusses the instrumentalization of violence by the parties concerned in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, as well as other conflicts where violence was utilized. Three main themes covered include the material benefits of violence, institutional modes of violence, and the impact of violence.

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This chapter examines the philosophy of martyrdom and the role of martyrs in Christianity and Islam. The author describes martyrdom in each of the two traditions separately, and then briefly discusses similarities and differences of concept and attitude towards the martyr in the two communities. In both, the blood of the martyr washes away his or her sins. The true martyr is he who is free from any other motive. Perhaps the most obvious and important historical difference is that while in Christendom martyrdom was considered a glorious struggle before Christendom became a world power under Constantine, in Islam the jihad or struggle of the martyrs was instituted after Islam became a religious, social, and political order. Overall, the concept of martyrdom has played an increasingly important role in today's global political environment.

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Bandura discusses many of the methods by which people can justify violent actions that they would normally find reprehensible. Bandura argues that acts of violence are often undertaken by ordinary (as opposed to "monstrous") people and because these people cannot ignore or deceive themselves in actions that they take, they constantly seek some way of self-sanction. He explains moral justification, dehumanization, advantageous comparison, and displacement of responsibility among the many ways in which violence is legitimized, and stipulates that these methods take time to bring disengagement. He concludes that as so many methods of sanction are available, a system with high political diversity is the surest way to identify suspect methods.

Topic 1: Terrorist Movements and Psychology


In 1998, President Clinton responded to terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam with retaliatory strikes launched at targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. This case study raises a number of questions that are central to U.S. national security decision making options for the future: What are the domestic and international legal considerations in deciding whether and how to respond to acts of international terrorism? To what extent must the Congress be involved and what discretion does the Commander in Chief have to act on his own? Legal considerations aside, does the use of force as an instrument of counterterrorism policy pay off? Can the war against international terrorism be won through military means?

Topic 1: Case Studies  Topic 2: Counterterrorism Instruments  Topic 3: Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective

Countries/Regions: United States


This book examines war and violence in Sri Lanka from the perspective of just-war tradition and theory. The author argues that religious stories are used in contemporary Sri Lanka to justify ethical positions on war. Chapter One provides an introduction to the method and scope of the study, a review of the ideology of Sri Lankan Buddhism and its relationship with ethical theory, and the preliminary questions that frame the discussions in the remaining chapters. Chapter Two describes how some Sri Lankan Buddhists maintain that the Buddhist prima facie duty of non-violence can be over-ridden with good cause, drawing on the case of the King Dutugemunu (who went to war in order to protect the Buddhist dharma). Here, religious stories were used to justify the government's position on war. The concluding chapter re-examines the idea of just-war ideology in Sinhala Buddhism and concludes that Buddha's visits to Sri Lanka transformed the island into a sacred relic of Buddhism, which give support for the just cause of some forces engaged in the current
conflict. Overall, this study illuminates the thinking that allows for Sinhala Buddhists to justify war in certain situations.

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Countries/Regions: Sri Lanka


This chapter argues that religious leaders, actors, and entities can play a vital role in the peace process, particularly in the motivation of prominent actors, in the availability of resources through the religious networks, and in the overall vision and style of the peace process. The Community of Sant'Edigio were especially important to this process in resolving the Mozambique conflict. The religious contribution to the peace process made the political discourse more flexible and able to respond to the increased complexity of the process. The new social contract produced by the peace process was negotiated with the involvement of religious leaders, but the reconciliation and forgiveness that has kept the peace is owed to the flexibility of the political discourse and the creativity of the population as a whole.

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Countries/Regions: Mozambique


This chapter focuses on the fifteen-year civil war in Mozambique, which ended in October, 1992. The Community of Sant'Egidio, a Catholic NGO, took the lead in trying to mediate a resolution to the conflict. Lacking much power or authority, the mediating team focused on achieving substantive dialogue and fostering interpersonal relationships between the primary participants. Their efforts were ultimately augmented by the support of the United Nations, which successfully implemented the resulting peace accords. The lessons learned from this experience include: (1) involve all parties that have influence in a conflict; (2) establish a logical framework; (3) make sure that all parties articulate their positions to the mediators, without seeking immediate full disclosure; (4) involve the international community but do not assume it will bring a solution; (5) respect local cultures, identities and languages; (6) do not follow a preconceived set of rules and procedures; (7) emphasize negotiation as a political process that may serve the interests of the parties better than military confrontation; (8) strive for appropriateness; (9) be faithful to the process; and (10) create political institutions based on the agreement.

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Countries/Regions: Mozambique

Bearden recounts how Alexander the Great, the Mongols, the British, and Russia all met trouble in trying to conquer the land and people of Afghanistan. He lists four actions that he believes always leads to disaster: occupying with foreign troops, assisting an unpopular puppet to gain leadership, cruel actions by foreign-backed proxy forces, and lowering the amount of monetary aid pumped in to bribe and help the Afghans. He then counsels the U.S. against these actions in its hunt for bin Ladin.

**Countries/Regions:** Afghanistan

**Topic 1:** Historical Context  **Topic 2:** Case Studies  **Topic 3:** Counterterrorism Policies

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As a principal leader of the Irgun Zvai Leumi (a militant underground Zionist movement), Begin played a vital role in bringing to a reality the Provisional Hebrew Government declared in May, 1948. This book, originally written in Hebrew, is a memoir of his role in the history of Jewish extremist actions during the 1940s, first against the British Mandatory rule in Palestine, and subsequently against Arab military aggression in 1948-49. The book begins with Begin's reflections on his 1941 imprisonment as a dangerous element in society, and tells the story of his involvement in the "army of the underground," which eventually became an open military force recognized by the official institutions of an independent Israeli state. Begin's detailed account of the underground movement - their logic, tactics, failures and successes - provides a uniquely informative historical narrative of revolutionary terrorism.

**Countries/Regions:** Israel

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  **Topic 2:** Revolutionary Terrorism

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This book tells the history of the underground political Zionist movement, covering their leaders, objectives and activities. The author describes the lack of support for Zionists throughout Europe and elsewhere, suggesting that a long history of anti-Semitism - combined with the Holocaust and Arab attacks on Jews in the Middle East - influenced Zionist adherents to go underground and take up arms. He then describes the role of various Revisionist Zionist leaders, including Menachim Begin, Vladimir Jabotinsky, and Avraham Stern, founder of LEHI (a.k.a. The Stern Gang). The book also describes how the British tried, and often failed, to keep the peace and prevent repeated mob riots, murders, and other atrocities (on both sides) in the region under their mandate. When the UN attempted to intervene, the assassination (by LEHI) of the UN's mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte in 1949 brought an abrupt end to the international community's first attempt to resolve the conflict in this region.

**Countries/Regions:** Israel

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  **Topic 2:** Religious Ideology

This book was written by two former members of the National Security Council, concerned about what they viewed as a rising threat of al-Qaeda. They began writing the book more than a year before the attacks of 9/11, and intended the book to be "a descriptive warning about the new terrorism and an analysis of its causes, including the forms of religious belief that drive adherents to commit violence, and the circumstances that give rise to such creeds." After 9/11, the authors added to this discussion substantial material about what the U.S. government has done to combat terrorism in the last decade, in addition to their views about "how America let its defenses down, how warnings went unheeded, how key parts of the government failed at vital tasks." While the post-9/11 additional material is covered by other books more comprehensively and is thus not altogether useful here, the authors make several keen observations about the challenges ahead. For example, they observe that "our enemy has demonstrated a remarkable ability to turn assets - from Boeing jets to satellite phones to the open society itself - against us" and caution us not to underestimate "an enemy unlike any seen in living memory - one with an extraordinary ability to detect weakness and exploit it, one with a determination to inflict catastrophic damage, one that will not be deterred." (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: United States


This article deals with the threat of nuclear terrorism primarily from an Israeli viewpoint. There are some sections that could generally be applied to nuclear terrorism, especially with regard to the potential for nuclear weapons/materials acquisition by terrorist groups. Beres argues, "Should the terrorist group(s) seek to acquire an assembled weapon, it (they) could aim at any of the nuclear weapons already deployed in national arsenals around the world. Moreover, because the number of nuclear weapons states is likely to grow, such terrorists are destined to have a steadily enlarging arena of opportunity." Beres goes on to state, "Should they seek to manufacture their own nuclear weapons, anti-Israel terrorists would require both strategic special nuclear materials and the expertise to convert these materials into bombs or radiological weapons. Both requirements are now well within the range of pertinent terrorist capabilities." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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Countries/Regions: Israel

Bergen explores the lessons learned from the Manhattan trial of four men linked to Osama bin Laden, the result of the largest overseas investigation mounted by the U.S. government prior to 9/11. The trial generated thousands of pages of documents and the testimony of dozens of witnesses with some knowledge of bin Laden's group. What was learned from the trial is that bin Laden's organization experienced severe cash flow problems in the mid-1990s; that the U.S. government has had some real successes in finding informants within bin Laden's organization; that bin Laden has taken steps to acquire weapons of mass destruction; that the training of bin Laden's followers in his camps in Afghanistan is quite rigorous, featuring instruction on a wide range of weapons and explosives and terrorism techniques; and that bin Laden's group operates transnationally - its membership drawn from four continents. Finally, the trial underlines the strengths and limits of the law enforcement approach to bin Laden.

**Topic 1:** Case Studies  
**Topic 2:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 3:** National Terrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions: United States**


Bergen uses the first chapter of his book to explain his thesis that while many Islamic terrorists appear to be fighting all modernization, most are actually only opposed to the Western values system that spreads as globalization increases. These terrorists actually embrace the technological aspects of modernization. Indeed, modern terrorist networks depend on technology to survive. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** Religious Ideology  
**Topic 2:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 3:** Terrorism's New Model


Betts argues that in the post-Cold War world, the power of deterrence and arms control is steadily declining, raising a real possibility for a terrorist attack that uses WMD. Betts writes that there is little hope of using deterrence and arms control to prevent such attacks, and that active defense systems will do little to mitigate their effects. He argues that the U.S.’s focus must be on developing post-attack civil defense programs aimed at reducing the impact of such attacks through a quick, orderly, and effective response.

**Topic 1:** CBRN Counterterrorism Policy  
**Topic 2:** New Threats  
**Topic 3:** National Terrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions: United States**

Blank uses his extensive travel in Kashmir to provide a detailed explanation of the conflict in the region from all points of view. The thoughts of Hindus, Muslims, pro-Indian state, pro-Pakistani state, and separatists are all provided in this account. He shows how the people of Kashmir do not identify with the mujahedeen or the Indian military, but rather, that most hope for a peace where Kashmir is separate from both states, and all people are welcome.

**Topic 1:** Case Studies  
**Topic 2:** Religion and Conflict  
**Countries/Regions:** India, Pakistan, Kashmir


This chapter draws on a 1997 study to discuss the threat posed by the development and use of biological weapons, focused specifically on six broad classes of genetically engineered pathogens: 1) Binary biological weapons - a two-component system where neither of its major parts is toxic on its own, but when suitably combined they generate a lethal mixture. 2) Designer genes and life forms (synthetic genes, viruses and organisms) with immunity to all known antibiotics. 3) Gene therapy used to carry transforming viruses (e.g., "Trojan horse" genes). 4) Stealth viruses - infections that can reside for lengthy periods without causing detectable harm until triggered by some signal that then activates the lethal disease within. 5) Host-swapping diseases combine the parasitic nature of viruses with an ability (genetically-engineered or not) to mutate and successfully transfer from one species to another. And 6) designer diseases, drawing on naturally programmed cell death (apoptosis) to activate death pathways in all cells, resulting in mass suicide of otherwise healthy cells. In his concluding remarks, the author lists some of the many challenges faced in coping with the next generation of pathogens, including identification and classification, screening, vigilance, mitigation, remediation, and education.

**Topic 1:** CBRN Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** CBRN Counterterrorism Policy  
**Topic 3:** New Threats


This book explores the cultural aspects of violence in modern society, drawing on religious and philosophical traditions and on works of literature and art to explore the nature of violence. In Part One, the author takes up the most spectacular displays of entertainment violence in history - the gladiatorial games in ancient Rome - to examine the hold that violence can come to have on the emotions of an entire population and to ask what relevance their experience might have for our present debates. Part Two considers the findings of current research regarding the relationship between the media's focus on carnage and crime and our possible inoculation to real life violence. Part Three addresses the dilemma between unfettered violent programming and government control over what is spoken, written, and performed. Part Four examines ways for families, communities, and public policymakers to guard against the effects of entertainment violence without
resorting to official censorship. The aim of this last part of the book is to challenge the helplessness that so many now experience with respect to media and especially entertainment violence.

**Topic 1:**
**Terrorism and the Media**

**Countries/Regions: United States**

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The possibility of a terrorist attack using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons is an ongoing debate in the national security policy arena. While terrorist motivations have traditionally been political ones that would not benefit from such an attack, concern is now voiced over a possible trend of inflicting greater numbers of casualties. Terrorists most likely to attempt attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are extremist religious millenarian groups and small splinter terrorist cells. Nation-states appear unlikely candidates owing to fear of severe retaliation. Some terrorist groups may also fear that WMD use would undermine support for their cause. Terrorist ability to produce or obtain WMD may be growing due to looser controls of stockpiles and technology in the former Soviet Union and the dissemination of technology and information. However, WMD are significantly harder to produce or obtain than what is commonly depicted in the press and today they probably remain beyond the reach of most terrorist groups. The Central Intelligence Agency believes that it is likely that terrorists will continue to choose conventional explosives over WMD. Two groups that have warranted special attention, because they combined the motivation to use WMD with substantial resources, are the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo and Usama Bin Ladin’s organization, Al-Qaeda.

**Topic 1:**
**CBRN Terrorism**

**Countries/Regions: United States**

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This book focuses exclusively on the threat posed by Biological Weapons (BW), addressing it primarily from a terrorist-use, rather than state-warfare, perspective. By and large, this book does not discuss at length the likely perpetrators of BW attacks, nor broach the question of their motivations (except tangentially when discussion targeting) or characteristics. This book focuses primarily on utility of BW to strike at U.S. vulnerabilities and posits how this might be done. Bowman, the editor, begins by declaring that BW attacks, specifically terrorist ones, are a real threat; even the mere threat of an attack could cause significant disruption. He suggests that while many analysts believe that state-sponsorship of terrorist groups with BW is unlikely, a state committed to employing BW may very well use a supported terror group as one delivery mode. Like others, Bowman assesses that the spread of biotechnology bodes ill for the United States on the BW front, that it stands to worsen the threat of biological terrorism. Terry Mayer discusses the BW threat primarily from the perspective that inventive, relatively simplistic delivery means are within the grasp of lesser-developed potential adversaries of the United States. As he states, "the purpose of this article is to raise the awareness level about a very real and probable threat," which, in his mind, has not been adequately addressed. Mayer suggests that two likely BW agents to be used against the United States are botulism and anthrax. Furthermore, he posits the possibility of eventual genetic manipulation of BW agents. Included in his treatment of BW are hypothetical terrorist BW attack scenarios - of the smaller-scale variety. Finally, like
Bowman and Mayer, Bob Kadlec argues that the BW threat is real and that low-tech groups and countries pose a serious and increasing danger. In this view, agricultural sprayers could be "easily adapted" to efficiently disseminate BW agents. He views BW as having "utility across the spectrum of conflict" making its use, in whatever way, more likely than chemical or nuclear weapons. BW could be used to cause widespread and severe economic damage rather than human fatalities alone if, for instance, it were targeted at America's agricultural sector. He warns that little attention or effort have been devoted to this vulnerability, and articulates a number of hypothetical attack scenarios on U.S. agriculture with BW. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topic 1:**
**CBRN Terrorism**

**Countries/Regions:** United States

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The authors make two key points in this essay: (1) the application of rational expectations theory to policies of retaliation against terrorism suggests that only unexpected retaliations will be effective in causing terrorist attacks to deviate from their natural rate; and (2) there is a time inconsistency problem in responding to terrorism. Based on a model that assumes a "natural" rate or process of terrorist attacks (which can only be altered by unanticipated retaliations), the authors conclude that Israel may be better off if its retaliation against terrorism were to be constrained by some third party. The data also suggest that the impact of retaliation is temporary, and that routine retaliations are fully discounted by the terrorists and have little effect on the rate of terrorist activity.

**Topic 1:** Counterterrorism Instruments  
**Topic 2:** Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective

**Countries/Regions:** Israel

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In these two chapters, the author addresses the problem of behavior that cannot be effectively addressed by the global nation-state system. He argues that contemporary world society operates with a growing incongruity between the political/legal forms for securing the physical survival of national communities and a vulnerability of these communities to genocidal destruction at each other's hands. Overall, a variety of forces (including economic transnationalism, increasing interdependence, and the global mobility of people, information and ideas) are creating a context in which nation-states, subnational groups and transnational interests compete for the support and loyalty of individuals. Attempting to strengthen the sovereignty of national governments will thus be inadequate, and perhaps even counterproductive, to solving the deep and complex problems emerging in the modern world. The author concludes with a call for strengthening the role of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations for dispute resolution, collective security, peacekeeping, and ensuring the accountability of national governments.

**Topic 1:**  
**Topic 2:**
While Bunn and Steinhausler are not actor-specific, they argue in general that there is a real and increasing risk of terrorists targeting civilian nuclear plants in order to create a radiological disaster. Such an event, they say, is "frighteningly plausible." Although they do not discuss the characteristics of groups who would conduct such attacks, they do point to the cases of the September 11, 2001, attacks and note that "if terrorists were willing to kill thousands of innocent people" by attacking the World Trade Center and Pentagon, "they would probably not have hesitated to attack nuclear reactors in order to create clouds of radioactivity." Clearly, the authors believe that groups motivated by the desire to inflict mass casualties would be difficult to deter or dissuade from carrying out a radiological attack. Moreover, they assess, a group that manages to obtain a sufficient amount of fissile material would probably be capable of constructing a crude nuclear device. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


This article discusses the threat to nuclear facilities posed by terrorists and thieves, and the authors suggest that the threat of nuclear terrorism has moved from hypothetical to reality. The authors argue, "There can now be little doubt that if such terrorists could acquire weapons-usable nuclear material from thieves and learn how to make nuclear weapons, they would employ them in their attention-seeking tactics." Due to the spread of knowledge, the authors suggest that the one major obstacle to terrorist use of nuclear devices is the acquisition of nuclear materials. If such materials were acquired, it is well within the means of several countries and well-organized terrorist groups to construct a device. The remainder of the article focuses on existing U.S., Russian, and international programs for improving training of security personnel at nuclear facilities as a means of reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism/theft. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


Byford argues that the Bush rhetoric calling for a "war on terrorism" is too simplistic. He believes that there is no simple definition that can encompass all terrorist activities while still leaving out those activities that most people consider acceptable. He notes that, in its decision making, the U.S. evaluates interests first, ends second, and means third. He believes that the Bush administration's war-time rhetoric and explanation should reflect a more comprehensive analysis.
This chapter examines a variety of recent crises involving attempts to coerce nonstate adversaries, including efforts to coerce local warlords during humanitarian operations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, and Israel's coercion of Jordan to crackdown on radical Palestinian activity in 1970. Their analysis reveal several common characteristics of coercive operations against nonstate actors, such as: a lack of identifiable and targetable assets; inaccurate intelligence estimates; a lack of control over nonstate constituent elements; and an ability of nonstate actors to exploit countermeasures to coercion. Finally, they observe that indirect coercion of nonstate actors is often difficult, unreliable, and counter-productive. The authors conclude that despite an extremely favorable balance of conventional military power, the U.S. is likely to face huge obstacles in securing escalation dominance over or denying the strategic objectives of these adversaries. While coercion, and coercive air power more specifically, has proven effective against a number of nonstate adversaries, it often cannot overcome inherent problems of dislocated authority or a lack of targets to strike. Success in these cases will often require a convergence of factors, many of them far beyond the control of air planners.

In the first of these two selections of the book, the authors examine diasporas - immigrant communities established in other countries - whose members have sent money, arms, and recruits to support insurgencies in their homeland. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of how the LTTE has harnessed its overseas migrant community, using it for funding, arms running, and a host of other activities. Drawing on the LTTE's experience, the authors then describe reasons why immigrant communities often support insurgencies in their native lands, and examine the difficulties that many host governments have in halting this form of assistance. In the second selection (an appendix), the authors describe the LTTE's secretive global network for procuring arms and munitions.

This article discusses the potential threat of agricultural terrorism to the United States, looking at briefly at how the threat has been perceived in the United States and at the programs initiated to deal with this threat. The authors then examine the definitions of agricultural bioterrorism, the difficulty of distinguishing between deliberate and natural outbreaks, and the diversity of the U.S. agricultural sector. The article also examines a small database of chemical and biological incidents directed at agricultural targets by sub-national groups and individuals, providing some insight on the agents selected as well as delivery systems chosen. Although the authors conclude that agricultural pathogens may be acquired more easily than human pathogens, the historical record indicates that attacks against agriculture have been limited and of low sophistication. In their view, this would seem to indicate that either the technical obstacles to agroterrorism are significant or "that there is little indication that sub-national groups are interested in this type of attack." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Topic 1: CBRN Terrorism


This article provides a chronology of 1999 WMD terrorist/hoax incidents preceded by a short method description and summary. Its primary usefulness is in providing a glimpse into the wide array of possible BW terrorist options. The article reviews 175 incidents, including actual uses of agents, attempted acquisition, possession, hoaxes or pranks, or "plot only." Almost one hundred of the incidents reviewed were hoaxes, pranks or threats, while only 39 involved the actual use of an agent. Of the incidents covered in the review, the vast majority involved biological and chemical weapons (95 and 82 incidents, respectively), while only 10 involved nuclear or radiological materials. The predominant biological agent of choice was anthrax, which featured in 83 cases (many of which were hoaxes), while the most common chemical agent was tear gas. In the nuclear area, there were two threats against nuclear facilities and one incident involving radiological materials. The authors/compilers conclude that the primary scene of BW attacks happens to be the United States, though their results may be skewed due to better reporting of events in the U.S. press. On the subject of motivations in the incidents reviewed, the authors divided the incidents into two categories: politically/ideologically- and criminally-motivated. The division between the two categories was roughly equal. Based on this division of motivations, the authors conclude that "both criminally and ideologically motivated actors appeared equally interested in WMD materials." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Cameron compares the strategies that Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaeda pursued in their attempts to acquire CBRN weapons. Chief differences between the two groups that influenced their CBRN acquisition strategies were in their respective motivations and organizations. Whereas al-Qaeda was (and is) motivated by a series of finite political objectives pursued for religious reasons (e.g., removal of Western troops from the Middle East, etc.), Aum was more motivated by the cult's apocalyptic and millenarian leanings, as well as criminal and vengeance-related (e.g., against former cult members) reasons. Organizationally, the two groups were also very different, with Aum being a highly centralized and hierarchical group that in some ways mirrored the organization of the Japanese government and al-Qaeda being a "decentralized, diffuse, and flexible" as well as multinational and pan-Islamic organization. The chief similarity between the two groups was in the financial assets available to each group. Aum reportedly possessed assets totaling an estimated $1 billion while al-Qaeda had access to Osama bin Laden's personal fortune of an estimated $100-400 million. These substantial assets allowed these groups a great deal of independent action on a global scale, unlike most terrorist groups, and had a direct influence on their CBRN acquisition strategies. With the monetary assets available to them, Cameron argues that both Aum and al-Qaeda decided to manufacture their own chemical and/or biological weapons, rather than attempting to acquire them from a secondary source. Cameron then outlines the strategies both groups followed in their attempts to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In all three areas, both groups followed multinational, multi-track strategies, simultaneously seeking to acquire nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or materials by purchasing them from secondary sources (mainly the former Soviet Union) and by setting up their own manufacturing processes. Cameron suggests that this was because both groups were intent on acquiring a weapon of mass destruction, regardless of whether it was nuclear, chemical, or biological. Both groups encountered significant difficulties in their attempts, although some of Aum's efforts in the chemical area were somewhat successful. Cameron concludes that it may be possible that future terrorists groups may pursue the same paths that Aum and al-Qaeda took by setting up their own manufacturing processes. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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Cameron examines the threat of WMD terrorism with the viewpoint that the threat of terrorist use of such weapons "has been overstated and misrepresented." The threat cannot be dismissed entirely, he argues, but the more immediate threat to the United States stems from conventional terrorism. Cameron discusses the shifts in recent terrorism, including the rise of religious motivations and the desire for mass casualties, pointing that these trends are making terrorism less predictable. He argues that the United States is more likely to experience chemical, biological or radiological terror attacks, and that nuclear attacks are unlikely due to technical and material acquisition difficulties. In his view, this does not necessarily mean that such attacks will be mass casualty events, as there are technical difficulties with weaponization and dissemination that would reduce the likelihood of such attacks. His central point with regard to the threat of WMD terrorism is that it is "not presently obvious or immediate." Moreover, the likelihood of mass-destructive terrorism using non-conventional weapons seems less plausible presently than the likelihood of another conventional attack of the variety seen at the World Trade Center or the Murrah Federal building. He argues that countermeasures need to be geared toward more realistic threats. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)
Although titled Nuclear Terrorism, Cameron's book takes a relatively broad look at the psychological, organizational, and operational factors that influence terrorist groups. Generally, he relates these factors to "mass-destructive" terrorism, but most of his examples of terrorist groups and their behavior are of those that traditionally have perpetrated "conventional" terrorist acts. Cameron concludes that of the potential manifestations of "nuclear" terrorism, the use of radiological devices is much more likely to occur than actual nuclear detonation. He suggests that groups might use radiological devices to tap into the "nuclear phobia" of people without necessarily causing mass casualties, in order to gain greater attention for their cause. The increasing availability of fissile material due to problems in the former Soviet Union affects the likelihood of this occurring. Yet while the increased availability of material is a key factor, the author argues that motivations are the primary determinant as to whether or not a terrorist group would choose to use a radiological or nuclear device. Cameron does not view "cost" as an overriding factor for many terrorist groups that would seek nuclear weapons, and observes that the concept of "martyrdom" should not be disregarded when considering the prospect for nuclear terrorism. The prospect of state-sponsorship and a tendency toward group conservatism are also important considerations. Terrorist groups, says the author, are generally conservative in their choice of weaponry, preferring tried-and-true methods over untested ones, although innovation does occur. States, furthermore, are unlikely to provide groups that are not completely under their control with nuclear weapons because of the possibility of responsibility being traced back to them and because they themselves might become vulnerable to blackmail. Of all terrorist groups, Cameron argues, religiously motivated ones are the most likely to resort to mass-destructive terrorism. For such groups, "violence is perceived to be part of an all-encompassing struggle between good and evil." What is more, they lack the moderating influence of an external "audience" or "constituency." The author states that there is a trend toward greater destructiveness in terror attacks, a trend that would be dangerous even without the increased likelihood of nuclear terrorism. Cameron also notes that chemical or biological weapons terrorism is more likely than a "nuclear-yield" terror attack. The book concludes by stating: "Mass-destructive terrorism is now the greatest non-traditional threat to international security." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Carter states that the challenge of catastrophic terrorism is destined to be a centerpiece of the field of international security studies. However, while the varieties of extremism that can spawn catastrophic terrorism seem limitless, they have not been studied as thoroughly by social scientists as have the dynamics of great power rivalry. Carter calls for new studies of the motivations and root causes of catastrophic terrorism as well as the potential of catastrophic terrorism to transform traditional international relations. He also suggests the need to reengineer the architecture of governance-security institutions and their modes of operation-when warscale damage results from terrorism. What is required is a multiyear, multiagency program of invention and investment devised in the White House, embedded in the president's budget submissions and defended by him to Congress, and supported by appropriate law and regulation. This program should cover all phases in the war against catastrophic terrorism-detection, prevention, protection, interdiction, containment, attribution, analysis and invention.

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<td>Counterterrorism Questions in Society</td>
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Countries/Regions: United States


In this article, the authors propose that while the U.S. has become reasonably adept at dealing with normal terrorist incidents, it is not at all prepared for what they call "catastrophic terrorism," better known as WMD terrorism. They acknowledge that the task appears insurmountable, yet emphasize that the U.S. has overcome similar periods of challenge in the past. In order to meet the threat, they recommend reorganization along four lines: intelligence and warning, prevention and deterrence, crisis and consequence management, and coordinated acquisition of equipment and technology. The authors propose new institutions that should be developed within each of these four areas that they believe would meet the stated needs. (Written in late 1998, some of their suggestions have come to pass after September 11, 2001.)

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Countries/Regions: United States


Carus provides a brief overview of historical bioterrorism and concludes that a low number of attempted incidents combined with ineffective dispersion techniques made the threat of bioterrorism small in the past. However, Carus notes that an increasing terrorist desire for mass casualties, growing technological sophistication of terrorist groups, and the emergence of terrorist groups with resources comparable to those of some countries combine to increase the current threat of bioterrorism. Carus recommends improved
surveillance equipment, intelligence assets, and preparation for governmental response to a terrorist attack to mitigate this threat.

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Carus briefly examines the issue of biological warfare, attempting to separate the credible facts of the issue from the hype with which the subject is often portrayed, especially in the popular media. He briefly outlines countries suspected of pursuing offensive BW programs, based on public reports from government agencies, and discusses technical assessments of those BW programs. Carus outlines three trends in BW proliferation: no evidence of growth in the number of countries pursuing BW programs, some success in constraining the pace of proliferation, and the disturbing trend of some BW proliferators seeking to enhance their BW capabilities. He argues that the threat of bioterrorism is difficult to assess, "simply because there has been so little of it." He mentions that some 40 groups have shown interest in BW, but "it appears that any involvement with biological agents was neither serious nor sustained." He acknowledges that the threat of BW use by non-state actors is legitimate but "there is no evidence to suggest that the threat is imminent or that any group has acquired and mastered the complex technology of biological warfare." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


Casagrande discusses the threat of agricultural terrorism, the threat of which he argues is greatly underestimated by government officials, in spite of the potentially huge economic impact of a successful attack. He addresses four areas of the issue, the acquisition of pathogens, the employment of pathogens, groups that may be motivated to resort to agroterrorism, and measures that can be taken to prevent and mitigate such attacks. He argues that obtaining plant and animal pathogens is a relatively easy task, with isolating pathogens from the environment and obtaining pathogens from state sponsors being the most likely sources. These avenues for acquisition require less specialized equipment and expertise, unlike human pathogens. As for employment, Casagrande suggests that this issue is not as difficult as it can be with human pathogens: "terrorists can chose among several plant or animal pathogens that need to come in contact with only the surface of the target host to cause infection." Also, he points out that for many diseases, once the initial infection has been established they can be spread effectively through the wind. He does acknowledge that terrorists would need different procedures for targeting livestock (which has an industry-wide trend of consolidating animals on fewer numbers of larger farms) and crops (which are spread out over thousands of acres). As motivating factors, he cites the potential for large economic impact and the relatively less severe consequences for agroterrorism attacks (which do not necessarily cause any loss of human life). Casagrande suggests that four types of terrorists would consider resorting to agroterrorism, those with political, religious, or criminal goals, and those fanatically devoted to a single issue. In certain cases, the goals of those groups might be satisfied or furthered through the use of agroterrorism compared to other methods. He concludes by offering suggestion to prevent or mitigate the agroterrorism threat at several levels, including acquisition prevention, increased surveillance, and stiffer legal consequences. (Abstract from Center for

This book analyzes various components of the American response to international terrorism during the late 1970s though the 1980s, addressing the role of bureaucratic agencies, the military, the intelligence community, and international law. Celmer argues that the Reagan administration's approach had no positive impact on the deterrence, prevention, and suppression of international terrorism, nor did it create a greater degree of safety for Americans traveling and living abroad. He supports the view of others that "the means used by the United States in combating terrorism should always be proportional to the desired ends and must be based on accepted norms of conduct," and argues for a "regional and issue-oriented approach" for U.S. foreign policy. Also, U.S. decision-makers must recognize that terrorists have a different perception of rationality, life, and use of violence as a form of political expression and behavior. He concludes that "the unfortunate reality of international terrorism is that there are no solutions. The best that can be achieved is damage control and the formulation of an antiterrorist policy and program that demonstrates an awareness of the complex nature international terrorism and the sobering realities associated with it."


This 46 page document provides a thematic analysis of the literature on CBRN terrorism. According to the authors, most sources fall into one of three broad categories: "a call to arms;" discussions of terrorist motivations; and discussions of CBRN threats. They note an abundance of literature focusing on the biological warfare threat, with less recently on the nuclear, radiological or chemical threats posed by terrorist groups. Their review of the literature also notes a general assumption among many experts that terrorist groups are generally conservative in their approach to new weaponry. The problem of post-Soviet security is also a widespread theme in the BW and nuclear discussions, and the case of Aum Shinrikyo appears to be a key component of today's debates on the prospects for CBRN terrorism.

This article analyzes the scope and dimension of the transnational infrastructure supporting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), one of the most proficient and dangerous guerrilla/terrorist groups in the world. The author describes the LTTE international network, the main personalities and front organizations behind it, and the various ways in which it facilitates the LTTE guerilla and terrorist campaign in northeastern Sri Lanka. His analysis suggests a continuation, and possibly growth, of the global financial, propaganda and arms procurement support network upon which the LTTE depend for their military activities. By permitting the LTTE to open offices and establish representation, Western countries have unwittingly blessed the group's political and military agenda. Moreover, the generally unrestrained liberal democratic freedom that the LTTE has been allowed to enjoy in these states has enabled the group to slowly build and develop a complex, multi-layered and truly integrated global support structure which has become increasingly difficult to detect and root out. As long as the group is permitted to conduct propaganda, raise funds, procure weapons and ship supplies to Sri Lanka, its guerrilla and terrorist campaign will continue. This will generate more violence and contribute to an already serious refugee problem, both of which carry significant implications for stability in what is already a highly volatile part of the world.

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Countries/Regions: Sri Lanka


Chalk argues that when dealing with terrorism as a threat to liberal democracy, it is a common assumption that it is the terrorists who pose the greatest threat to the underlying principles and freedoms that are enshrined in this form of political life. However, in instances where the state fails to ensure that its response to terrorism is limited, well-defined and controlled, it is likely that institutionalized counter-terrorist policies will pose an even greater threat to the political and civil traditions that are central to the liberal democratic way of life. This article demonstrates the potential danger by examining three cases when counterterrorist policies initiated by liberal democratic entities came dangerously close to transplanting subversive terror from "below" with institutionalized, bureaucratized terror from "above": the "strategy of tension" initiated in Italy between 1969 and 1974; the Spanish "dirty war" against ETA between 1983 and 1987; and the abandonment of democratic rule in Peru between 1992 and 1996. The author concludes that ultimately the effectiveness of the liberal democratic state's response to terrorism depends on its acceptability. It is therefore paramount that any solution which is initiated is made with due regard to the long term impact that it will have on the wider process of liberal democratic life.

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Countries/Regions: Italy, Spain, Peru

This book provides historical context behind an important region of conflict related to the global fight against terrorism. The author covers issue of religion, history and political geography (particularly regarding the inter-relationships of space and power) for the area that is now comprised of three sovereign states: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Much of the latter discussion in the book (on state policies, identities, etc.) is essential for developing a more completed understanding of Kashmir.

**Topic 1:**
Historical Context

**Countries/Regions:** South Asia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh


This chapter tells the story of Iran's state-sponsored terrorism against French targets throughout the mid-1980s, including the March, 1985 kidnapping of French diplomats in Beirut by Islamic Jihad (an Iranian-backed terrorist group) and a series of deadly bombings in Paris. The French government responded first by engaging Tehran in a lengthy series of negotiations, and then shifted from dialogue to force in 1987, breaking diplomatic ties with Iran and moving an aircraft carrier and escort ships into the Persian gulf "to protect French interests." But it was a series of secret talks between the French government and Tehran in April 1988 that eventually secured the release of the hostages.

**Topic 1:**
Case Studies

**Topic 2:**
Counterterrorism Instruments

**Topic 3:**
State Terrorism

**Countries/Regions:** France, Iran


Chomsky begins this essay by explaining that a study of terrorism can be undertaken in a serious manner that attempts to look at the phenomena completely or in a manner that attempts to turn the study into propaganda to support a certain view. The rest of his chapter seems to follow the later type of study, despite all claims to the opposite. His approach is unique in that it highlights ways in which western states (particularly the U.S.) have participated in state-sponsored terrorism, but it seems that the serious approach would pursue a balanced study that recognizes terrorist actions in both western states and in those which he adamantly defends. He seems content to blame the U.S. for underwriting all terrorism through its proxy forces (including Israel and Lebanon), and mentions the complicity of the U.S. press for doing its part to assure that people never learn the 'truth'.

**Topic 1:**
Defining Terrorism

**Topic 2:**
State Terrorism

**Topic 3:**
Terrorism and the Media

**Countries/Regions:** United States

In this short paper, Chyba observes that because knowledge about biological weapons is much more widespread than that of nuclear weapons, a similar program of deterrence and compliance verification will not work to alleviate the biological weapons threat. Chyba advocates adding measures such as increased disease surveillance and stockpiles of vaccines and antibiotics; measures that he feels will protect public health from both biological weapons and naturally occurring infectious disease.

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This article focuses mainly on the public health response to the threat of bioterrorism, a "high-consequences but low-probability event" that must be viewed as serious, but without the attendant hype. Chyba argues that BW terror attacks could take many forms: "An attack could be overt and announced; it could be covert and insidious; or it could be used to cause economic damage and social panic by following covert releases with credible announcements and threats." He notes that it may be difficult to tell the difference between natural and man-made outbreaks, and notes the low inspection rates for imported food, suggesting that this could be a vulnerable and likely mode of transmission for bioterrorism. He also underscores that important differences exist between BW and CW, differences that must be understood by responders, and suggests that responses to bioterrorism will differ greatly from responses to nuclear and chemical terrorism, probably much more closely resembling responses to "emerging infectious diseases." Chyba suggests that too much "hype" has been injected into the debate on bioterrorism, resulting, perhaps, in misperceptions and an increase in the problem of BW hoaxes. The article does not discuss the variety of groups that might seek BW, their motivations, specific tactics and goals, or the agents that they might seek to employ. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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In this article, the authors offer ten issues that require thoughtful consideration before committing the U.S. to new policies on information warfare, cyber crime, and cyber terrorism. They call for better definitions of cyberspace conflict and the criteria for U.S. rules of engagement for cyberspace, in order to clarify what constitutes an act of war, how to differentiate between a terrorist attack and a financial crime committed with a computer, and how to ensure an adequate balance between protecting civil liberties, businesses, and national security. The authors also focus on the role of non-state actors, local governments and emergency responders, online public protests and other types of disruption, the media, and minimizing risks through government-industry cooperation (particularly regarding commercial systems under civilian control that are
used by military communications). Finally, they call for new laws and legal frameworks to ensure that achieving our national security goals does not have an adverse affect on citizens' privacy.

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<td>Cyberterrorism</td>
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| Countries/Regions: United States |

(67.) Cilluffo, Frank J. and Curt H. Gergely. "Information Warfare and Strategic Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 84-95.

This article examines the changing nature of terrorism, the attributes of information warfare (IW), and the potential impact and consequences of an IW attack. The authors also explores the vulnerability of the U.S. to an IW attack, and describes the risks of such attacks. They argue that the current ability of the U.S. to deter and mitigate IW attacks is fragmented at best. From their analysis, the authors offer five recommendations: 1) development of a national information assurance strategy; 2) reallocation of intelligence assets to develop an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the IW threat; 3) development of crisis and consequence management procedures for an IW attack; 4) development of retaliatory options that respond to the threat posed by information attackers; and 5) drastic improvement of the nation's indications and warning capabilities for IW attacks.

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| Countries/Regions: United States |


The author examines the concept of "superterrorism" advanced in recent years by many observers and experts, taking issue with many of its underlying tenets. Proponents of superterrorism hold that terrorism today is fundamentally different from that of past decades. These "new terrorists" are "prepared to break new ground, to ruthlessly innovate in the name of their cause. . . . These new players are generally assumed to be religiously motivated, with no regard for human life, and less of a perception of the traditional linkages between victim, target and audience than 'traditional' terrorist groups." In the "superterrorist" view, the new terrorist are likely to escalate to the use of CBRN in their attacks, as suggested by the Aum Shinrikyo's experience and the efforts by other terrorist groups or individuals to acquire CBRN weapons or materials. Claridge argues that much of the supposed threat of superterrorism is in fact exaggeration and a misinterpretation of facts and events in the evolution of terrorism. As for the subject of CBRN terrorism, he similarly takes issue with the current presentation of the threat, referring to it as "scaremongering." He argues that for most terrorist groups - including Islamic fundamentalists - there is no attraction to CBRN, and that it is not necessarily inevitable that terrorists will graduate to CBRN use. He also proposes that "it is a mistake to assume that simply because there may be better access to materials or knowledge of the means to construct a weapons of mass destruction, that terrorists groups will be naturally attracted to doing so." In the end, while Claridge does not completely rule out the threat of CBRN terrorism, he intimates that any potential threat will come from a specific subset of terrorist organizations: "cults and millenarian groups." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Cole argues that public figures, including government officials and media sources, are giving too much attention to the possibility of a bioterrorist attack and its outcome. Cole argues that this exaggerated publicity has resulted in numerous hoaxes that have caused unnecessary mental and physical trauma to those effected.

**Topic 1:** Terrorism and the Media

**Topic 2:** CBRN Counterterrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions:** United States


In this book, the author - a former member of the IRA - offers his reflections on the causes, and nature, of political violence within Northern Ireland. He tells an insider's account of "the grim business of political murder," providing a number of details about the inner-workings of political terrorist acts. Collins acknowledges that he is deeply hostile now to the IRA and looks forward to its demise. He concludes that the IRA are not the liberators of the Irish people, and that violence was not the best and most effective way of combating the discrimination of Catholics. Instead, ironically, they helped sustain the discrimination by helping to entrench the most reactionary unionists behind the security fence. Also, he believes that the violence has isolated Northern Catholics from Northern Protestants, while also deepening the gulf between Northern and Southern Irish Catholics.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict

**Countries/Regions:** Northern Ireland


In the first chapter of her book, Combs develops a definition for terrorism that is sufficiently narrow so as not to include every revolutionary yet still open enough to cover a large number of possible acts. She lends appropriate discussion to the difficulties in determining where the lines should be drawn within this definition. Inherent in her definition is that terrorism is an act, rather than a person or a goal. Her discussion ends in defining terrorism as "an act of violence that has a political motive or goal and is perpetrated against innocent persons... to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result."

**Topic 1:** Defining Terrorism

Combs describes some of the special military units that nations have developed to fight terrorism, such as the Israeli Sarayat Matkal, British SAS, German GSG9, and U.S. Delta force (later editions of Combs' work also gives more description to the myriad of U.S. special operations communities). She explores the pre-1970's barriers to the development of units of this kind, and shows how the terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympic games helped provide the push towards their development. She also describes how states grapple with finding a delicate balance between providing enough commitment and resources to ensure the operational capability of these groups, while also imposing sufficient constraints to prevent an overuse of their skills.

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Combs explores many aspects of the psychology of a terrorist in this chapter. Although she acknowledges that a 'typical' terrorist may not exist, she uses data on significant demographic trends and on the psyche of terrorists today. Among other facts, she notes the downward trend in relation to education level of terrorists and links this to the increasingly muddled political and religious justifications for terrorist actions. She also notes one researcher's description of terrorists as "criminals, crusaders, or crazies" and explores the validity of this classification.

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In the concluding chapter of her book, Combs discusses several developing trends in terrorism. She observes that terrorist incidents have become less prevalent than in the past, but also that the number of casualties from terrorist events has increased substantially; attacks are happening less frequently but are much more lethal. Her analysis highlights an increase in attacks on non-governmental actors and places, while suggesting that business people are those most likely to be a casualty and places of business are among the most likely to be hit. She also notes that bombs are the preferred method of terrorists, and that terrorists now have fewer barriers to planning attacks that make use of WMD.

Combs illustrates the ideology of terrorism and how terrorists rationalize their chosen methods. She details how, historically, both the anarchist right (the right for revolution against the ruling government) combined with the right of self-determination have provided all the rationalization that any terrorist needed. However, she notes that current terrorists do not seem to rely on these rights, but rather on a system of dehumanizing their victims, creating a monolithic enemy, and using their actions for a greater religious or 'humanitarian' purpose. She also describes several motives for terrorism, spanning from left to right-wing extremist beliefs, with a dose of nationalism and issue orientation thrown in the mix.

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In this chapter, Combs looks at legal perspectives on terrorism in a primarily international light. She examines several theories, such as Just War Theory and its encompassed ideas of proportionality and protection of civilians as a way to show that terrorism would seem to violate laws of both war and peace. She details a few specific areas of terrorism, such as skyjacking and assassination that seem to engender enough international outcry to have assisted in the development of international law prohibiting such acts, but also explains how some methods can be used to circumvent such prohibitions. Her final analysis is somewhat depressing, as she suggests that the international community is unlikely to ever adopt laws against terrorist activities or to develop an appropriate method for enforcing laws if they were enacted.

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Combs' second chapter offers a brief historical overview of terrorism. She examines how terrorism has developed and changed over history, and how it develops a cycle of violence in which those who were previous victims of terrorism use that fact as a legitimization for acts of terrorism that they then perpetrate. Towards the end of her chapter she describes how terrorism has changed in the past century, suggesting that it is not a static phenomenon and may change more in response to the changing global environment.

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Combs states that terrorism has been an instrument wielded by the state more than it has been used by individuals and other groups. She explains how internal terrorism on the part of a state often begets a cycle of violence that leads to terrorist actions on the part of rebellious internal groups. She also explains how states can use terrorism as an aspect of foreign policy, and then details the recent history of four countries who have been known to employ such methods.

**Combs, Cindy C. "Terrorism by the State," in Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. (Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 66-86.**

In this chapter, Combs reviews the important dimensions of the relationship between terrorism, the media, law and public policy. Terrorists clearly look to the media as a tool for achieving their goal of having a dramatic psychological impact on their target audiences. However, a free press being a cornerstone of democracy, there is no legal or meaningful way to prevent or restrict the benefits terrorists derive from media coverage. In order to understand the complexity of these issues, the author first clarifies the goals of terrorists, the government, and the media. In covering important issues of censorship and complicity, the author notes that portrayals of the media as either friend or ally of terrorists seem harsh, yet restrictions on the press play directly into the hands of terrorists by undermining democracy. The author concludes that the media should work closely with the government when it concerns terrorism.


This reference volume provides an extensive collection of historical event summaries, including the events surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks on America. Entries include personalities, organizations, nations, techniques, weapons, and ideologies of terrorism. Examples of entries include Anthrax, as a biological weapon; Begin, Menachem; bin Laden, Osama bin Mohammed; Black Hand; Christian patriotism; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Iran; Ku Klux Klan; neo-Nazis; al-Qaeda; Rushdie, Salman; Stockholm syndrome; and Zionism. Included in this volume are an appendix with charts and graphs, a 33-page chronology called "Major Acts of Terrorism, 1946-2000," and a 27-page chronology called "U.S and International Reaction to September 11, 2001." Entries contain cross-references, and many have a short list of suggested readings.


The author provides a narrow working definition of cyberterrorism: premeditated, politically motivated attacks by subnational groups or clandestine agents against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data that result in violence against noncombatant targets. By this definition, many crimes - stealing credit card information, defacing web pages, etc. - do not constitute instances of cyberterrorism, contrary to what local government authorities and the press have stated. Whereas such crimes are real and widespread, cyberterrorism exists only in theory. Terrorist groups at this stage have used the Internet only for propaganda, communications, and fundraising. The media's consistent inflation of the concept of cyberterrorism is ultimately not in the public interest.

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As the title suggests, this part of the "Defending America" series covers the BW threat both in the context of adversary use by a state as well as a sub-national terrorist organization. Much of the book is devoted to charts and statistics detailing the specific characteristics of biological agents - infective doses, communicability, lethality, persistency, and other such attributes. In addition, the author briefly notes two specific state BW programs, Russia's and Iraq's. Cordesman does not delve deeply into the issues of motivations for terrorist use of BW, nor does he explore group dynamics and characteristics. He does suggest, however, that Aum Shinrikyo may not represent "anything other than a fluke," arguing: "Few religious extremist movements turn to radical terrorism of the kind that involves the potential use of weapons of mass destruction." However, Cordesman notes that the variety of biological attack methods is nearly inexhaustible. So many high-value targets are at risk and so many vulnerabilities exist that biodefense will remain problematic for the foreseeable future. Humans, obviously, are highly susceptible, but also at risk is U.S. agriculture. Cordesman notes that agro-terrorism involving BW has been overlooked until recently and is nearly unprotected against a serious attack. Such attacks could come in any number of forms, from contamination of food and water, to bombs and missiles, to aerosol clouds from sprayers, ground or aerial. To matters worse, attacks "could involve a mix of different biological weapons" that could confuse and disrupt identification of and response to an attack. There are "no rules preventing multiple attacks and/or the use of multiple biological weapons at the same time." The author does agree that the technical barriers to non-state acquisition and use of BW are steadily decreasing as biotechnology and scientific expertise proliferates worldwide. "While the technical skills involved in making such agents are high, biological weapons can be relatively easy to manufacture if such skills are present, and such skills and the required equipment are becoming increasingly common." However, he is dismissive of arguments made elsewhere that a basic introduction to biology and chemistry in college would be sufficient for a group to engage in bioterrorism. On this issue of large- versus small-scale attacks, Cordesman suggests that all levels are possible and that past experience offers little in terms of predicting the future. Furthermore, he argues that "the frequency of given types of attacks is not a meaningful criterion" for risk assessments. Though most incidents to date have been low-level attacks or hoaxes, "some attacks," including those causing large casualties, "will almost certainly eventually succeed." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

| Topic 1: | CBRN Terrorism |


As with the other works in the "Defending America" series, Cordesman does not address the underlying motivations or characteristics of terrorist groups and instead focuses on the nature of the weapons - in this case, CW - and their unique attributes and effects. He sees that main threat from CW, unlike biological and nuclear weapons, in terms of low-level attacks that probably will not generate mass casualties. Chemical weapons, while a clear threat, will not necessarily kill more people than bombings. Cordesman argues, "it is easy to exaggerate the lethality of most chemical weapons," and that it is "an illusion that the effects of chemical weapons are always radically worse or more repellant than the damage done with conventional weapons." He is skeptical both of the effectiveness of CW agents in open environments and the available open-source literature on the subject. That being said, Cordesman recognizes that use of CW against the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests is an existing, and growing threat. In terms of tactics, CW poses the most likely risk of being used in a number of small-scale attacks, perpetrated either with weaponized agents or industrial chemicals, or by causing chemical accidents through sabotage. Such attacks could be conducted either simultaneously or sequentially as part of an extended terror campaign that is directed as much at causing panic as at killing. Contamination of a building via its ventilation system and industrial sabotage are seen as viable avenues of chemical attack. Cordesman notes the high casualties caused by the 1984 Bhopal accident in India as evidence of the gruesome potential of CW at a larger scale. Also mentioned is the case of Aum Shinrikyo. Cordesman notes that in Aum's case, the selection of sarin gas for its attack on the Tokyo subway may have been motivated not because of sarin's "superiority" over a different agent, but rather because "it was relatively easy to manufacture." He argues that Aum's failure to effectively deploy its sarin was due more to "Aum's peculiar internal structure and lack of effective organization than the technical problems in manufacturing chemical weapons per se." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

...
possible. With actual nuclear devices, Cordesman notes: "factors seem to limit the probability of a nuclear attack on the U.S. However, effective Homeland defense must deal with the risk of such attacks over at least a 25-year period, and the process of proliferation described earlier does not create high confidence that the U.S. can count on future restraint." One probable method of attack would be the detonation of a device aboard a ship arriving into an American port. As for the factors limiting the risk of a nuclear attack at present, Cordesman cites the probable reluctance of a state to supply a terrorist organization with such a weapon and the difficulty in acquiring or manufacturing fissile material. However, he acknowledges that worldwide proliferation continues to be dynamic and poses greater and greater risks. Furthermore, the possible use of nuclear or particularly lethal biological weapons by other states could reduce the taboo against their use in the minds of terrorists or terror sponsors. "No one looking at the history of the 20th Century," he argues, "has any reason to assume that sudden catastrophic events will not occur in the 21st Century. At the same time, no one can assume that because such events can occur, they will occur. There simply is no clear nexus of probabilities to act upon." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


Drawing on lessons from three countries - Israel, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom - that have enacted social and economic development policies to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism within their jurisdictions, the authors offer six policy suggestions: (1) social and economic development policies can weaken local support for terrorist activities; (2) real policy achievements in these areas can discourage terrorist recruits; (3) inadequately funded development policies are likely to inflate expectations and renew support for terrorism; (4) the ability of these policies to inhibit terrorism depends on their implementation; (5) social and economic development policies can be used as a "stick" to discourage terrorism; and (6) these policies do not eliminate terrorism. These conclusions have particular relevance to the prosecution of the global war on terrorism.


This monograph analyzes the impact of the war on terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army, he highlights the requirements associated with combat operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation and the new emphasis on homeland security and force protection. At the same time, he points out that the Army and the other Services must remain involved worldwide in day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities; execution of peace operations and other smaller-scale contingencies; and remaining ready for other major combat operations. Crane asserts that these obligations require the Army to reshape and expand its force structure. Failure to do so places critical missions at risk around the world, and could lead to replacement of operational 'victory' in the war on terrorism with strategic failure as regional instability increases.

Crelinsten's main objective is to assess terrorism and counter-terrorism in an increasingly multi-polar world, comparing past and present incidents to evaluate the underlying trend line. With regard to CBRN terrorism, he draws on a 1980 article by political psychologist Jeanne Knutson that discussed the "implicit rules of the game" that constrained the actions of terrorists. In particular, he references Knutson's "third dilemma," which posited that "there is a maximal and a minimal degree of terror which may be employed." That is to say, too low of a threat level will result in the terrorist group not being taken seriously, while the opposite will result in the terrorist group losing all room to maneuver and inevitably pressing the government into a forceful response. Using Knutson's findings as a basis, Crelinsten posits that it is highly unlikely that a "terrorist group with a specific goal and a desire to impose specific demands would actually resort to such mass-destructive tactics at all." Again referencing Knutson, he cites two exceptions to the rule that terrorists tend not to use mass destruction as a tactic. First is "the psychotic whose capacity to 'plan, devise action, and further goals' is greatly diminished," and the second is "the irrationality built of the fanatical means-end component of the 'soldier' psychology - a psychology which pressures for victory with an accompanying avoidance of the psychological impact of general acts of destruction." However, Crelinsten asserts that the growth of a multi-centric world has made the conditions necessary to produce these states - intense training and conditioning as well as societal isolation - much harder to maintain and potentially more noticeable to law enforcement and security agencies (thus providing early warning of potential threats). He then turns to a discussion of the frequent assertion that it is "irrational," religiously motivated groups (such as Aum) that would be most likely to use CBRN weapons. Crelinsten points out that the case often used to support this view - Aum Shinrikyo - may be inaccurate in that the attack on the Tokyo subway was a the result of a mixture of religious and political goals: at the same time the Aum was attempting to bring about Armageddon, they were also trying to deter police investigations into their activities. Crelinsten's conclusion regarding the ongoing discourse on CBRN terrorism is "that WMD terrorism cannot be predicted with certainty at this time and that much of the current discussion constitutes projection of fear based on a focus on capabilities and impact more than accurate prediction based on an understanding of motivations and goals." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


Crenshaw's chapter focuses on the American response to terrorism in the 1990s. She outlines the policies that the Clinton Administration inherited from its predecessors and describes the basic dimensions of the threat that U.S. policymakers confronted after the Cold War. Finally, she analyzes the general concept of coercive diplomacy in relation to terrorist strategies.
According to Crenshaw, American counterterrorism policy is not just a response to the threat of terrorism, whether at home or abroad, but a reflection of the domestic political process. The issue of terrorism is interpreted through a political lens, thus policies are developed and implemented in the context of a debate involving government institutions, the media, interest groups, and the elite and mass publics. Multiple actors, inside and outside government, compete to set the agenda and to determine policy through public debate, conducted largely in the news media. Each actor, whether an executive branch agency, Congress, or an interest group, wants to forge a national consensus behind its particular preference. Due to pressures from Congress, the president will not be able to set the agenda for counterterrorism policy with as much freedom as he can in other policy areas. Implementation of policy decisions will also be affected by controversy, due to rivalries among agencies with operational responsibilities. Thus it will be difficult for any administration to develop a consistent policy based on an objective appraisal of the threat of terrorism to American national interests. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)


This article is concerned with the decline of oppositional terrorism, which is a critical question for both scholars and policymakers. According to Crenshaw, the former have neglected the issue, while the latter have tended to assume that government policies of prevention and deterrence are the key determinants of outcomes. This analysis suggests that government actions must be seen in the context of the internal organizational dynamics and strategy of the opposition groups using terrorism. In some cases, terrorism is self-defeating.


In this introductory chapter, Crenshaw contends that "both the phenomenon of terrorism and our conceptions of it depend on historical context... And on how the groups and individuals who participate in or respond to the actions we call terrorism relate to the world in which they act." She argues for the necessity of recognizing that "an important aspect of terrorism is its social construction," and organizes her overview of terrorism around three themes: the historical context of the concept of terrorism; the causal relationship
between terrorism and its political, social, and economic environment; and the impact of terrorism on this setting. Crenshaw also previews the rest of her edited volume of case studies, acknowledging the challenges inherent in cross-national comparison of terrorism case studies, but arguing that research of this kind is critical for discovering a more effective global response to terrorism, particularly since "conceptions of terrorism affect not only scholarship but government policy and popular reactions." The case studies in the volume thus address questions about the relation of historical settings to the causes and effects of terrorism, as well as to our understanding of the phenomenon. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Crenshaw offers a number of topics in which further research of the psychological nature of terrorism should be conducted. She suggests organizing such research into areas focusing on causation/prevention, conduct/management, and consequences/control of terrorism and then further narrowing research to individual, group, and societal levels of analysis. She presents many areas for future analysis and shows that terrorism is a subject that requires further study.

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Crenshaw focuses her analysis on the outcomes of terrorism, especially in terms of its effectiveness in producing important political change, drawing on the cases of the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and the Organisation de l'Arme Secrete (OAS). The author explores the meaning and factors behind both effectiveness and success in terrorism. Terrorism can be effective without being successful (that is, in relation to intention), since it can produce decisive results that are nevertheless counterproductive; but if it is without any important consequences, it has clearly failed. In terms of operational effectiveness, the decentralization of the FLN underground enabled a variety of small, loosely connected cells to operate virtually unseen and untraceable to the central leadership. Meanwhile, the 'scorched earth' policy of the OAS and their successive attacks on Muslims and Europeans led to that organization's eventual disintegration, as their main supporting base fled the country. In her conclusion, the author notes that the Algerian cases of the FLN and OAS suggest that terrorism is more likely to be effective than successful, because the political changes to which terrorism can plausibly be linked diverge from those its users seek. Thus, as a method of achieving radical political change, terrorism has no proven efficacy. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: Algeria
Crenshaw argues that terrorist actions are the product of a strategic, rational choice. She does not ascribe abnormal pathology to terrorists, believing instead that terrorists are quite rational and consciously choose to make violent actions a part of their political strategy. She recognizes terrorism as a political force that can achieve some measured success, and one which may become increasingly popular when other options are limited.

Topic 1:
Terrorist Movements and Psychology

Crenshaw’s chapter addresses why some opposition groups reject the use of terrorism. She stresses the voluntary quality of such decisions, arguing that one can only understand specific cases of decision-making in political organizations acting in the context of particular historical settings and cultures. A combination of instrumental, organizational, and psychological reasons help explain why groups and individuals initially reject or eventually renounce the use of terrorism as a strategy of political resistance. Assessments of its likely consequences, its expediency, and its potential impact on the organization’s internal dynamics are often important factors in initially rejecting terrorism. Decisions to abandon terrorism depend on the lessons learned from experiences, whether satisfactory successes or dismal failures, and the impact of these acts on sustaining the organization's internal and external support. The processes by which outcomes are realized are complex and involve interactions among many different political actors under changing circumstances.

Topic 1: Mobilizing Forces
Topic 2: Case Studies

The Indonesian government is naturally concerned that conflict in Afghanistan could boost domestic support for Islamic radicalism. In recent years Indonesia has experienced an increasing number of terrorist attacks - particularly bombings - some of which have been linked to Muslim groups. Muslims have also been involved in violent conflicts in various regions of Indonesia, including Maluku, Poso (in Central Sulawesi), and Aceh. However, much of the violence in Indonesia involving Muslims can be adequately explained in domestic terms - although there is some evidence of limited involvement of foreigners. The author argues that radical Islam in Indonesia is still quite weak and the goal of its proponents of turning Indonesia into a state based on Islam is far from achievement. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s democratic transition is being accompanied by a crisis of lawlessness that has allowed many groups - including radical Muslim groups - to flaunt the law by engaging in violent behavior with impunity.

Topic 1: Religion and Conflict
Topic 2: Case Studies

The authors take issue with two potentially conflicting commitments of the Bush administration's National Security Strategy: "fighting terrorists and tyrants" and "encouraging free and open societies on every continent." Which of these, they ask, should take priority - America's commitment to its ideals, or a concern for its safety? Noting that the strategy offers no advice on how to answer this question, the authors critique the administration's foreign policies, suggesting that they risk alienating friends and allies while leaving at least some of the threats to American security unaddressed.

Countries/Regions: Indonesia


This chapter provides a history of community relations in Northern Ireland before 1969. The author notes that there are many dates that are fixed like beacons in the folklore and mythology of the Irish, including 1170, 1641, 1690, 1798, 1912, 1916, 1921, and 1969. This discussion is meant primarily to provide a brief history of the events that took place on these important dates. Topics include colonization; the ebb and flow of relations between the religious communities in Ireland, including a series of riots and violent encounters between Protestant and Catholics throughout the centuries; an evolving separatism between Ulster and the rest of Ireland; the relationship between economic and political dimensions of this separation; the establishment of the state of Northern Ireland, its relationship with Great Britain, and the violent opposition to the establishment of this new state; and the political marches, riots and other events during the summer of 1969 which "set the province on a new and violent course."

Countries/Regions: Northern Ireland


This article provides a brief history of Laskar Jihad beginning in April, 2000, when a procession of its members marched to the presidential palace in Jakarta brandishing sabers. By the following month, two to three thousand of the group's members had traveled to Maluku (the Moluccas), in eastern Indonesia, to fight alongside local Muslims locked in a cycle of communal violence with the region's Christian population. Their intervention turned the tables in a conflict in which the Christians had previously appeared to have the upper hand. Despite widespread criticism of their response to its activities, the Indonesian authorities have so far
taken little sustained action against Laskar Jihad. The group's emergence has aroused speculation on whether it heralds an expansion of the political influence of conservative Islam among the world's largest Muslim population.

**Topic 1:** Religious Ideology  
**Topic 2:** Case Studies  
**Topic 3:** Political Islam  

Countries/Regions: Indonesia

(100.) **Davis, Paul K. and Brian M. Jenkins.** *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002.

This monograph summarizes the findings of a six-month project, conducted jointly by RAND and the Institute for Defense Analysis, on deterrence of terrorism. Historical experience shows that successful strategies to combat terrorism spawned by serious, deep-rooted problems have involved first crushing the current threat and then bringing about changes to make terrorism's reemergence less likely. Davis and Jenkins call for greater emphasis on an "influence component" of strategy that has both a broader range of coercive elements and range of plausible positives. Since U.S. targets include the many elements of the al Qaeda system - which comprises leaders, lieutenants, financiers, logisticians and other facilitators, foot soldiers, recruiters, supporting population segments, and religious or otherwise ideological figures - the authors suggest that what is needed is a multifaceted strategy that tailors influences to targets within this system. The discussion emphasizes the need for a strategy which manifests strength, purpose and determination, is consistent with American values in war, and provides a balance between efforts to crush a particular terrorist organization and efforts to mitigate the factors that give the organization appeal and power.

**Topic 1:** Strategies to Respond and Defeat Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** National Terrorism Policy  

Countries/Regions: United States


The author describes how educational separatism in secondary schools and discrimination in university admissions has fueled militants in Sri Lanka. Issues of poverty and a low quality of life are related to education access and completion rates, and thus the management of education is a hot issue for Tamils of Northeast. Government reforms in the 1980s, decentralizing responsibility for primary and secondary schools and establishing provincial councils, and continued devolution of control in all sectors of education throughout late 1990s have been important milestones in the right direction. The author suggests three additional ways in which modifications in Sri Lanka's education system might contribute to the amelioration of ethnic tension: develop a more equitable system of undergraduate admissions, increase the devolution of education to the regions, and ensure that education plays a vital role in decreasing ethnocentricity and developing more tolerant attitudes.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 2:** Ethnic Separatism  
**Topic 3:** Case Studies  

Countries/Regions: Sri Lanka
This paper focuses on the religious dimension to the conflict in Sudan, asking what the Nuba war tells about the possibility of political Islam peacefully coexisting with diverse cultures and religions. The author notes that religion has become an integral part of the contested identities of Sudanese, nowhere more so than in the Nuba Mountains.Islamists are fighting to establish an Islamic society formed on the basis of Islamic principles and rules, which includes building and reconstructing all state institutions on principles derived from the Koran. The religious dimension to the conflict is thrown into sharpest profile by the 1992 jihad. In April, a conference of religious leaders sponsored by the government issued a fatwa, a religious edict, in support of the jihad in the Nuba Mountains. This instructed government forces to treat Muslims in the SPLA-controlled areas as non-believers and heretics. Government troops wantonly destroyed not only churches, but also mosques and Islamic books. This supports the author's assertion that the war in Sudan is fundamentally about greed and identity, rather than primarily religion.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 2:** Religion and Violence  
**Countries/Regions:** Sudan

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This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of Left-Wing terrorism in 1970's Italy. The author analyzes terrorism as a social, organizational, and individual phenomenon, and draws many conclusions from her analysis. In her view, this brand of terrorism needed at least three social phenomena before the wave of terrorism and terrorist-organized violence of that era could develop: frustrated societal interests; a highly political culture that already accepted violence (perhaps only in a mass-protest form); and prior use of violent tactics. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** Revolutionary Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** Domestic Terrorism  
**Topic 3:** Case Studies  
**Countries/Regions:** Italy

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**della Porta, Donatella. Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics), 1995.**

This book offers a comparative analysis of student militancy and terrorism in West Germany and Italy. The similarity of the experience of these two countries frames this analysis: students were rioting in Germany at the same time that they were doing so in Italy; the authorities in both countries reacted with remarkable similarity; and their terrorist movements shared many common features. But a significant difference stems from the organization and ideology of the terrorist groups: militants in Italy were ideologically aligned with Marxists and the revolutionary potential of the working class, while radicals in Germany saw the working
class as hopelessly corrupted by affluence and affiliated themselves instead with squatters and others on the fringes of youth culture, and with third world revolutionaries. Thus, German terrorist movements were always more isolated than their Italian counterparts, and the study of this isolation makes an important contribution to the literature on social movements and the terroristic aspects of mass mobilization.

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Countries/Regions: Italy, Germany


Delpech describes how terrorist organizations are uniquely positioned to wage an effective war against the U.S. because their strengths lie in the areas of the greatest American weaknesses. However, she also details how changes made in the wake of 9-11 may give states new powers and cooperation with which to battle the terrorists. Finally, she points out how the September 11th attacks put an end to the post-Cold War environment, and brought in a new era that requires political courage in response to terrorism and demands a resurgence of ethics in politics.

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Countries/Regions: United States


After four decades of civil war between the Arab Muslims of the North and the African-Animist-Christian South, there is still no resolution to the fundamental question of whether Sudan is Arab or African. The answer to this question has serious implications for the sharing of power, distribution of resources, and opportunities for political participation. According to the author, an "acute crisis of national identity is at the core of this conflict, which is exacerbated by conflict-related famine, a collapsing economy, and insecurity brought on by a disintegrating political situation." Pages 486-487 summarize the challenges faced by the Sudanese leadership, wherein Deng argues that unless the country experiences a dramatic change in the competing self-perceptions between the North and the South, the country's unity appears unsustainable. Unless a suitable and lasting compromise can be reached, partition may be the only alternative.

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Countries/Regions: Sudan

These three chapters discuss the historical process that has dichotomized Sudan into two very different identities - North and South. The roots of this history lie in the Arabization and Islamization of the North and the resistance to those forces in the South, resulting in a country with a national identity crisis. Political parties have adopted extreme positions - Islamic fundamentalism in the North, and a radical counterforce in the South. The author describes various bloody phases of the conflict, and the establishment of an Islamic state. The imposition of Islamic law triggered the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the SPL Army, whose declared objective was the creation of a new, secular, democratic, pluralistic Sudan. Over time, self-perceptions in the North and in the South have consolidated racial, cultural, and religious identities and attitudes that are basically sustained by confrontation and conflict. The author suggests that the polarization between North and South can only be resolved through a redefinition of national identity, a diversified coexistence based on the principle of live and let live.

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Countries/Regions: Sudan


Dishman argues that some of today's terrorist groups have transformed into transnational criminal organizations (TCO) who are more interested in profits than politics. This dynamic has important implications for policymakers as some traditional, politically motivated terrorist groups are furthering the goals of profit-minded agencies under a political banner. The author argues that there are different degrees of transformation: some terrorists commit criminal acts to support political operations, while others view profit-driven criminal acts as their endgame. He further argues TCOs and terrorist groups will not cooperate with each other to advance aims and interests, but will instead utilizing their "in-house" capabilities to undertake criminal or political acts.

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Dolnik observes that while suicide bombings are linked to a weakened instinct of self-preservation, nuances of contemporary suicide terrorism suggest that this practice does not necessarily make a mass-casualty chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack by a terrorist group more likely. Religiously motivated suicide bombers, who are presumably closer to an indiscriminate CBRN weapons attack, due to an advanced psychological level of enemy dehumanization, still face important technical and motivational constraints associated with agent production and delivery. The greatest danger is posed by religious cults combining an apocalyptic vision with outward-oriented violence and suicidal tendencies. However, most suicide cults tend
to direct their violence only inward, committing collective suicide without attacking others. Non-religiously motivated groups, on the other hand, appear too rational in their planning to use CBRN agents in an indiscriminate mass-casualty attack. Almost all suicide attacks to date have involved the death of individuals, carefully planned to sacrifice the lowest number of people necessary to carry out the operation. Taking into consideration the severe military retaliation that would follow, a large-scale CBRN attack would require self-destructive behavior within entire organizations. Thus, the assertion that suicide terrorism as a tactic brings us closer to a mass-casualty CBRN incident is based on unfounded generalizations of this phenomenon.


This chapter explores Parliament's adoption of recent counter-terrorism statutes, intended to complement existing legislation on achieving political solutions to the Northern Ireland conflict. The introduction of the 1998 Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act in the wake of the Omagh bombing created more stringent forfeiture provisions, made incursions into a suspect's right to silence, and allowed the testimony of a police officer to serve as evidence of membership in a specified organization. This Act also allowed Parliament to assume additional powers regarding the investigation and prosecution of individuals charged with conspiracy to engage in terrorist activity overseas. The chapter concludes with a review of the Labor Party's 1998 White Paper and subsequent discussions in Parliament on the formal adoption of counter-terrorist legislation. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)


This chapter explores the circumstances surrounding the inception of Northern Ireland and discusses "the web of emergency measures instituted to secure the constitutional position of the North." The 1920 Government of Ireland Act delineated which policy matters fell within the auspices of the new parliament, and provided the framework for several legislative acts regarding the composition of local councils and town commissions, the creation of special courts for the trying of offences linked to political violence, and the formation of local security forces. By far the most significant measure introduced at this time was the 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, which became the cornerstone of Unionist security policy. This Act made it an offence not only to act against a regulation created by parliament, but to incite or persuade another person to commit an offense, or harbor any person believed to have committed (or was about to commit) an offence.

Countries/Regions: Northern Ireland

This edited volume covers a variety of topics, including biological and chemical weapons (BCW) attack scenarios; weapons resulting from advances in chemistry and molecular biology; control regimes, treaties and compliance protocols; strategies and challenges in the areas of intelligence, warning, detection and deterrence; and the role of various agencies in preparing for attacks. In their introductory chapter, the editors suggest an agenda covering five areas through which actions can be effective in reducing the BCW threat: 1) reliable intelligence on the intentions of would-be perpetrators; 2) a strong scientific and medical research agenda; 3) new protocols for inspection; 4) consequence management; and 5) defense, encompassing both passive efforts (such as equipment, preparation, and training of medical response and clean-up teams) and active efforts (such as sanctions and export controls). (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)


Drezner spends most of this article reviewing and criticizing the globalization theories forwarded by Benjamin Barber, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Robert Kaplan, and Kenichi Ohmae. Drezner asserts that their theories rest on a seemingly Marxist belief that social and political changes depend on developments in the economic sector. Barber, Fukuyama, and Ohmae assert that economic globalization will result in a single entity in which people throughout the world are joined together, disregarding their differences, while Huntington and Kaplan posit that increased globalization will exacerbate differences and result in increased separation and distrust. Regardless of their predicted end states, all five of these authors predict the death of the nation-state system. Drezner opposes this belief, writing instead that while the nation state will lose some powers in economic control (an area in which he says they never excelled), they will gain authority by developing coordinated regulation, fostering technological innovation (as opposed to production), and yielding an increase in available soft power. Drezner admits that the nation-state system might die, but believes that it is in the middle of its life, rather than the end.


In his brief and informative review essay, Dunne explores six recent contributions to the literature on the world's most infamous terrorist leader. A member of the Overseas Security Advisory Council of the U.S. Department of State, Dunne is in a uniquely qualified position to judge the merits of books by Bodansky, Reeve, Bergen, Robinson, Jacquard, Alexander and Swetnam. These examples of research on bin Laden provide insights and documentation useful for scholars as well as "those charged with putting his influence to an end."

This chapter is focused primarily on the constitutional reform initiatives of the late-1990s. Following a technical critique of previous initiatives, the chapter provides an analysis of important provisions of the 1997 Draft Constitution and suggests a number of new approaches needed for effective constitutional reform. First is the need to communicate the importance of a new approach to the notion of a Sri Lankan identity. The right to self-determination recognized in a new constitution must not include the right to secession, perhaps using the South African constitution as a model. Also, special voting arrangements and regional representation at the center should be incorporated into any initiative. Finally, devolution of political decision-making will prove vital to the success of any constitutional reform initiative.


This concluding chapter of Elliott's book addresses the role of stereotypes and bigotry - and the longstanding grievances they fuel - in the Northern Ireland conflict. She observes how the Catholic Church's mid-century hostility toward the state provided some indirect encouragement to the Provisional IRA. For example, the Church required Catholics to send their children to Catholic schools, and parents going outside this system (in essence, patronizing the state schools, which were perceived as Protestant) encountered considerable hostility from their clergy. The Church has also continued to bury IRA men and refused to excommunicate them. This in turn led to a certain insecurity among Protestants - a belief that Catholics can only prosper at their expense. Eventually, the Church became more accommodating towards the state, and this had some impact on ending the Troubles. Because of these changes, Ulster Catholic identity is in transition. A "sense of belonging" without resentment could prove to be the most important legacy of the Good Friday Agreement.


This article compares the U.S. national security strategy's vision for counterterrorism missions to the political realm in which conventional military forces and terrorists operate. Terrorist acts and state responses are analyzed to demonstrate that they have differing political effects, which calls into question the political utility
of a conventional military counterterrorist response. According to Martin van Creveld, evolving historical conditions are wrenching warfare out of the political realm in which Clausewitz's analysis originally posited warfare's extension of political activity based on state power. The article also discusses terrorism's nebulous placement within the levels of war to reveal another aspect of terrorism's different relationship to the political realm. Ultimately, this challenges the U.S. national security strategy's conclusion that conventional military force used in "punitive" or "counterterrorism" operations is an effective response to terrorism.

Topic 1: National Terrorism Policy  
Topic 2: Counterterrorism Instruments  
Topic 3: Counterterrorism Policies  
Countries/Regions: United States


This article explores the world of government or contract linguists who sift through volumes of raw material looking for clues to an impending terrorist attack. In addition to the physical and contextual challenges of this work, analysts must often decipher hidden codes in conversations; for example, Al-Qaeda members tend to speak Arabic saturated with cultural and historical allusions, making it tough to distinguish religious dialogue from attack plans. Four branches of the military, 13 intelligence agencies, and the State Department's diplomatic corps all have their own set of translators, analysts and databases - yet our collective capacity for processing all the available raw material gathered each day is severely limited. From this need has emerged the National Virtual Translation Center in Washington, DC - a new hub of translation-assistance technology serving all federal agencies, linking tens of thousands of government linguists and private contractors via secure network connections of a type already used by the FBI and the CIA. A suite of technologies - tools that can digitize, parse, and digest raw material - supports this collaborative effort and, when fully operational in a few years, promises to have a noticeable impact on the nation's combating terrorist efforts.

Topic 1: Counterterrorism Instruments  
Countries/Regions: United States


The author describes four competing perspectives of the term jihad: striving to lead good a Muslim life; spreading the message of Islam; supporting the struggle of oppressed Muslims around the world; and working to overthrow governments in the Muslim world and attacking America. Sunnis and Shites agree that the importance of Jihad is rooted in the Quran's command to struggle in the path of God, and many Muslims today believe that the condition of their world requires a Jihad. He concludes that Islamic movements share several ideas: 1) Islam is an all-encompassing way of life; 2) the Quran and early Muslim community guide daily actions; 3) Islamic law (Shariah) provides the blueprint for Muslim society; 4) departures from Islam are the causes for Muslim decline; 5) science and technology must be harnessed and used within an Islamic context; and 6) Jihad is the means to bring about successful Islamization of society and the world. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

Topic 1: Religion as a Mobilizing Force  
Topic 2: Religious Ideology  
Topic 3: Religion and Conflict

Standard texts in politics and international relations often ignore religion, seemingly too pre-occupied with other institutions, structures, and persons perceived as powerful in the contemporary world. In this introductory chapter to the volume, Esposito highlights the various dimensions through which religion plays an important role in politics throughout the twentieth century. He notes that today's world is predominately oriented toward Western conceptions of rationality and political ideology, the spread of which has been enabled by forces of globalization. In this context, other forces are reacting and renewing themselves - particularly the major world religions, which have developed as strong rivals to states for allegiances and a proponent for the conservation of cultural identity and community values. Thus it is unsurprising that religion has played a prominent role in a variety of modern conflicts, including Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Sri Lanka. He concludes that, as demonstrated by the chapters of this volume, a principal opposition (and alternative) to the existing global order (with its emphasis on Western capitalism) resides in the major religions, stemming from their emphasis on global values of justice, peace and ecological integrity.

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In a relatively short book, Esposito analyzes the activities and influence of Osama bin Laden, explores the doctrines and practice of Jihad throughout history, and describes the major Islamist groups worldwide. Jihad, he argues, incorporates warfare with an individual effort to live a holy life, and jihadist radical movements throughout the Muslim world are aimed at resisting authoritarian states. Esposito's policy recommendations include pushing for democratization in the Muslim world and working with moderates in those states. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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In this brief article, Euben explores competing definitions and interpretation of the term Jihad, arguing that it is "neither simply a blind and bloody-minded scrabble for temporal power nor solely a door through which to pass into the hereafter. Rather, it is a form of political action in which . . . the pursuit of immortality is inextricably linked to a profoundly this-worldly endeavor - the founding or re-creation of a just community on Earth." Calling into question the work of many contemporaries on this subject, Euben notes that viewing jihad as a "counterpart and pathological side-effect of globalization does not illuminate much about jihad" and draws a closer relationship between Islamist interpretations of jihad and the spread of political violence aimed at bringing about social change.

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Falkenrath's article provides a useful primer to the general issues of NBC terrorism (radiological is not discussed): weapon characteristics and accessibility, the likelihood and effects of an NBC attack, and the evolving government response. Though in some respects dated by the events of September 11, 2001, the piece generally remains applicable and useful. Falkenrath views NBC terrorism as a "low-probability, high-consequence threat" that is likely to increase in the future. In his eyes, this threat is "serious, often underestimated but not apocalyptic." According to Falkenrath, religious group, particularly those from the Middle East (where "religious and political motives for terrorism clearly reinforce one another") are the likeliest to seek and, if successful in acquisition, employ NBC. Like others, Falkenrath sees a growing trend toward mass-casualty terrorism disassociated from (secular) political objectives. Though he points out the conventional explosives continue to be used primarily and with severe effects, the potential for NBC terrorism will continue to expand. "Since the fundamental cause is social progress, this expansion of latent non-state actor NBC potential is inexorable, and is not reversible by governments." Falkenrath suggests that the future will buck the historical record of few NBC-related terror attacks. Of note, Falkenrath stresses that the proliferation of technology and know-how is almost inherently unstoppable and will lead to more terrorist groups becoming capable of conducting NBC attacks, although the number capable of mass-casualty NBC attacks will remain much smaller. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

The authors suggest that the U.S. government does not treat the danger of covert nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) aggression as a first-order national security challenge. They offer five key areas in which increased funding and effort can reduce our nation's vulnerability and improve our ability to contain and respond to the threat: 1) national strategy, planning and coordination (establish a response center and rationalize departmental responsibilities); 2) intelligence and threat identification (reform the U.S. intelligence community, improve international cooperation and detection of small-scale NBC weapons programs, enhance epidemiological surveillance, and improve the capability for post-attack attribution); 3) operational preparedness for crisis and consequence management (enhance resources and improve federal, state and local cooperation); 4) fissile material security; and 5) strengthen declaratory policy and law, and support international initiatives to criminalize bioweapons possession and use.
With respect to CBRN threats from non-state actors, the authors contend that while use of such weapons has to date been limited, "a threat assessment based solely on extrapolation from the past would be misleading." Strongly agreeing with the widely-held perception of a "new terrorism" focused on perpetrating increasingly lethal attacks, Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer contend that conventional explosives will continue to be the first choice for most terrorist organizations but that a small number of groups will seek and use CBRN weapons to achieve mass casualties. For them, the near-term likelihood is limited, but the spread of materials - but more particularly, know-how - will steadily increase the probability. In addition to groups and states that pour resources into developing such weapons, the "gradual increase in potential NBC capabilities is in part a byproduct of economic, educational, and technological progress." What is more, since "the fundamental cause," of the increasing availability and understanding of relevant technologies, "is social progress, this expansion of latent non-state actor NBC potential is inexorable, and is not reversible or even manageable by governments." Clearly, the authors take a "not if, but when" approach to CBRN terrorism, though they argue that the numbers of such incidents likely will remain well below those of conventional attacks. Religiously motivated groups, most likely, but not exclusively, Islamic, are the most probable groups to commit CBRN terrorism. Religious or far right-wing anti-government groups within the United States have also demonstrated interest in these weapons and pose a risk. Furthermore, the evolving terrorist tendency to organize in loose structures that form on an ad hoc basis "for specific purposes, sometimes to commit a single attack" may apply equally for likely CBRN terrorists as for 'conventional' ones. Finally, the authors note that certain factors (beyond the capability to inflict large numbers of casualties) increase the probability of CBRN use in years to come. These include the prestige and symbolism associated with these weapons (a group could raise its status by gaining the "trappings of a state") and the possibility of "copycat" attacks once the CBRN taboo is unalterably broken. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topic 1:**
CBRN Terrorism

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This book examines the organizational problems faced by the U.S. government in developing an effective strategy to counter terrorism and presents a detailed history of U.S. counterterrorist policy since 1972. Farrell offers a working definition of terrorism, reviews its international transnational, nonterritorial, and domestic forms, then focuses on the activities of those U.S. government agencies directly concerned with the prevention or neutralization of terrorism. He also examines the sociological, legal, and operational factors that would be brought into play should military forces be deployed to quell a terrorist attack and also addresses the nature and extent of the terrorist threat to U.S. businesses.

**Topic 1:**
National Terrorism Policy

**Topic 2:**
Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective

**Countries/Regions:** United States

Ferracuti first looks at primarily left-wing terrorists in Italy to try to establish their ideological reasons for turning to terrorism, citing insecurity and a search for absolute values as two important pieces. He believes that typically, ideological terrorists are completely dedicated and focused on their goal, and to combat such terrorism, society must develop some way to make it easy for terrorists to renounce their actions and re-enter society. Ferracuti then analyzes Italy's "repentance" method as an example of how states can provide this exit, demonstrating that having an open political system where radical opinions remain welcomed in society is a good solution. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: Italy


In an important application of dissonance theory, the authors contend that an ardent believer of some idea will increase his or her dedication to (and proselytization of) that belief after it has been unequivocally disconfirmed. The authors give five preconditions to this theory, which serve to ensure that the given believer is deeply dedicated to the idea and has made some sort of personal sacrifice that supports such devotion, and that there is a social network of similarly-minded individuals. The authors believe that a disconfirming event causes increased proselytization because followers associate an increasing number of followers with confirmation of the given belief. Importantly, however, there is a limit of disconfirmation beyond which the phenomenon ceases. This theory is especially applicable to millennial groups.

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This essay focuses on a number of vulnerabilities at the nation's borders, ports and waterways, telecommunications, power, water supply, and transportation infrastructure. Flynn argues that concerns over national missile defense and maintaining the health and growth of the economy have been more important than real domestic security. He recommends building a homeland security regime that includes point-of-origin security measures; securing loading docks from unauthorized entry; monitoring loading processes with cameras; embracing new technologies (such as GPS transponders and electronic tags for shipping containers, and universal biometric travel identification cards, including electronic scanning of fingerprints, eye retina information, or a facial profile); and coordinating with private companies and trade associations. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Ford discusses how the Soviet Union's dissolution has led to the emergence of smuggling nuclear material. Although he notes that smuggling attempts apparently fell in 1995 from the levels of the previous year, he cautions that none of the factors that lead to the smuggling have been removed, nor have proper precautions been put in place, and thus the numbers are likely to rise once again. He advises the U.S. to work with Russia and other nations to develop a comprehensive policy to reduce this threat.

**Countries/Regions:** United States

**Topics:**

**1:** CBRN Terrorism

**2:** CBRN Counterterrorism Policy

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Ford examines the threat of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs), focusing primarily on the physical and psychological effects on targeted populations. He states that in spite of the growing attention focused on RDDs in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, much of the public information is incorrect, overstated and potentially misleading. He cites the general view of national laboratory scientists, who argue that constructing an effective RDD is more difficult than popularly assumed. Ford also argues that public perceptions of the physical effects of RDDs is equally misstated, given the difficulties in constructing a large, lethal RDD (which would most likely be beyond the means of many terrorist groups). Ford also highlights the tremendous psychological (and by extension, political) effects of an RDD, which could have more of an impact than the actual physical effects. He concludes by outlining the 1997 recommendations of the Defense Science Board regarding a response strategy for RDDs, including improved military training and preparedness and public education on the threat. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topics:**

**1:** CBRN Terrorism

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(132.) Foreign Policy Website. http://www.foreignpolicy.com

Recommended website on terrorism and counterterrorism.

**Topics:**

**1:** Historical Context

**2:** New Threats

**3:** Defining Terrorism

Samuel Huntington's controversial "Clash of Civilizations" argument posits that the extent of both international and domestic conflict between "civilizations" will increase with the end of the Cold War, especially with the clashes involving the Western and Islamic civilizations and even more so for clashes between these two civilizations. Fox uses the Minorities at Risk dataset, along with independently collected variables, to test these propositions with regard to ethnic conflict.

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The author addresses the issue of agroterrorism, an area that he states "has been seriously underrated until recently." Foxell argues that the shift in terrorism that has occurred in recent years increases the likelihood of terrorist attacks directed against U.S. agriculture and food supplies. He outlines several key factors that make this possible, including: relatively easy access to plant and animal pathogens, aided further by the spread of information on the Internet; the potential for significant impact, not in terms of the numbers of casualties, but rather economic dislocation and shortages; and, of principal importance, the vulnerability of the U.S. agricultural sector. Foxell then outlines several possible techniques that terrorists could use to strike the agricultural sector, including: contamination of crops or livestock; contamination of animal feed, supported by references to several U.S. cases of terrorist/criminal contamination using organic pesticides or herbicides; the use of adulterated seeds; and contamination of municipal water supplies, which he acknowledges would be "highly complex and difficult" requiring terrorists to "overcome significant obstacles." With respect to motivations, Foxell argues that the rise in the threat of agroterrorism is part of the larger shift in the motivations of terrorists that other authors have noted, as well as the ongoing threat of state-sponsored terrorism. Many states known to have biological warfare programs have reportedly researched and/or stockpiled agroterrorism agents. In his conclusion, he reiterates that the United States is presently unable to deal with such a threat since, "the case has yet to be made to the American public - and even to decision makers." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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The author examines the threat of terrorism to the United States, especially CBRN terrorism, and suggests that the threat is increasing. Foxell argues that previous factors that deterred terrorists from using CBRN - lack of technical skill or information, or the potential for a public backlash at committing such a monumentally reprehensible act" - are weakening. In his view, the world is witnessing "a paradigm shift in terrorism in which total annihilation of opposing cultural and economic systems has become the straight-out ambition of a new breed of terrorists. Thus, these quintessential terror weapons (i.e., mass-destructive agents..."
used against civilian populations) suddenly offer not only an option but an expedient." Combined with the growth in numbers of groups with no "audience" or constituency to appeal to and the "persistence of purely antithetical religious, cultural, social, political, and economic cleavages within global inter-communal societies," the moral restraints against atrocity or CBRN terrorism no longer exist. He suggests that a "new wave" of terrorists, comprised of "religious fanatics, ethnic-cleansing terrorist movements, mind-control and millenarian cults, 'morality terrorists', and 'for-profit' extortionists." Groups such as these, the author concludes, would be the most likely to use CBRN, "as their idiosyncratic, self-encapsulated world views each qualify a climate in which the world's judgment is unimportant." Foxell argues that terrorists "will continue to seek more powerful weapons" to increase the shock value of their attacks, thus making it more likely that terrorist groups will use such weapons. The increasing availability of information, technology, and materials on the Internet and through gray and black markets, as well as the possibility of foreign assistance, foreshadows a growing threat from CBRN. The author posits particular attack scenarios, and concludes with a brief discussion of the measures taken by the United States government in response to this threat. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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Countries/Regions: United States


Fraser and Dando explore both the promise and the problem of the recent genomics revolution. Would-be terrorists could use recent breakthroughs to engineer biological weapons that are far more devastating than those now available. The authors hold that the scientific community must face up to this possibility. They suggest developing a communications web in which the whole community engages in discussions about how their work could be used for evil purposes, and actively works to prevent this from happening.

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This article, written by a former Associate Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency, briefly reviews the early days of the CIA, when officers contemplated the use of lethal force against named, specific individuals such as Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, and Joseph Stalin. However, this was removed as foreign policy option for the U.S. in 1975 under Executive Order 11905, which stated "No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination." Fredman explores the CIA’s experience during the past 20 years with the separate and serious policy considerations that may apply whenever its activities may cause the loss of life, whether or not that loss, strictly defined, would constitute assassination. He concludes that the prohibition on assassination and the related policy requirement to minimize the gratuitous loss of life serves the national interest by protecting the CIA and its officers from charges of criminality or impropriety and ensuring that covers U.S. activities continue to reflect American values and law.

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Freedman suggests that the September 11th attacks and the U.S. removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan may be viewed as the opening skirmishes of a Third World War. In this analysis, the implications of the global fight on terrorism can be placed within the context of previous global conflicts. The author observes that the U.S. has been focused on developing the capacity to win wars based on previous global conflicts, and that a military-focused, unilateral approach is ill-suited for the asymmetric nature of the current global conflict - especially when dealing with religious ideologically-motivated non-state actors. In asymmetric conflict, the weak must convince the strong that it is not in their interests to persist. The advantages of the weak - particularly in terms of ideological motivation - over the strong are likely to be reduced if the strong is hurt so badly that the defeat of the weak becomes a vital interest. The author concludes that conceiving of its most likely wars in classical terms, the military establishment and U.S. defense policy are misaligned with the needs of the current asymmetric conflict, the outcome of which will be determined by the ability and willingness of the U.S. to more effectively engage the international community.


This chapter describes the Budyonnovsk terrorist incident of June, 1995, the single largest hostage-taking event of the 20th century. Chechen separatists attacked a Russian town 100 miles from the Chechen border, and held over 1,000 Russian hostages in the town hospital for a week. Initial Russian attempts resulted in a public relations disaster and hundreds of civilian casualties, and Yeltsin's bellicose statements on the need to annihilate the Chechen rebels did not help the situation. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin eventually agreed to the terrorist's conditions; sending a peace delegation to Grozny, ordering a ceasefire in Chechnya, and guaranteeing safe passage back to Chechnya. This was a pivotal episode of the war between the Chechens and Russia. Law enforcement agencies were shown to be incapable of protecting the population from terrorism, while an OSCE report criticized Russia's use of disproportionate and indiscriminate military force in this situation. And the terrorists succeeded in their goal of gaining publicity for the Chechen cause, hoping that pressure from Russian society and other countries would force a policy change in Russia's leadership.

This article analyzes the origins and dynamics of the secessionist insurgency in Kashmir, its impact on India-Pakistan relations, and the prospects for its resolution. Hostility in this region has resulted in two major wars and several near misses, and fosters endemic instability and insecurity throughout South Asia. With the onset of a secessionist ethno-religious insurgency in 1989, a proxy war developed between India and Pakistan, which brought bilateral relations between the two states to its nadir, contributed directly to an arms race and nuclear weapons testing in the subcontinent, undermined regional integration efforts, and resulted in gross human rights violations. In 1999, a brief outbreak of conventional warfare between the two countries, contained only through intense international pressure, momentarily raised fears of a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Clearly, there is an urgent need to resolve the secessionist insurgency in Kashmir.

**Countries/Regions:** India, Pakistan, Kashmir


This article provides a detailed account of the historical origins of the Islamic militant insurgency in Kashmir, placing it within the context of India-Pakistani relations and regional security. The author examines a number of general explanations of ethnic conflict as well as the particular arguments that have been put forth to explain the Kashmir conflict, and suggests a new explanation which challenged this existing body of work. Ganguly argues that two interlinked forces - political mobilization and institutional decay - best explain the origins of the insurgency in Kashmir. The growth of political assertiveness of minority communities in democratic states is virtually inevitable. The failure of institutional mechanisms for resolving political problems or grievances raised by these minority communities can lead to adverse consequences both in the region and in the larger state, particular when coercive military strategies are involved. For example, "continued reliance on the Indian army to quell civil unrest in Kashmir and other parts of the country bodes ill for civil-military relations in India." The author discusses the larger theoretical significance of the Kashmir conflict as well as possible policy prescriptions that may flow from this analysis.

**Countries/Regions:** Pakistan, India, Kashmir


Ganguly describes the history of Pakistan's four military coups and the historical weakness of the Pakistani government. He asserts that Pakistan's troubles extend from its inception, when the governing All-India Muslim League developed weak institutions that supported elitist goals. Since that time, Ganguly maintains that the beaocracy gained power, and linked itself with the army, resulting in a team that overruled all attempts for democratization and the development of strong legislative, executive, and judicial arms of the government. Ganguly recommends that outside nations support Musharraf (the leader of the most recent
coup) as leader, but should pressure him to improve the status and independence of the other branches of the Pakistani government.

### Topic 1: Religion and Conflict

### Topic 2: Case Studies

### Topic 3: Revolutionary Terrorism

**Countries/Regions:** Pakistan

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Ganor argues for a definition of terrorism based on three elements: the essence of the activity (the use of, or threat to use, violence), the aim of the activity (to attain political objectives), and the targets of terrorism (civilians). A definition that enjoys wide international agreement must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (between an organization and a state). Such a definition of terrorism will enable legislation and specific punishments against those involved in terrorism; allow the formulation of laws and international conventions against terrorist organizations and their sponsors; hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy; and motivate these organizations to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses in order to attain their aims.

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(144.) Garreau, Joel. "Disconnect the Dots." The Washington Post (September 17, 2001), C01.

Written in the wake of September 11th, Garreau argues that bombing Afghanistan is not the way to properly combat terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. These groups are based on a networked structure of people (as opposed to the computers they use), and it is the networks that must be destroyed if the U.S. is to win the war on terrorism. Garreau cites various experts' theories on targeting the networks through technology and through personnel manipulation.

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This article provides a brief and general overview of the prospective bioterrorism threat, but does not offer insight into the potential severity or range of bioterrorist challenges. The main thrust of Garrett's article is on the response side, from vaccine stockpiles to epidemiological surveillance to government anti-terrorism programs, with a conclusion that more must be done to avoid a "train crash." This article does not address either the objectives or motivations of groups or the agents they would likely seek with respect to bioterrorism, let alone their desired effects or likely tactics. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Gershman wrote this article as the U.S. appeared to be heading towards opening a Southeast Asian front in the war on terrorism. Gershman argues that military force is not what is needed in that region; indeed, he believes that aiding Southeast Asian militaries would heighten human rights violations and strengthen the appeal of radical Islamic groups. Gershman calls instead for a program that strengthens law enforcement organizations, while also improving democratic institutions to watch over the police and reinforce the rule of law. Finally, Gershman calls for changes in the U.S.'s current economic policy towards Southeast Asia in an attempt to alleviate grievances aggravated by extreme poverty.


Gibbs offers an analysis of the issues and problems that surround the conceptualization of terrorism. He suggests that current definitions are too simplistic given the complex nature of human behavior. He also vehemently rejects those who say terrorism cannot be defined, arguing that it must be defined if accurate theory is to be developed. The meat of his article rests on his explanation of why a definition is needed, why the current ones are not adequate, and why his paragraph-long definition is more fitting.


This chapter examines urban guerilla theory and movements in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay during the 1970s, covering issues of political context, organization, militarism, and ideology. Gillespie argues that urban guerilla warfare should not be confused with terrorism, as it is more discriminate and predictable in its use of violence to secure political objectives. He concludes that urban guerilla warfare in Latin America has been effective but its effects have been other than those sought by the insurgents. It contributed to the destabilization of governments in Argentina and Uruguay, but eventually led to repressive military rule. As a result, urban guerilla warfare as a strategy lost much of its following throughout the continent.

Originally published in Spanish in 1990, this volume examines the development of Peru's bloody Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso--SL) insurrection and the government's response, from 1979 through December 1982. The book draws on a variety of primary sources, including classified reports of Peru's security agencies, documents emanating from the Shining Path, and interviews with scores of participants and witnesses, as well as his own experiences. The author also discusses the government's failure to combat the insurrection effectively in its early days, when the Shining Path might have been suppressed at much less cost in lives and money. He argues that the nation's leaders misunderstood and underestimated the movement, and suggests lessons to be learned for other national leaders.

**Topic 1:** Revolutionary Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** Domestic Terrorism

**Countries/Regions:** Peru


Terror has been an intrinsic component of the historical pattern of Iranian political expression; it is not merely a product of the Islamic revolution. The author provides an historical narrative of terrorism through the Pahlavi dynasty, the Mohammed Reza Shah period, and the rule of the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers. In terms of the latter, the author pays special attention to domestic terrorism as well as its role in carrying out the foreign policies of the Islamic state's charter, noting that when the state's image as a pariah, terrorist-sponsoring state began to hinder its ability to secure arms (desperately needed for its long war with Iraq), the Islamic leaders tried to curb extremist elements insensitive to larger political considerations. By the late 1980s, all signs indicated that Iran had virtually abandoned its support of terrorism, opting instead to normalize relations with the rest of the world. However, Iran's dismal human rights record as well as its earlier support for terrorist acts allows a variety of parties in the West and in the Islamic world to point the finger at Tehran as a state that does not fully conform to international norms of behavior. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** State Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** Historical Context  
**Topic 3:** Case Studies

**Countries/Regions:** Iran


This article attempts to construct a model for determining the likelihood of terrorist use of CBRN, one that moves beyond "simple considerations of access and capabilities." The author instead suggests three factors that can be used to determine the likelihood of a terrorist group using CBRN weapons. The first factor is the core audience with whom the group seeks to communicate. Gressang posits that this can be a human audience (such as a population of constituency that the group operates in support of or on behalf of) or an ethereal audience (such as a religious deity), and that the later "may be prone to accept greater levels of
violence and, perhaps, see considerable utility in the use of mass-casualty weapons." The second factor is the content of the message directed on the core audience. Gressang argues that most terrorist groups seek social or political change, which is reflected in their message, while some groups preach a message of destruction (of an enemy, a people, a state, etc.). Because the desire to effect change requires that something survive the violence in order to be changed, Gressang argues that only those groups with a message of destruction would likely use CBRN. Third is social interaction, or the level of the relationship of the group to the society in which it exists. This relationship can be reciprocal, with the group receiving some sort of response from the target audience, or it can be inapposite, with the group isolating itself and severing all ties with the society around it. Using these factors, Gressang hypothesizes that groups that are at the negative extremes of each spectrum would seriously consider the use of CBRN with the intent to cause mass casualties. The author acknowledges that his model is incomplete at this point, but suggests that it can be refined and can serve as a starting point for future discussions. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


Gunaratna provides a short summary of Al Qaeda's initial links with the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) group, GIA's subsequent campaign of terror upon the Muslim citizens of Algeria, followed by Al Qaeda's split with the GIA and promotion of the alternate Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). Algeria provides an interesting case study, as it is one where a Muslim extremist group turned against members of its own Islamic sect (i.e. Sunni or Shi'ite) when the populace did not support its cause. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)


Gunaratna describes the links between Al Qaeda and various Muslim extremist groups in India and Pakistan, and shows how Al Qaeda influences their operations through ideas learned in terrorist camps, money, and promised audiences with bin Ladin and influential leaders. He also explains the two reasons why Al Qaeda is trying to move it's base from Afghanistan to the tribal regions of Western Pakistan: bin Ladin believes that a successful guerrilla campaign against the Americans can be launched from that area (following his experience in fighting the Russians), and bin Ladin also believes he can generate a new base of support in the population, leading to the overthrow of Pakistani president Musharraf and the installation of an Islamic state. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

This section of Gunaratna's book provides a brief discussion of al Qaeda's operations and affiliations in the occupied territories in the Middle East. Al Qaeda ties with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are reflected in the many Palestinians who went to Afghanistan and rose to important positions within the organization. The infiltration of al Qaeda in this troubled region is a considerable source of worry to the Israeli security forces. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  
**Countries/Regions:** Middle East


Gunaratna uses the final chapter of his book to reiterate the threat posed by Al Qaeda and to give policy suggestions for how the U.S. and the rest of the international community should meet that threat. He advocates a short-term strategy that utilizes mostly military strength, while education and mitigation of underlying factors are key in his mid- and long-term strategies. Emcompassing all of this is his belief that the entire international community must work together to defeat Al Qaeda. A solution formed by the U.S. or by western nations alone will not succeed. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy  
**Topic 2:** New Threats  
**Topic 3:** Counterterrorism Policies  
**Countries/Regions:** United States


This section of Gunaratna's book offers a comprehensive look at Al Qaeda's financial network. Al Qaeda's annual budget is estimated at $50 million, managed by a finance and business committee. In the developing world, its funding strategies are linked to providing goods and services to local Muslims, while in the Western democracies it raises money for needy Muslims overseas, the soliciting and channeling of funds providing opportunities for building support and recruitment. They have also had a worldwide network of investments and small businesses. Wealthy Arab benefactors in the Middle East, including respected individuals in the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, are al Qaeda's financial mainstays. To facilitate their transactions, many businesses and banks in the Gulf are used as "fronts", allowing al Qaeda to conduct business under cover. Shutting down this financial network is a critical dimension of the War on Terrorism. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** Terrorism, Money and Crime  
**Countries/Regions:** Arab World, Middle East

Gunaratna explains the ideological backing behind Al Qaeda in this short selection. He begins by examining the concept of jihad, and explains how differing interpretations can use it to either justify or dismiss terrorist violence. He then delves into the particular ideology espoused by Osama bin Ladin, illustrating how its loose nature helps to form a pan-Islamic ideal that expands the reach and appeal of the Al Qaeda organization. He also suggests that al Qaeda is as formidable for its espoused ideology as it is for its terrorist operations. He ends with a classification system for terrorist organizations, separating them into revolutionary, ideological, utopian, and apocalyptic groups. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:**
Religious Ideology

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This book surveys the origins, development, structure, strategies and tactics of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the separatist-terrorist organization in Sri Lanka that is widely viewed as being at the cutting edge of insurgent and terrorist technology, military adaptation and innovation. Gunaratna notes that the current situation was precipitated by poor governance and prolonged ethnic, social, economic and political unrest, creating the conditions for a terrorist and insurgent campaign. The study concludes that the only impediment preventing the LTTE from achieving its goal of a separate Tamil state is the absence of total support from within the Tamil community. This is owed to the ruthless and dictatorial policies of the LTTE towards their own people. Had the LTTE been more tolerant towards rival Tamil politicians and insurgent groups, the LTTE would have become a mass movement by the 1990s. A 14-page chronology provides a useful overview of the major events in this conflict from 1931 through 1998. Also, a series of organizational charts and several peace accords from 1957 through 1995 are provided as annexes.

**Topic 1:**
Ethnic Separatism

**Topic 2:**
Case Studies

**Countries/Regions:** Sri Lanka

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The authors seem to take the position that the CBRN terrorist threat is real, but the debate on the subject of has often been over-sensationalized in the United States, especially when compared to only limited discussion in other countries. They argue that a precedent has been set with regard to acquisition and use of CBRN weapons by sub-national actors. However, they suggest that not every terrorist group will be motivated to opt for such weapons, rather it is likely that only a small number of groups will pursue CBRN acquisition or development. The reasons for this lie in the technical constraints and the motivations of terrorist groups. While the technical constraints that in the past limited terrorist acquisition of CBRN are weakening, it is not a given that every terrorist group will have the requisite technical skills or financial and time resources needed to acquire or develop and effectively deliver such weapons. What weapons terrorists do develop are most likely to vary considerably in quality, though tending more to lower levels. Also, the authors argue, the use of
CBRN weapons may not fit in with the goals and motivations of some groups. Gurr and Cole appear to agree with the prevailing view that terrorist groups predominantly religious in character show the strongest motivation to acquire CBRN. With the exception of racial extremists, Gurr and Cole do not believe that secular terrorist groups would opt for CBRN weapons. The authors conclude that future CBRN terrorist events are a relatively low-likelihood given that many terrorist groups lack the expertise and resources required to acquire CBRN materials and weapons, as well as the fact that such weapons may not be the means to advance the goals of some terrorist groups. Nevertheless, "there is a small cadre of groups and individuals who could develop them, and would use them, and therefore the threat is real." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topic 1:**
CBRN Terrorism


In this selection of the book (an appendix), the authors provide the complete charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which includes an introduction to the Movement, its connection to the Society of Muslim Brotherhood, its structure and formation, the universality of the Movement's objectives, and its strategies and means.

**Topic 1:**
Religion and Conflict

**Topic 2:**
Religious Ideology

**Topic 3:**
Religion and Violence

Countries/Regions: Middle East


Hardin describes his book as "an effort to understand the motivations of those who act on behalf of groups and to understand how they come to identify with the groups for which they act." In the first of these two selections, the author focuses on issues of collective action, identity and identification, social theory, and the relationship of self-interest and motivation. He argues that rational choice theorists often fail to take into consideration the important dimension of individual-specific knowledge when making assertions about a person's motivation to act in particular situations. In the second selection, he argues that what is rational (in one's interest) to do depends on what knowledge one has. Thus, socially-constructed knowledge plays a significant role in the identification of groups and their members engaged in violent conflict - particularly conflicts that involve issues of territory, state control, different ethnic identities, and secessionist movements.

**Topic 1:**
Mobilizing Forces
Hartman argues that globalization is having a tremendous effect on the ability of terrorist and criminal organizations to act on a global scale. These organizations are using asymmetrical means to target U.S. interests at home and abroad. The series of coordinated attacks of September 11th demonstrate how globalization has increased the ability of terrorist and other non-state actors to project power in the global environment. The negative effects of globalization have continued to create a large disenfranchised population primarily centered in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, where networked terrorists and criminals take advantage of the tools of globalization. Those tools include the internet that provides secure means of communication, the technology that enables them to act, and the porous environment that allows one to move around the world undetected. The same tools being used to advance world societies and economies are increasingly being used as tools to help destroy them. He concludes that the U.S. needs to develop a better National Security Structure to deal with this threat and solve longstanding foreign policy issues, taking advantage of a network architecture and addressing issues that fuel resentment and hatred towards the U.S. and make it easier for our adversaries to plan and conduct asymmetrical attacks.

Topic 1: Global Environment  Topic 2: National Terrorism Policy  Topic 3: Terrorism's New Model

Countries/Regions: United States


In this article, the author provides a comprehensive review of the domestic and international background of a Muslim militia that has played a conspicuous role in the Moluccan conflict since 2000. Drawing from a variety of printed and Internet sources as well as interviews, the author discusses the social and doctrinal nature of this movement and its development in the context of recent political transformations in Indonesia and the Muslim world at large.

Topic 1: Religion and Conflict  Topic 2: Case Studies

Countries/Regions: Indonesia


This chapter explores the traditional and revolutionary ideological outlook of the Islamic Jihad: traditional in rejecting the prevailing sociopolitical order in the Arab world in favor of a perceived Islamic golden age, and yet revolutionary in denouncing the approach of Islamic circles regarding the timing of jihad in Palestine. A central pillar has been setting Palestine free by means of violence and immediate struggle. However, in spite of this explicit Palestinian dimension, the Islamic Jihad has not had a fixed or cohesive platform. Rather, it has blended themes deriving from three main sources: the ideology of the Muslim Brothers, as developed especially by Sayyid Qutb; the ideological guidelines and patterns of activity of the Islamic militant groups of
Egypt; and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In their eyes, Arab nationalism is legitimate only so long as it is confined to the context of the unity of faith, while democracy is legitimate only when viewed within an Islamic and not a Western context, and only if it functions within the confines of Shari’a authority.

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Countries/Regions: Israel-Palestine, Middle East, Lebanon, Syria


This introductory chapter describes the maturation of Palestinian radical Islam's ideology and organization during the late 1970s and early 1980s. A series of developments paved the way for this maturation: (1) the failure of various initiatives to end the Israeli occupation and realize the national rights of the Palestinians; (2) a religious resurgence in the Middle East, which highlighted the universal nature of Islam and the deep roots of Muslim peoples; (3) the rise of related sources of inspirations, including the Islamic Revolution in Iran and guerilla attacks by Shia Muslims in Lebanon against U.S. and Israeli targets; (4) an internal schism in the Arab world and within the PLO (the PLO leadership's policy of controlled radicalism and non-acceptance of the occupation, but avoidance of a direct confrontation, evoked criticism); (5) a passive stance of the Muslim Brothers on issues of armed struggle against Israel; and (6) the expansion of secondary and higher education in the territories, alongside depressed economic conditions.

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Countries/Regions: Israel-Palestine, Middle East, Lebanon, Syria


This chapter covers the historical roots of the Islamic Jihad, the early influence of other militant Islamic groups, key members (and their initial contacts while students at universities in Egypt), and influential books and authors. The author separates the history of the Islamic Jihad into three stages: political indoctrination (1981-83), armed confrontation (1984-87), and the outbreak of the Intifada, followed by the shift of the movement's center to Lebanon and Syria (1988 and onward).

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Countries/Regions: Israel-Palestine, Middle East, Lebanon, Syria

This chapter addresses the Islamic Jihad's negative stance toward the peace process, which is rooted in the cornerstone of their ideology: the belief that Palestine is the focal point of an historical-cultural struggle between the Muslims and their eternal enemies, the Jews and the Christians, and must be liberated by a holy war. In this view, no one has the right to "barter any of this land away," and thus the Islamic Jihad condemned the PLO's abandonment of the strategy of complete liberation of Palestine in favor of the historic compromise with Israel. Arafat denounced the Islamic Jihad as an agent of Shiite Iran, and the Islamic Jihad's leaders responded by charging that Arafat was only trying to secure the survival of the PLO on behalf of his patrons - the West and the Arab regimes. After a series of suicide bombings, members of the Islamic Jihad (who were attempting to create a broad resistance to the Oslo Accords among the Palestinians) were imprisoned by the Palestinian Authority security forces in early 1994. Meanwhile, Hamas developed an increasingly tolerant view of the Islamic Jihad, noting that the main differences between the groups were over methods of activity, not over principles, and emphasizing that the Palestinian area was broad enough to accommodate several Islamic movements.

|-------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|

Countries/Regions: Israel-Palestine, Middle East, Lebanon, Syria


This book traces the rise of the Islamic Jihad, its ideological platform, and its relations with other political forces both within and outside the Palestinian area. The Islamic Jihad, which emerged in the early 1980s in the Gaza Strip, played a key role in molding radical Islam and establishing it as a legitimate form of struggle against Israel. Its main features were in two inter-related areas: ideological, in blending politics with violence; and social, in constituting a young, educated leadership cadre from the lower stratum dedicated to changing reality by revolutionary means.

Selected segments of the Islamic Jihad's charter, covering ideology, goals and objectives, are provided in an appendix. The study provides a basis for a wider discussion of how Palestinian Islamists deal with the new political reality created by the Oslo Accords, particularly the shift of the PLO from a liberation movement to a sovereign entity with coercive power.

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Countries/Regions: Israel-Palestine, Middle East, Lebanon, Syria


This book covers the origins and evolution of the independence movements on the Indian subcontinent. The author describes nationalist movements - such as Jugantar and the Anushilan Samiti - which fought British occupation throughout the first decade of the century. Leaders of these movements - such as Khudiram
Bose, Aurobindo Ghose and Pulin - are referred to in the book as "freedom fighters". Another prominent revolutionary - Bengali statesman and nationalist leader Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose - constructed an Indian National Army and created a revolutionary atmosphere (including inspiring the revolt of the sailors of the British Indian Navy) which eventually provided the impetus for the British withdrawal from the subcontinent almost 40 years later.

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In this final chapter of his book, Hefner argues that democratization involves the interaction between civic organizations and democratic culture, and must be reinforced by the creation of a civilized and self-limiting state. The state must open itself to public participation, and act as a guardian of public civility as well as a vehicle of the popular will. At the same time, independent courts and watchdog agencies must be ready to intervene when some citizen or official tries to replace democratic proceduralism with violence. The key to democracy's possibility thus builds on incremental and strategic interventions at many points in the democratic circle: civil associations, a free press and judiciary, the egalitarian diffusion of wealth and opportunity, and public support for citizens and leaders committed to these goals. The Indonesian example thus illustrates the fragility and variability of the democratic process. Hefner argues that what is needed is a civil-religious approach, in which public religion is promoted but distanced from the machinery of the state. The desire for democracy and civil decency is as important in the Muslim world as it is elsewhere.

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In this introductory chapter, Hefner describes the purpose of his book as examining the relationship of Islam to democratization in Indonesia. He argues that despite the rich civic precedents and popular support for democratization, the regime that ruled the country from 1966 to 1998 was one of the world's most shrewdly authoritarian. The crisis of 1997-99 underscored the scale of the challenge faced by Indonesian democrats of all faiths. Although Suharto stepped down in 1998, most of his supporters did not. Hefner argues that democratic consolidation will require not just a civil society of independent associations, but a public culture of equality, justice, and universal citizenship. In the aftermath of a great Islamic revival, the creation of such a democratic culture will be impossible unless it can build on the solid ground of civil Islam. While affirming the legitimacy of religion in public life, civil Islam rejects the mirage of the "Islamic" state, recognizing that this formula for fusing religion and state authority ignores the lessons of Muslim history itself. Without checks and balances in state and society, the "Islamic" state subordinates Muslim ideals to the dark intrigues of party bosses and religious thugs. Thus, the Indonesian example reminds us that while a civil society and civic culture are required to make democracy work, by themselves they are still not enough - a healthy,
civilized state is also required.

### Topic 1: Religion and Conflict

**Topic 2:** Political Islam

**Topic 3:** Case Studies

### Countries/Regions: Indonesia


This chapter addresses the role of Zionist rabbis such as A.I. Kook, Moshe Levinger, and Zvi Yehuda. Through yeshiva high schools (religious boarding schools), these and other rabbis promoted the view that facilitating the return of the Jewish people to their homeland and to sovereignty was an act of redemptive duty for all Jews. They influenced the development of a generation committed to reclaiming Israel's past, which led to the founding of Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) and their increasingly active involvement in Jewish settlements in the region. Subsequent peace agreements between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's administration and the PLO served to pull together the radical Zionist rabbis into a singular group, who began issuing proclamations encouraging Jews to take up arms to prevent the relinquishing of lands in Gaza and elsewhere that should be rightfully part of Israel. Such encouragement convinced Yigal Amir to assassinate Rabin in November, 1995. Following the national shock, government officials began investigating various rabbis for inciting violence. These events served to deepen the division between expansionist religious Zionists and secular Israel.

### Topic 1: Religion and Conflict

**Topic 2:** Religious Ideology

### Countries/Regions: Israel


This chapter explores why hostage-taking situations have the potential for being stressful for presidents, the constraining effects that this stress can have on decision making, and some ways to help limit the impact of stress on the future. Hostage crises can quickly become personal issues for presidents, fueled by a non-stop barrage of media attention, anguished calls for action from relatives and the general public, and the need to protect the president's domestic authority and international prestige. The authors propose five strategies for reducing stress in hostage-taking events. 1) humanize the enemy; 2) depersonalize the situation for the president - keep the problem at the policy level, educate the media, keep hostages' families away from the president, and set up a standard operating procedure for dealing with such events; 3) "emotionally inoculate" the people involved in the decision process; 4) encourage dissent among the president's advisers; and 5) continue the study of how presidents manage stress. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

### Topic 1: National Terrorism Policy

**Topic 2:** Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspectives

**Topic 3:** Terrorism and the Media

### Countries/Regions: United States
(174.) Hersh, Seymour M. "The Missiles of August." *The New Yorker*, vol. 74, no. 31 (Oct 12, 1998), 34-42.

The White House claimed that it had convincing evidence to support the strikes against Osama bin Laden in Sudan and Afghanistan. However, according to Hersh, experts are not convinced.

**Topic 1:**
**Case Studies**

**Countries/Regions:** United States, Afghanistan, Sudan

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The author provides a brief biography of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, one of "a handful of passionate and extraordinary men responsible for the creation of modern Zionist thought." In 1921, Kook became the head of the rabbinical court of appeals and the first chief rabbi of Palestine after the British mandate, an office he held until his death in 1935. Kook's view of Zionism argued that the present generation was the one foretold in prophecy as the age of the coming of the Messiah. Following the biographical summary, the rest of the chapter is comprised of selections from Kook's writings, in which he discusses various dimensions of Eretz Israel.

**Topic 1:**
**Religion and Conflict**

**Topic 2:**
**Religious Ideology**

**Countries/Regions:** Israel

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On January 13, 1987, Mohammed Hamadei, a 22-year-old Lebanese wanted in the U.S. for his alleged role in the brutal 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, was arrested in Frankfurt by West German police. Within hours, the U.S. formally requested that West Germany extradite Hamadei to the U.S. for trial. Within days, however, two Germans were kidnapped in Beirut and word reached Bonn to release Hamadei or the hostages would die. This case sketches the attempts of the Reagan administration to promote international counter-terrorism policies, explores the legal structures around which such policies take form, and traces the complex reactions of the German and American governments to the legal and political problems posed by Hamadei's arrest and the subsequent hostage-takings. It conveys a basic picture of the interagency conduct of international legal affairs, and to highlight the chief legal and political factors that influence international cooperation against terrorism.

**Topic 1:**
**Case Studies**

**Topic 2:**
**Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective**

**Countries/Regions:** Germany, United States

This case examines both the intelligence and legal ramifications of the Achille Lauro cruise ship hijacking. Part A (863.0) recounts events from the point of the hijacking until the U.S. decision to intercept an Egyptian plane on which the hijackers were being flown to safety, as part of a deal for the release of the passengers. The case examines the various response options weighed by the U.S. (including that of a military rescue) and the supporting intelligence assessments. Part B (864.0) tells the story of the legal complications which resulted from the successful interception of the Egyptian plane, raising questions as to the applicability of legal frameworks to national and international responses to terrorism. The case examines the relevant differences between the Italian and U.S. judicial systems and the confluence between legal imperatives and political constraints in cases of terrorist incidents.

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Countries/Regions: United States, Italy


In 1987, officials of the National Security Council inter-agency group dealing with counter-terrorism learned of the whereabouts of Fawaz Yunis, a suspect in a 1985 airline hijacking. Over the following months, officials of the FBI and U.S. intelligence agencies mounted a "sting" operation that resulted in Yunis' arrest on the high seas off Cyprus and his transport to Washington. Officials were satisfied that, with this arrest, they had demonstrated the U.S. government had the logistical means and willingness to pursue terrorism suspects abroad and bring them to the U.S. for trial. This case study describes the difficulties for the prosecution, which hoped that Yunis' trial would test recent U.S. legal statutes relating to terrorist acts committed abroad and provide a precedent for an "extra-territorial arrest" by U.S. law enforcement agents.

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Countries/Regions: United States


The trial in France of Lebanese national Georges Abdallah, accused in the murder of an American diplomat, forces the U.S. Justice Department to consider strategies aimed at ensuring conviction and a prison term while having to work through the complexities of a foreign legal system. Knowing that politics might dictate the accused terrorist's release, U.S. officials seek a strategy that will serve their ends and not offend the

Heymann argues that while domestic counterterrorism actions are important, the U.S. can most effectively stem the tide of terrorism by concentrating outside its borders. He acknowledges that the U.S. has limited capacity to act within those states most likely to harbor terrorists, but believes that the U.S. can combine military threats, economic and political incentives, and moral imperatives to pressure such states to act against terrorist groups within their borders. He further argues that because states that harbor terrorists are likely to be despotic and thus more willing to use harsh counterterrorism methods against constituents, these states (with the proper encouragement) could take actions that will prove to be more effective than anything the U.S. would use.

Hill, Paul. Various Internet essays and material. Available online at: http://armyofgod.com

This website provides an extensive collection of information resources on Paul Hill. Sections of the website include titles such as "Anti-abortion heroes of the faith" and "Anti-abortion prisoners," a Paul Hill message board, and the online version of Paul Hill's book, Mix My Blood with the Blood of the Unborn. WARNING: Explicit images of bloody fetuses on the home page are not for the squeamish.


Hoffman argues that the expected graduation of terrorists from guns and bombs to CBRN weapons has not occurred and is an unlikely threat. He challenges the notion that the Aum Shinrikyo case represented a watershed event with regard to CBRN terrorism, stating that rather than showing the ease with which a terrorist group could acquire CBRN weapons the case showed "the immense technological difficulties faced by any non-state entity in attempting to weaponize and effectively disseminate chemical and biological weapons." He also criticizes U.S. planning for CBRN terrorism for focusing on worst-case scenarios instead of less serious incidents that may, in fact, be of more utility to terrorists. In conclusion, Hoffman argues that while there is a threat of CBRN terrorism, it is an unlikely one and will not shake the foundations of the nation, as some observers suggest. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN

Hoffman provides an in-depth study of the definition of terrorism in the first chapter of his book. He begins by acknowledging that terrorism is not easily defined and then follows terrorism through its modern history as a method of showing how the meaning of the word has changed. He does not attempt to develop a succinct definition, but rather defined terrorism by its differences from criminal activity, guerilla warfare, personal assassinations, and other deviant activity. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)


Part Two (p. 27-174) of this volume addresses issues of constitution and structures, special policing and executive powers, and criminal procedures in Northern Ireland, while Part Three (p. 175-278) addresses a similar collection of issues in the Republic of Ireland. In their discussion on Northern Ireland, the authors conclude that legal reforms and government strategies deployed since 1972 cannot hope to transform patterns of behavior and allegiances established over centuries, but may decrease alienation and contain (but not eradicate) political violence. In their analysis of the Irish Free State, the authors note that the Republic's criminal justice system has not been profoundly affected by political violence, and the level of support for paramilitary activity is low. Also, the Constitution of Ireland guarantees certain fundamental rights and (unlike in Northern Ireland) courts in the Republic do not allow the ill-treatment of suspects, the denial of their right to legal advice or their detention in illegal custody. However, as a result of political violence, some standards of criminal justice have mirrored trends their Northern Ireland, including special arrest powers for offences against the state and the ability of police to hold individuals 'for questioning'. The authors conclude with a call for a national parliamentary review of these issues as a first step towards ensuring the long-term health of the democratic society.

In this introduction, Holm and Sorensen claim that globalization and the end of the Cold War combine to have the greatest effect on the current world order. Both events affect world regions differently. They observe that globalization is increasing worldwide in the economic, political and social sectors. However the process is not affecting all areas of the world equally, thus the phrase "uneven globalization." They also assert that the post-Cold War security environment has undergone quantitative rather than qualitative changes. Finally, they suggest that the future move towards globalization will be one in which security, economics, and politics are focused on a regional, rather than global, level.


In the first of two articles on the fundraising activities of the Provisional IRA (PIRA), the extent and nature of the PIRA's finance operations are described. The areas of kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, extortion and drug trading, although very specific, serve to illustrate the nature and potential complexity of fundraising activities, the general issues that surround them, as well as specific internal organizational issues and factors indicative of an acute awareness by PIRA leaders of the environments within which they and members of their organization operate. How the PIRA's involvement in certain kinds of criminal activities can and does influence not only their operational development and successes but also the development and sustenance of support for the PIRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, is discussed, It is clear that the absence of direct PIRA involvement in certain forms of criminality is imperative for the development of Sinn Fein's political successes. The descriptive data and implications presented here, along with case-study material, discussions and interpretations presented in a second article, clarify many general and conceptual issues emerging from terrorist financing. Both articles illustrate the PIRA leadership's many internal organizational concerns relating to fundraising, the links between the PIRA's militants and Sinn Fein - and between PIRA and Sinn Fein fundraising - and the relative sophistication of the Republican movement as a whole.


This volume, edited by two U.S. Army officers with extensive special operations combat and training experience, addresses the overall themes of defining global terrorism threats, identifying their sources and locations, and implementing effective strategies for responding to (and defending against) these threats. Over thirty contributed articles (about 75% of which were written by prominent scholars, policymakers, and military professionals after September 11th) are organized around themes including: definitions and models of terrorism; dimensions of religion; weapons of mass destruction; criminal organizations and other non-
religions and religious dimensions; strategies and approaches for combating terrorism; and organizational elements for fighting terrorism, including intelligence, law enforcement, and the military. The volume in its entirety serves as a useful textbook for undergraduate and graduate courses on terrorism and counterterrorism. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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This report assesses the activities of organized crime groups, terrorist groups, and narcotics traffickers in general in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, focusing mainly on the period 1999-2002. The report indicates that various Islamic groups have a presence in the TBA and are probably cooperating in the region; they are using the TBA for purposes of safe haven, fund-raising, money laundering, recruitment, training, plotting, and other terrorist-related activities; an informal alliance exists among the Islamic terrorist groups, organized crime mafias, and corrupt government or police officials in the region, which reaps multi-million-dollar profits from illicit activities (such as narcotics, arms trafficking, and product piracy); if TBA-based Hezbollah and al Qaeda are plotting any anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, their most likely targets would be U.S. embassies and consulates in South America; the capabilities of the security forces in the TBA are inadequate for ridding the region of the Islamic terrorist groups, organized crime mafias, and corrupt officials who do business with them; and laws for combating terrorist fund-raising, money-laundering, organized crime activities in general, and official corruption in this region are also inadequate.

**Topic 1:**
Terrorism, Money and Crime

**Countries/Regions:** Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay


This report reviews the literature on individual psychological and sociological characteristics of terrorists in an effort to determine how the terrorist profile may have changed in recent decades, or whether they share common sociological attributes. The author acknowledges that the isolation of attributes or traits shared by terrorists is fraught with difficulty, and efforts to create a profile or "typical" terrorist have yielded mixed results. A review of educational, occupational, and sociological backgrounds observed among terrorists reveals interesting, but inconclusive, patterns. One finding, though, is fairly substantiated - most terrorists are not diagnosably psychopathic or mentally sick. Terrorist groups are highly selective in whom they recruit, which partially accounts for the low number of pathological members in their ranks. The report also concludes that the psychological approach by itself is insufficient to understanding what motivates terrorists, and argues that an interdisciplinary approach is needed. An extensive (120 page) appendix is included, offering brief profiles of several ethnic separatist groups, religious fundamentalist groups, and their leaders. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:**
Terrorist's Movements and Psychology

This monograph discusses two moral frameworks within which the United States can fight the war on terror. Since the war on terror is likely to be long, unlike previous conflicts fought over territory, and global in scale, the United States must mobilize and sustain domestic, international, and media support if it is to succeed. Criminal justice and just war are two moral frameworks necessary for success. The criminal justice framework denies terrorist groups all legitimacy, but has serious drawbacks in that it is designed specifically to protect the rights of those whom the government intends to prosecute. The just war framework allows all instruments of national power to be used against the enemy, but has serious drawbacks in that treating terrorists as legitimate combatants may encourage their behavior and allow them to seek overt support. The author concludes that, when terrorist groups meet certain criteria, fighting the war on terror under the just war framework will not only allow the United States to bring its full resources to bear, but encourage the necessary domestic, international, and media support necessary to fight a protracted war.

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy

**Topic 2:** Counterterrorism Policy - Macro Perspective

**Countries/Regions:** United States

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(191.) Huntington, Sam. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 22-49.

This article describes Huntington's theory that forceful conflict of the future will occur between different civilizations. Huntington claims that nation states will remain politically powerful, but that any conflicts they enter will be based on differences in civilization. In a future he defines by globalization, Huntington asserts that the eight major civilizations (Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African) have basic cultural differences that are not negotiable and that will be exacerbated by the shrinking global community. Huntington separates globalization into Westernization and modernization, asserting that cultural differences will cause most nations to modernize but not Westernize, and that the differences will promote increasing political and economic regionalism at the least, if not result in bloody conflict.

**Topic 1:** Global Environment

**Countries/Regions:**

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(192.) Ignatieff, Michael. "Intervention and State Failure." *Dissent* (Winter 2002), 115-123

This article offers an historical review of the interaction between sovereignty and human rights since 1945, and describes how the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention has developed in response to the epidemic of state failure since the end of the cold war. Ignatieff argues that without the basic institutions of a state, no basic human rights protection is possible. As long as populations are menaced by banditry, civil war, guerrilla campaigns, and counter-insurgency by beleaguered governments, they cannot be secure. If chaos rather than tyranny is the chief cause of human rights abuse, then activists will have to rethink their traditional
suspicion of the state and of the exercise of sovereignty. Also, if state fragmentation and collapse are the chief sources of human rights abuse, the debate over humanitarian intervention needs to be rethought.

**Topic 1:**
**Historical Context**


In this paper, the author examines the role of intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) in force protection, and provides suggestions for improving the U.S. Air Force's ability to detect, analyze, and investigate force protection threats. He first suggests the Air Force must clarify the roles of Air Force Intelligence and CI in force protection, and produce comprehensive CI doctrine. Secondly, he discusses the need to increase the presence of Air Force CI personnel in major U.S. cities and key foreign areas. He also offers proposals to increase the number of Air Force personnel engaged in CI collection activities. Finally, he discusses the need for the Air Force to clearly assign responsibility for the analysis of force protection intelligence, and develop force protection analytical cells at the Headquarters Air Force, major command, and numbered Air Force levels. In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our force protection efforts, we must be able to collect and analyze information on potential terrorists, saboteurs or other force protection threats in any location where Air Force resources and personnel operate.

**Topic 1:**
**Counterterrorism Instruments**

**Countries/Regions:** United States


This book provides a comprehensive review of Hezbollah’s founding and key figures; the organization's tactics, goals and objectives; its leadership structure, hierarchy and decision-making; its relations with Syria and Iran; and its use of the media. While Hezbollah's initial goal was to launch a revolt against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, its manifesto of February 16, 1985 stated that "what befalls the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, or anywhere else verily affects the body of our Islamic nation." Hezbollah associates the West with European colonialism and struggle for independence from colonial rule, and believe West's opposition to its vision for Lebanon is rooted in the Crusades and history of Christian antagonism towards Islam. Jaber notes that the Party of God's participation in the 1992 parliamentary elections (Hezbollah won in a landslide wherever it had candidates, and 8 members were elected to Parliament) helped legitimate its Islamic Resistance.

**Topic 1:**
**Religion and Conflict**

**Topic 2:**
**Political Islam**

**Topic 3:**
**Case Studies**

**Countries/Regions:** Lebanon, Middle East

This article deals examines the concept of nuclear terrorism, with the goal of determining the likelihood of this form of terrorist act. The author examines possible avenues for terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials, including theft of an intact nuclear weapon, construction of a nuclear device, construction of a radiological weapon, and reactor sabotage or destruction. The author then attempts to explain why there have been no nuclear terrorist incidents. He attributes this to three reasons: (1) conventional means may accomplish terrorist objectives; (2) conventional means tend to be safer and have relatively predictable consequences; and (3) conventional means have "consequences and outcomes which have a 'history,' both in terms of damage and in terms of public opinion." Nevertheless, Jacobs warns against complacency, suggesting that it is not a given that "this state of affairs will continue indefinitely" and that current national and transnational measures designed to combat this threat may not have contained the threat. He concludes by arguing that the first terrorist use of a nuclear or radiological device will set a dangerous precedent: "Terrorist groups will realize that it is technically possible to create a weapon which was formerly only available only to the world's most advanced countries." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topic 1:**
CBRN Terrorism


Terrorists target state legitimacy, and are a transnational threat to liberal democracies. Comparative studies reveal that if societies of liberal states must condone their states' counter-terrorist policies, then those societies must reach a minimal level of consensus on how to view justice, human rights, rule of law, civil liberties, etc. Drawing on the case of the Basque separatist movement, the author connects theories of international relations, security studies and comparative politics by examining how the combination of Spain's adherence to democratic principles during its transition and its cooperation with France facilitated Spain's democratic consolidation and mitigation of the Basque terrorist threat. Jebb concludes that because of its legitimacy (by addressing the concerns of the Basques politically through its inclusive democratization efforts), Spain was able to marginalize ETA and treat it more like a criminal organization than a wartime adversary. Also, both France and Spain bolstered the strength of their liberal democracies by more effectively cooperating with each other.

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy
**Topic 2:** Case Studies

**Countries/Regions:** Spain, France, United States


In this brief monograph, Jenkins observes that the ability of U.S. agencies to detect and prevent future terrorist attacks is limited, although al Qaeda must now operate in a less-permissive environment. The greatest challenge, he argues, is that as military operations move beyond a single theater, the more complex
Jenkins offers a variety of policy recommendations, which include making sure the destruction of al Qaeda remains the primary aim; keeping Pakistan on the side of the allies; creating new networks to exploit intelligence across frontiers; and incorporating tools of political warfare, aimed at reducing the appeal of extremists, encouraging alternate views, and discouraging terrorists' use of WMD. He also argues that the goals of the war on terrorism cannot be accomplished unilaterally; international cooperation is a prerequisite for success, although this war must be conducted in a way that is consistent with American values.

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**Topic 1:** Strategies to Respond and Defeat Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** National Terrorism Policy  
**Countries/Regions:** United States

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This book offers a guide to images of terrorism seen daily in the mass media. The author argues that all too often, scholars and journalists accept uncritically the interpretations of terrorism they receive from governments and official agencies. Our perceptions of terrorism formed by the interaction of bureaucratic agencies, academics, and private experts, and the mass media do not necessarily reflect objective reality. According to Jenkins, terrorism - like any other problem - is socially constructed.

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In this brief introductory article, Johnson and Martin suggest that as a tool of the weak, terrorism rarely succeeds in achieving its political goals. Historical insights suggest that laws governing domestic and international actions against terrorism must be adapted for comprehensive intelligence collection and for prompt action on that intelligence. Appropriate safeguards must also be provided. Terrorists must be separated from their popular support base as well as from any state support they may be receiving. And every effort must be taken to maintain the will of Americans and coalition partners in the War on Terrorism. Focusing on the inherent weaknesses of terrorist organizations will lead to their eventual destruction.

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**Topic 1:** New Threats  
**Topic 2:** National Terrorism Policy  
**Countries/Regions:** United States

In the selection from his book, Johnson explains how the idea of Holy War has developed within Christians and Islamic traditions. He introduces the two worlds idea inherent in both religions, and shows how that separation is used to decide when war can be fought.

**Topic 1:**
Religious Ideology


In this opening chapter of his book, Johnson looks at the development of political structure within the Western and Islamic worlds to show how Western nations divorce themselves from religion, considering it to be a divisive idea, while Islamic nations embrace religion as a unifying part of state structure.

**Topic 1:**
Religious Ideology

**Topic 2:**
Political Islam


In these two selections, Johnson explains the theories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello and discusses historical ideas about the treatment of noncombatants in time of war. Johnson’s discussion surrounding noncombatants (p. 119-124) explains how such a distinction is called for by both international law and moral codes. His discussion about the just war tradition explains the seven tenets of jus ad bellum (just cause, right authority, right intentions, proportionality of ends, last resort, reasonable hope of success, and the aim of peace) and the two elements of jus in bello (proportionality of means, and discrimination between combatants and noncombatants) and gives adequate attention to both their theoretical background and how they can be upheld or challenged by common present-day international practice. The largest problem with the selection on just war theory centers on the fact that it is rooted in Western ideals and experiences, and may not adequately cover recent conflicts based on religion and civil uproar.

**Topic 1:**
Religious Ideology

**Topic 2:**
Defining Terrorism


Jones writes that relatively little attention has been paid to the manner in which intelligence has been used by Israel in its attempts to curb what it regards as Palestinian terrorism. This article looks at the way in which tactical or operational intelligence has come to be used by both the Israel Defense Forces and the political
leadership to inform strategic choice, a position that favors a military rather than political solution to the ongoing violence. It examines closely the reasons for the emergence of this "attitudinal prism" and concludes with a prescriptive call for the National Security Council to be put on a statutory civilian footing if more balanced and coherent assessments regarding the nature and scope of Palestinian violence are to be reached.

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Countries/Regions: Israel, Palestine, Middle East

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One network of militant Muslims has produced all the Indonesian nationals so far suspected of links to al-Qaeda. This briefing paper explains how that network emerged, its historical antecedents, and the political dynamics over the last two decades that led some of its members from Indonesia to Malaysia to Afghanistan. The network has as its hub a religious boarding school (pesantren or pondok) near Solo, Central Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, after the village where the school is located. The "Ngruki network" began to coalesce in the late 1970s as Indonesian intelligence operatives embarked on an operation to expose potential political enemies of then President Suharto. It drew in additional members in the early 1980s, many of whom had served time in prison for anti-government activities. The author describes the common characteristics of these members, and the organization and leadership of the network's inner core.

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Countries/Regions: Indonesia

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Joseph recognizes the attempts of the U.S. military to increase readiness in combating NBC threats on the battlefield, but believes that the military's talk of threat prevention has not translated into effective action. Joseph identifies deficiencies in doctrine, force structure, training, and education, and underscores that the military must make progress in these areas if our preparation for combat is to remain high.

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Countries/Regions: United States

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This article provides an historical overview of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a guerilla/terrorist group representing the minority Tamil community, fighting for an Eelam, or homeland in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Led by V. Pirabhakaram, the group started as a small forty to fifty man outfit in the early 1980s, but has since grown to an organization of several thousand. A unique, if
The macabre feature of its tactics has been the use of suicide commandos, both men and women, some in their early teens, for individual assassination as well as mass attacks. A former Indian prime minister, a Sri Lankan president, and several top aides have been targeted and killed in this way. The LTTE has not hesitated to kill prominent Sinhala civilians. Between 1987 and 1990 LTTE fought the Indian Army, which was sent to disarm it as part of an Indian-Sri Lankan agreement. After the Indian pullout in 1990, the organization used a suicide bomber to carry out the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Thereafter, Indian authorities unraveled a well-organized network of safe houses, supporters, and logistics depots in Tamil Nadu. India maintains a strict naval cordon sanitaire around the area of conflict, which shows no signs of abating.

**Topic 1:** Revolutionary Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** Ethnic Separatism  
**Topic 3:** Case Studies  

**Countries/Regions:** Sri Lanka

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The author explores how and why the combination of religious conviction and hatred of secular society translates into the selection of potential terrorist targets. While many of the bombing sites chosen by the Lebanese Amal and Hezbollah movements in the 1980s and 1990s were military, terrorist groups such as Hamas and al Qaeda have attacked symbols of political and economic power (such as embassies and trade centers) and centers of secular life (including residence halls, office buildings, buses, shopping malls, cruise boats, and coffee houses). Although Islam is generally ambiguous about violence, there are some tenets of the religion that condone struggle and the use of violence, and Juergensmeyer draws from these to explore the meaning and application of the terms jihad and intifada.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 2:** Religious Ideology  

**Countries/Regions:** Middle East

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Juergensmeyer underscores the differences between what he calls the "new terrorism" and terrorism of old. The new terrorism is often based on religious traditions, and proves especially worrisome as it is hard to determine a clear motive for its actions, which appear to be completely random. It defies an easy sense of classification and explanation that was available with terrorism in the mid-twentieth century.

**Topic 1:** Defining Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** Terrorism's New Model  
**Topic 3:** New Threats

In this selection Juergensmeyer explores the ideological basis for American Christian militant groups, and shows that violent acts based on religious fervor are not the sole domain of Islamic terrorists. Juergensmeyer describes his interview with Reverend Michael Bray, a convicted abortion clinic bomber, and explores Bray's justification for his actions. Juergensmeyer then illustrates how some Christian theological interpretations support Bray's ideas, as well as the larger Christian movements of Reconstruction Theology (which wants to supplant the U.S.'s secular government with one based on religious principles) and the Christian Identity Movement (which believes in racial supremacy and religious law).

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Countries/Regions: United States


Juergensmeyer describes the new religious revolutionaries altering the political landscape in the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. His study of religious movements that decisively reject Western ideas of secular nationalism includes Muslim leaders in Egypt, Palestine, and Algeria, rabbis in Israel, militant Sikhs in India, and Catholic clergy in Eastern Europe. These are portrayed as modern activists pursuing a legitimate form of politics, rather than as wild-eyed, anti-American fanatics. Noting that the synthesis of traditional religion and secular nationalism yields a religious version of the modern nation-state, the author claims that such a political entity could conceivably embrace democratic values and human rights.

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Countries/Regions: Egypt, Israel-Palestine, India, Algeria


In this article, Survival presents the responses from three scholars of WMD to a previously published article by Falkenrath, and then lets Falkenrath respond to their critiques. In the original article, Falkenrath claims that WMD terrorism is a low probability event, but one that would carry grave consequences, and writes that governments should take a more active role in countering this possibility. Stern's response fairly echoes Falkenrath's, while Kamp seems to agree with the assertion that nuclear terrorism is not threat at all, and chemical and biological terrorism should be emphasized. Pilat appears to disagree with Falkenrath by believing that the low probability of WMD terrorism negates the need for countries to pay special attention to the threat, and he calls instead for more focus on conventional threats.

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In this chapter of her book, Kanter discusses the concrete social practices that helped generate and sustain the commitment of individuals belonging to nineteenth century communes. She notes that successful groups tend to have stronger and greater numbers of commitment mechanisms (specific ways of ordering and defining the existence of a group). Every aspect of group life has implications for commitment, including property, work, boundaries, recruitment, intimate relationships, group contact, leadership and ideology. The chapter addresses issues of personal sacrifice, investment (committing one's personal profit to the group), renunciation (relinquishing relationships that are potentially disruptive to group cohesion) and communion (renouncing separate attachments in order to find collective unity, brotherhood and comradeship). Kanter concludes in addition to these and other commitment mechanisms, successful communities also benefit from charismatic leaders who provide ideological meaning and order, communally-accepted philosophical guidance, and the establishment and maintenance of traditions.


This short news story focuses on the transnational nature of Al Qaeda. The authors show how Osama bin Laden leads a network that tightly controls its own operations, and also links to other terrorists groups to bankroll and encourage their own operations. A vignette about bin Laden's son marrying the daughter of a member of the Egyptian group Islamic Jihad underscores the point that al Qaeda is a network run on personal relationships and will be difficult to counter.


In this detailed and informative case study, Kaplan explains the genesis of Aum Shinrikyo, from the ideology of its leader to the recruitment of the members. He goes on to describe how the group financed its activities and developed and used chemical and biological weapons. He goes on to demonstrate how the group's particular worldview rationalized its plans for mass murder.

This article focuses on Islamic terrorism in the framework of overall Islamic activity in Turkey. It argues that Islamic terrorist organizations active in Turkey during the 1990s strived to establish an Islamic Sharia'-based state on the Iranian model, capitalized on deep social and political divisions in Turkish society, and at the same time strengthened these divisions by their violence. These groups enjoyed wide Iranian support and often acted on behalf of Iranian local, regional, political and strategic interests. The reaction of Turkish authorities in the past to Islamic terrorist activity was limited and thus encouraged leaders of these groups and their sponsors to continue escalating violence hoping it would bring down the secular democratic regime in Turkey. Overall, the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Turkey has understood the constraints and dangers of a direct clash with the nationalist Kemalist ideology and especially with a military establishment sworn to defend the secular regime and its values at all costs.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 2:** Case Studies  
**Countries/Regions:** Turkey


This brief article provides an overview of the key groups responsible for terrorist attacks in Turkey during the 1990s. Many of these, Karmon argues, are related to the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, and his forthcoming trial in Turkey. Besides the PKK and other Islamic terrorist groups (such as the Turkish Hizballah), two more extreme leftist organizations have been active in Turkey during these years - the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), a spin-off of Dev-Sol, Turkey's most deadly urban leftist guerrilla group and - the Turkish Workers and Peasants Liberation Army (TIKKO). The author concludes that caution is needed by governments and these groups to prevent a violent confrontation.

**Topic 1:** Case Studies  
**Topic 2:** Religion and Conflict Management  
**Countries/Regions:** Turkey


This chapter explores the different norms and means through which Germany and Japan - two countries profoundly suspicious of military issues and deeply afraid of being drawn into military engagements - have increased the power of their internal security forces. In both cases, growing police power has moved away from a preoccupation with reacting to the threat of civil war or massive social unrest to focus on generating the social intelligence necessary to prevent the threat of terrorism and violent social protest. The author argues that institutionalized norms influence state behavior, setting the standards of appropriate behavior and offering a way of organizing action. Japan's normative vision centers on the notion of an economic partnership in an international society of states, while Germany's institutionalized norm involves the desire to
see the state fully integrated in a variety of international partnerships. Important differences in Germany's and Japan's policies of defending state security against threats posed by terrorism and violent social protest cannot be explained solely in terms of their domestic structures or the international structures that condition policy in the international system. An explanation of Germany's and Japan's policies of internal security must also pay attention to the normative context that frames political choices.

**Topic 1:** Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective  **Topic 2:** Case Studies  **Topic 3:** National Terrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions:** Japan, Germany


The author suggests that Germany's and Japan's very different approaches to counterterrorism are useful reminders of American exceptionalism. A comparative analysis of counterterrorism policies between the U.S., Germany, and Japan raises a host of questions about alliance cohesion and reveals the considerable diversity - even among liberal democracies - among national security ideologies and judicial philosophies. Clearly, waging a "war" against an enemy whose preferred staging areas for planning operations are the societies of America's liberal allies in Europe and Asia - and American society itself - will be difficult.

**Topic 1:** Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective  **Topic 2:** National Terrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions:** United States, Germany, Japan


Kellen argues that West German terrorism grew out of general popular discontent after WWII, when many former civil leaders, who had been members of the Nazi party, repented and were put right back into positions of power. He writes of the terrorism as one step beyond a growing youth rebellion against the status quo. Kellen views the West German terrorists as psychologically unsound individuals who cared only for influencing change in the political system, not in planning what would follow that change. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** Terrorist Movements and Psychology  **Topic 2:** Domestic Terrorism  **Topic 3:** Revolutionary Terrorism

**Countries/Regions:** Germany


Kelsay notes that over the last 1400 years, the Muslim tradition has deliberated on two issues of political justice and the requirements of ethical conduct. The first category of thought includes questions regarding how one establishes, maintains, and participates in a just state. The second category includes topics such as
warrior codes and the prescriptions of the ethical use of force in conflicts. With recent world events, the dispute on these issues has become more heated in the Islamic world, particularly due to articles published on the internet by Al Qaeda sympathizers and specific programs on the Al Jazeera network. Even more controversial is the letter from Osama Bin Laden to the American people, in which he claims that there are no American non-combatants since, being a democracy, all Americans share in the guilt of the American government's actions. Overall, critical issues of political justice frame a great deal of debate not only in Western societies, but in the Islamic world as well.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Violence  
**Topic 2:** Religious Ideology

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This article addresses the old adage: one person's terrorist is simply another's freedom fighter. In the context of continual terrorist violence in the Middle East and in the wake of the 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis advanced by Samuel Huntington, a major question arises: are there shared norms that transcend religion, culture, even civilizations that can and should provide a guide for distinguishing between terrorism and other acts of war or conflict? This article addresses one aspect of the overall question of shared norms, examining the norms established in both western Christian and secular and Islamic 'just war' traditions and their modern derivatives in terms of their utility as a guide for differentiating between terrorism and what might otherwise be simply called irregular warfare. The article concludes that generally shared norms exist among western Christian and secular and Islamic 'just war' traditions, although a number of factors contribute to differences of perspective between and among Muslims and members of many western societies. Among these factors are (1) a revival of jus ad bellum thinking that operates to the detriment of jus in bello, (2) United Nations restrictions on the use of force are not universally accepted, and (3) the impact of national liberation movements and national liberation theology. Such factors have contributed to an absence of a clear consensus on the definition of terrorism, which has been complicated further by the tendency among many western nations to adopt definitions that are overly inclusive.

**Topic 1:** Defining Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** Religious Ideology  
**Topic 3:** Holy War

**Countries/Regions:** Middle East

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Khashan studies the rise of militant Islamic groups in an attempt to discover what fuels their increasing popularity. He asserts that four factors have proved most decisive in the groups' growth: Islamic revivalism after the failure of the secular state, as seen in the Six Day War; refusal of ruling elites to open the political system; Western views of militant Islam as exclusively a security issue; and failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Khashan argues that militant Islamic groups derive most of their support from the local population (not from state sponsorship), and the four factors mentioned above combine to produce a population willing to support violent action.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 2:** Political Islam

Kinzer describes how susceptible the Central Asian republics are to (mainly Muslim) religious fundamentalists. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these republics have seen their standard of living sharply decline. Muslim fundamentalist fighters enter the area and promote religious rule, and the desperate environment encourages more people to listen. Kinzer also touches on the U.S.'s lack of attention to this area, derived from the feeling that it is too far away, and what happens in Central Asia does not matter.

**Countries/Regions: Central Asia**

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The author points to "a close relationship" that exists between terrorism, the global pursuit of oil, and U.S. national security, resulting in a favorable environment for conflict. Three more factors must also be considered: the strategic importance of oil, the great wealth generated by oil production, and the association between oil production and the rise of authoritarian regimes. He suggests that we have two paths available for future policy: the first entails a growing reliance on military force to protect American access to overseas sources of petroleum, and the other requires increased conservation efforts, greater reliance on renewable sources of energy (such as wind and solar), and the adoption of tough fuel-efficiency standards for American motor vehicles. He argues that the first path increases U.S. exposure to terrorism and overseas conflict, and thus the second path is preferable.

**Countries/Regions: United States**

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This book tells the story of two American diplomats - George Curtis Moore and Cleo Allen Noel, Jr. - who were abducted at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, along with their Belgian colleague Guy Eid, and killed in 1973 by members of a Palestinian terrorist group called Black September (referred to by one of its members as the secret arm of Fatah). The author, a former diplomat who had worked for one of the American diplomats, provides a vivid account of the events that transpired, the attempts to arrange for the release or rescue of the diplomats, and the terrorists' eventual cold-blooded murder of the diplomats when their demands were not met. Significant attention is paid to the human dimension of the story, covering the members of the terrorist group and their demands, and the personal lives of the diplomats. The efforts to bring the killers to justice - and the eventual failure and abandonment of these efforts - frame a dark period in America's foreign service profession.

This chapter explores how Hizbollah - "the party of God" - struggles internally with issues of morality, law and necessity when trying to justify suicide bombings and the kidnapping of "innocent" foreigners. When intellectual justifications were insufficient for providing a moral logic for these actions - for example, declaring that foreigners taken hostage were themselves guilty of some transgression against the Muslims, specifically that they were spies - Hizbollah's religious leaders were called upon to issue formal fatwas and interpretations of Islamic law that support such extreme measures. However, their most senior leaders refused to do so, instead declaring that these actions contradicted the teachings of Islam. Lesser clerics were unable to provide moral justifications that carried any significant authority, and thus consensus eluded Hizbollah regarding these measures, resulting in an internal debate that continues to this day. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)


This study examines the construction of a new political order in Zimbabwe from the perspective of veterans of the war of liberation. The political settlement left ex-combatants armed and concentrated, and the new leadership further empowered its own ex-guerillas by making the war and their war contribution central to their legitimation, as it sought to build its own power. The ruling party's guerilla war and its war veterans thus became important assets to the leadership, while the guerilla veterans of the chief opposition party constituted a threat to the leadership's quest for exclusive power. This struggle for power between the two guerilla parties persisted through the implementation of the settlement and shaped the first seven years of the post-war period. The findings of the study illuminate how settlements change the terrain of future political conflict and shape the strategies and resources of those involved. The author concludes that similar studies and evaluations of political transitions must encompass an open-ended examination of what actors do and say and from the resulting political outcomes rather than from imposing "peace-building" criteria.

This book examines the impact of international terrorism on American foreign relations, focusing on three case studies: the campaign of the Zionist extremists against the British Mandatory government in Palestine 1945-48; the revolt of the Algerian nationalists against French rule, 1954-62; and the holy war of the Palestinian fedayeen against Israeli and American interests, 1968-76. An historical analysis of these three cases reveal that, from an American perspective, international terrorism transcended the direct threat to lives and property and involved larger global concerns. The Cold War, Third World nationalism, and Middle East stability were among the various underlying issues that not only entangled the United States in a number of sensitive diplomatic situations but ultimately determined the country's response to international terrorism. This often led to policies that were interpreted, in many instances, as being sympathetic to terrorist organizations. Kumamoto's analysis suggests that no amount of preparation can totally eliminate terrorism as a political-military phenomenon.

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy

**Topic 2:** Cases Studies

**Countries/Regions:** Middle East, Algeria, France, UK, US


The author notes that American officials appear to have declared Southeast Asia the 'second front' in the global campaign against terror. However, he argues that supporting Southeast Asia's often brutal and compromised militaries - which themselves contain elements linked to Islamic radicals - will only boost human rights abuses, breeding popular resentment and setting the stage for more terror. Thus, Washington's current Southeast Asia strategy will not stem the rising tide of Islamism and terrorism. The U.S. must adopt a law enforcement-oriented approach that provides more aid for Southeast Asia's police force and facilitates greater sharing of intelligence and counterintelligence expertise through the ASEAN Regional Forum.

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy

**Topic 2:** Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective

**Countries/Regions:** United States, Southeast Asia


Kurth describes the U.S. as a global empire that seeks to reinvent the nations of the globe in its image. In the minds of the antiglobalization movement and the anti-American left, and perhaps in the minds of Islamic terrorists themselves, the growth of the American Empire has caused the growth of Islamic terrorism. From this connection, he suggests that a U.S. victory in Iraq would enlarge the American Empire, and would also energize and enlarge the opposition to the empire. In essence, significant victory by one group would likely cause the other to view a counter-victory as a necessity. Thus, Kurth concludes that "a dialectic and symbiotic connection, perhaps an escalating and vicious cycle, exists" between the growth of American empire and the growth of Islamic terrorism and "the world is about to witness a titanic and explosive struggle between them."

This reference volume contains over 300 entries on key terrorist organizations and individual leaders, with a significant (but not exclusive) focus on those involved in major attacks within the United States and its interests abroad. Over 100 entries are provided on nationalistic and religious terrorist groups from around the world. The editor also included an extensive 60-page index, a bibliography, and a 36-page chronology of terrorist attacks in the United States and on U.S. interests abroad, from 1865 to 2002.


This monograph examines current U.S. policy, strategy and doctrine related to offensive information warfare. The author argues that U.S. dependence on widely commercial available products is a huge vulnerability to mass disruption, and he offers a list of recommendations for those responsible for protecting U.S. information infrastructures, including: 1) Establish a declaratory deterrence policy that clearly states U.S. willingness to respond with the range of military forces at its disposal in response to information warfare attacks. 2) Improve strategic information warfare defense that stresses the voluntary, fast disclosure of vulnerabilities once discovered by the broad range of technology producers, network administrators, and infrastructure users. 3) Clearly and publicly communicate the threat posed by strategic information warfare. 4) Strengthen institutions that collect information on infrastructure vulnerabilities and develop remedial measures. 5) Improve efforts by operators and users to implement fixes that reduce systemic sources of vulnerability. 6) Create educational programs that improve the skills of security specialists and system administrators responsible for assessing and repairing problems throughout the U.S. information infrastructure. And finally, he argues that the U.S. must improve its understanding of its potential adversaries, state or non-state actors, in the realm of strategic information warfare.


The author argues that since Russia is a considerable force in the international community, international...
intervention in Chechnya is likely to occur only if signs of serious human rights violations exist. It is important to note that the international community currently recognizes Russian sovereignty over Chechnya. Thus, the international community's consideration of assisting Chechnya in its struggle for sovereignty will depend on the response of the Russian government to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

**Topic 1:**
Case Studies

**Topic 2:**
Religion and Conflict

**Countries/Regions:** Chechnya, Russia

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While the underlying thrust of the Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz edited volume is on state actors, Jessica's Stern's chapter on "Terrorist Motivations and Unconventional Weapons" addresses the broader issues of CBRN terrorism and the Aum Shinrikyo cult in particular. Stern does not discuss distinctions between specific CBW agents, but does draw a contrast between the relative ease of acquisition and prospective effectiveness of use (for terrorists) of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Stern concludes that the threat of CBRN terrorism is real, centered on religiously-motivated (generally millenarian) terrorist groups. Though she considers state-sponsorship to be a distinct possibility, and deterrence in such cases uncertain, the primary danger remains religious terrorists who are "unconstrained" either by fear of government action or moral considerations. The author argues that high-tech CBRN attacks are likely to remain exceedingly rare, but that low-tech approaches are well within the capabilities of terrorist groups and that such attacks, particularly with chemical weapons in enclosed spaces, are likely to be the most common form of CBRN terrorism. In the article, Stern notes that such attacks might not always have mass-casualties as a primary goal. Economic effects through anti-crop and anti-livestock attacks, or by simply contaminating an area (with chemical or biological agents) would cause severe financial hardships for a victim country. Stern also considers that CBRN weapons might be desired, rather than conventional explosives, because of the unique psychological damage they might cause. In the nuclear realm, Stern notes that the financial costs of the South African nuclear program, for instance, may be within the range of funds available to some well-financed terrorist groups. Coupled with the increasing availability of materials and know-how due to problems in Russia, this fact makes terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons not as far-fetched as some might think. In conclusion, Stern believes that indoor attacks or food contamination are the two most likely forms of CBRN terrorism - and thus not the often-envisioned "mass casualty" scenarios characterized by outdoor releases of aerosolized agents. However, unlike others, Stern suggests, "there is likely to be a negative correlation between psychological motivation to commit extremely violent acts and technical prowess," a conclusion that would seem to run contrary to the case of Aum Shinrikyo. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

This book addresses the challenges of bioterrorism and biowarfare more generally. In addition to bioterrorism threats, the contributors discuss epidemiological issues, medical countermeasures, historical cases (such as the Sverdlovsk incident), and individual country assessments (Iraq). Specifically regarding bioterrorism, most of the contributors, particularly Seth Carus, Jonathan Tucker, and Jeffrey Simon, stress that bioterrorism is a real threat, but that cataclysmic incidents are much less likely than smaller-scale attacks. Clearly, as Carus points out, there are "sufficient indications of interest" in BW by terrorist groups and historical cases of small-scale use, and recent attempts at large scale attacks (Aum). However, BW seems to be attractive to only a segment of the terrorist world. In particular, religiously motivated groups with apocalyptic views, driven by a charismatic and/or paranoid leader or leadership apparently have been the most likely to seek out and use BW. Complicating this quest, say the authors, is the not-insubstantial technical proficiency required to produce extremely virulent agents. What is more, the difficulties involved with proper aerosolization and the creation of milled, powdered agents (rather than the less effective slurry) further hampers a group's ability to cause mass casualties. And while the authors note that it is possible for these technical hurdles to be overcome through selective recruiting (as in Aum's case), they are likely to be best overcome only through state sponsorship. While the contributors may not agree on this point, state sponsorship of bioterrorism would appear to be a difficult proposition due to the inherent risk of discovery and retribution against the sponsoring state. In summary, the contributors generally agree the BW threat is real, today, but the threat of massive casualties (hundreds of thousands) is significantly less than that of "small- to medium- scale" attacks. Current technical barriers to developing advanced BW, assuming indigenous, unassisted production, remain greater than what media reports often suggest and the difficulty in achieving efficient release is also substantial. As Tucker points out, there appears to be a widespread tendency to confuse state BW capabilities with those of terror groups. In this light, fanatical religious groups with state backers or substantial human and financial resources appear to be the biggest risk at this point, and the possible agents to be used could include everything from incapacitating agents to highly lethal ones. What groups would chose to employ would probably be affected by very individual factors, such as what may be available and what group members' skills are, as well as the targets for attack. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topic 1:**
CBRN Terrorism


Leitenberg examines the threat of biological weapons to the United States, with the threat of bioterrorism as a subset of that examination. He briefly examines state offensive biological weapons programs and the potential for state-sponsored bioterrorism, the historical record of biological weapons use by non-state actors, and the Aum Shinrikyo case. On the subject of the threat of bioterrorism in the United States, Leitenberg takes a critical view of how the threat has been portrayed by the media and government officials. In his view, "terrorist use of a BW agent is best characterized as an event of extremely low probability, which 'might' produce high mortality" (emphasis in original). The discussion of the threat has been characterized by gross exaggerations, extravagant rhetoric, and a lack of sound statistics and threat assessments. With regards to the technical requirements for terrorist production and use of biological agents, Leitenberg suggests that the process may not be as easy as some commentators suggest, citing as support the difficulties faced by and resources devoted to state offensive BW programs. In conclusion, Leitenberg states that the threat from
proliferation of BW is greater than the threat of their use by non-state actors, and argues that the current national discussion on the latter "is characterized by gross exaggeration, hype, and abstract vulnerability assessments instead of valid threat analysis." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


The case of Aum Shinrikyo is considered by many to be a watershed event in the field of bioterrorism. The Japanese cult is known to have worked with several biological agents and attempted to use some of these in attacks, with botulinum toxin and anthrax receiving much of the media attention. Leitenberg challenges these reports, stating that much of the information that has come out regarding Aum's biological activities has been misstated or exaggerated. He argues that, "despite semi-professional capabilities, substantial time and effort, all of [Aum's BW] efforts failed." Each of the major allegations regarding Aum's BW activities - botulinum toxin, anthrax, Q Fever, Ebola, and genetic engineering - are examined in turn, and Leitenberg argues that many of the so-called facts were in reality "grossly inaccurate." He states that there are two lessons that can be drawn from the Aum case that pertain to terrorist ability to produce biological weapons. The first is that "the Aum utterly and totally failed, after no small expenditure of time and money." The second concerns the fact that, in all the time since information about Aum's efforts became known, few have questioned or challenged the misinformation that has been circulating, and that the conclusions that should have been drawn from this incident "have been precisely the opposite of the one that has been purveyed." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


Responding to an op-ed column by Defense Secretary William Cohen (Washington Post, July 26, 1999), Leitenberg asks why increasing preparedness against weapons of mass destruction has become the Department of Defense's signature issue. He argues that because there have been no large, successful biological terrorist attacks in the past, the likelihood of one in the future is small.


Lepgold makes two arguments in this chapter. First, since terrorists and drug traffickers have very different
sets of motivations than governments, especially democratic governments, the latter may not be able to exert effective coercive pressure against the former. Clearly, trans-state security threats differ from state-centered threats. The notion of coercion, which often presumes that one can identify and then punish specific perpetrators, is ill-equipped to deal with highly-mobile trans-state actors. Second, even though state sponsorship of terrorism ought to enhance coercability (since it gives coercers a fixed, known target) the reverse may under some conditions be true for drug traffickers. He concludes that if these propositions are true, strategic coercion - as defined in this volume - is unlikely to work against major trans-state threats. Overall, new frameworks are needed to help us evaluate whether, when and how coercion can be effective in dealing with the flow of illegal drugs and terrorism. 

Topic 1: Counterterrorism Instruments
Topic 2: Terrorism, Money and Crime


In this brief report, sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, the authors trace the evolution of international terrorism against civilian and U.S. military targets, offer judgments on the future directions of terrorism, and propose strategies for its containment. They argue that, unlike other security challenges such as nuclear deterrence or defense of borders, terrorism cannot be stopped nor absolutely prevented, only contained. The concluding chapter offers a typology of terrorist risks to U.S. interests and characterizes three dimensions of national counterterrorism strategy - core, environment shaping, and hedging - along with the implications of each dimension for air and space power needed to confront transnational, non-state terrorist organizations. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

Topic 1: Historical Context
Topic 2: National Terrorism Policy
Topic 3: Future of Terrorism

Countries/Regions: United States


Lewis draws from the 1999 publication of Osama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad against the U.S. to explain the source of some of his justifications for the declaration. According to Lewis, bin Ladin espouses three primary wrongdoings on the part of the U.S. and its followers (in order of importance): The U.S. presence in the Holy Lands of Saudi Arabia, involvement in Iraq, and our policies regarding Jerusalem. He describes the ideological backing for these beliefs and explains some of the history that has become entwined with the ideology.

Topic 1: Case Studies
Topic 2: Religious Ideology
Topic 3: Religion and Conflict


This article describes the USIP project on Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance, which traces the
connections between tolerance and peace, or conflict. The study concludes, tentatively, that the connection is important: Intolerance, defined, essentially, as the violation of the human rights of free exercise and nondiscrimination, undermines peace, while respect for those rights undergirds and promotes peace. The study also reveals that religion is a significant factor in the emergence and expression of nationalism, and can be a force for tolerance or intolerance. Thus, we must be as attentive to the conditioning effects of politics, economics, historical accidents, etc. on religion and culture, as we are to the contribution religion and culture make to the formation of nationalism, and thence to the incidence of tolerance and intolerance.


The author notes that while the conflict in Sri Lanka is mainly between the Buddhist Sinhala majority and the Hindu Tamil minority, the conflict is not focused on an attempt by members of one group to suppress the religious expression of the other. His chapter's emphasis on ethnoreligious nationalism highlights the important connections between equal rights, pluralism, and ethnic peace in Sri Lanka. He concludes by suggesting a need for constitutional reform to (a) entrench minority rights, and (b) establish an independent judiciary to ensure the protection of those rights.

| Topic 1: Religion and Conflict | Topic 2: Ethnic Separatism | Topic 3: Case Studies |

Countries/Regions: Sri Lanka


In this chapter, Livingstone notes that "until recently, only authoritarian governments, unrestrained by public opinion or safeguards on civil liberties and guided solely by consideration of self-preservation, have enjoyed any demonstrable success in combating terrorism." He argues that terrorism is war without limits, and unless the state can respond accordingly, measure for measure, it will be at a considerable disadvantage when confronted with an enemy that is not restrained by the same rules that it is. He then discusses a variety of strategies that have been advanced to delimit and control terrorist outbreaks in non-authoritarian governments, including: legal remedies; social reform; a strong intelligence capability; restriction of access to weapons and explosives; reprisals; boycotting nations that support terrorism; isolating terrorists from the population; executive action (assassination attempts of state leaders who sponsor terrorism); and elimination of safe havens (perhaps the single most effective action that could be taken to combat terrorism). Finally, he calls for the development and deployment of new counterterrorist technology, particularly for use by highly skilled and trained commando units.

| Topic 1: Counterterrorism Question in Society | Topic 2: Counterterrorism Instruments | Topic 3: Counterterrorism Policies |
The author advances two main claims about terrorism in this region. First, that in the development of both Zionism and Palestinian Arab nationalism the purpose of inflicting death and destruction on the enemy was seen quite prominently, though never exclusively, as serving the psychological needs of the group on whose behalf the violence was undertaken. Second, the historic transformation in the Arab-Israeli conflict that occurred after the 1967 war can be identified by tracing change in the rationale for political violence employed by each side against the other. A shift, replacing "symbolic" violence with calculated efforts actually to hurt and terrorize adversaries, was a necessary step before opportunities for political compromise in this protracted dispute could even begin to be explored. In his conclusion, he argues that decades of solipsistic terrorism may have contributed to the ability of each side to shift its attention from using violence to satisfy its own psychic and political requirements to using violence to manipulate the calculations and intentions of its adversary. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Countries/Regions:** Israel, Palestinians, Middle East

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This article provides an assessment of what is being done on the African continent in the War on Terror, what should be done and why. The Bush administration has designated the greater Horn of Africa a frontline region in the global war on terrorism, and has worked to dismantle al Qaeda infrastructure there. However, at the same time, the U.S. has failed to recognize the existence of other, less visible, terrorist threats elsewhere on the African continent. For example, lawless open trading systems in Central and Western Africa allow terrorists to shelter and trade their assets. Thus, the Bush administration must adopt a more holistic approach to fighting terrorism in Africa. This should include dealing with Africa's fundamental problems, such as economic distress, ethnic and religious fissures, fragile governance, weak democracy, and rampant human rights abuses. A successful strategy must also include the elimination of obstacles to developing a coherent Africa policy that exist in Washington, such as the divided responsibility for Africa among the Department of Defense's European, Central and Pacific Commands, and a similar division at the Department of State between those dealing with North Africa and those dealing with Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Countries/Regions:** Africa, United States

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This study examines the causes and effects of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan during the Soviet and post-Soviet era. During the Soviet era, Islam was driven underground and its institutions were...
significantly undermined, yet during these years of militant atheism, Islam survived as a cultural-religious phenomenon. After decades of Soviet efforts to weaken its public and private influence, the past decade has seen a major growth in interest in Islam. Following the Republic of Uzbekistan's declaration of independence in 1991, Islam has seen a dramatic revival in cultural and political influence throughout the region, to the point where it is seen as a threat by the more secular members of the population. Indeed, several fundamental extremist groups have resorted to political violence in various parts of the country in their efforts to create an Islamic state. The author suggests that Uzbekistan can only be victorious over anti-governmental religious fundamentalism with help of a more moderate faith, where Islamic clergies will play significant role. Also, because the socio-economic situation in the country plays a contributory role in the rising Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan, the author calls for greater economic integration with Western states and to ensure future employment opportunities for the country's youth. Finally, the author recommends the development of strong government media outlets, which should clearly communicate to the people the dangerous of religious extremism and the need for economic cooperation and religious tolerance.

Topic 1: Religion and Conflict Management  
Topic 2: Case Studies  

Countries/Regions: Uzbekistan


Maerli presents the argument that the threat of atomic (i.e. nuclear and radiological) terrorism is actually greater than that posed by chemical and biological terrorism. Consequently, the current U.S. focus on the latter is misplaced, and ignores the risk of atomic terrorism. Maerli argues that it would be easier for terrorist to design and construct a crude nuclear weapon that it would be for them to produce biological agents. He bases this argument on the availability of information concerning bomb design and planning, the potential for nuclear theft or diversion from the former Soviet Union, and the "reliability" of crude nuclear weapons compared to crude biological weapons. As to why terrorists would chose crude nuclear weapons, Maerli suggests that they would provide the "showy attacks that produce a great deal of noise" that most terrorists reportedly favor, a need that could not necessarily be satisfied by biological agents. In addition, terrorists would be able to capitalize on the psychological impact stemming from the fear of radiation among the general population. Maerli does not suggest that the threats of chemical or biological terrorism should be dismissed entirely, and argues that it is probable that firearms and conventional explosives will remain the terrorist staples. When terrorists choose to use CBRN weapons, however, Maerli argues that the unreliability and unpredictability of biological weapons makes them an unlikely threat. "Today, due to their inherent features and demonstration effects, crude nuclear weapons may prove to be a more reliable, tempting and prestigious option than crude biological weapons for aspiring large-scale terrorists." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Topic 1: CBRN Terrorism


This book examines the world of Khalistani Sikh militants and the community members who support their goals of an independent homeland. The author spent several years interviewing members of the Sikh communities in India and North America, and describes her work as "a glimpse into the world of violent
religious nationalists." She argues that without Operation Blue Star (the Indian army's crackdown on Sikh opposition members at the Golden Temple Complex in 1984, which resulted in heavy casualties on both sides), the moral justification for the continued insurgency - for many people both inside and outside the movement - would be absent. Although highly critical of state suppression and abuse by Indian authorities, she acknowledges that Sikh militants are guilty of their own atrocities, noting that for pragmatic and other reasons the book does not represent the voices of the victims of Sikh separatist violence. In her conclusion, Mahmood describes the challenges of ethnographic studies in religious fundamentalism. She also admonishes state leaders to remember that dialogue with militants is not impossible.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 2:** Terrorist's Movements and Psychology  
**Countries/Regions:** India


Mallaby argues that the U.S. must address the task of nation-building in order to counter the growing danger of failed states to national security. He notes that there is a wide gap between nation builders' aspiration to create stable democratic states and what the world's institutions (including the World Bank and the United Nations) can deliver, and thus an imperial America should actively work to fill this gap. He argues that the best hope of grappling with failed states lies in institutionalizing a mix of U.S. leadership and international legitimacy, particularly by working with a new body setup along organizational lines similar to the World Bank and IMF and funded by the rich countries belonging to the OECD and the other countries that currently contribute to the World Bank's subsidized lending program to the poorest nations. This new fund would need money, troops, and a new kind of commitment - and could be established only with strong U.S. leadership.

**Topic 1:** Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective  
**Topic 2:** Global Environment


In this edited volume, the chapter by Daniel S. Gressang relates to CBRN terrorism. More than simply a discussion of new terror threat, including CBRN, per se, in this chapter Gressang addresses what he argues to be a mistaken approach to the understanding of terrorism generally. In his view, rather than simply examining the structures of terrorist organizations and their rhetoric, terrorism should be viewed as a "process" with various inputs and outputs related to "influencing" a group's "audience." On the subject of CBRN terrorism specifically, the author primarily describes the perceptions prevalent in today's literature, mainly the view that a trend toward increased casualties is underway and that religiously motivated groups pose the gravest risk. In this chapter the author does not address the relative likelihood of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorism nor does he discuss specific agents or tactics. At no time does Gressang strongly announce his own view, though he does suggest that "terrorism has changed, but not for the better." "We see fewer instances of terrorism in total, but seem to see more terrorist 'spectaculars' with mass casualties than in the past." Thus, the author appears to agree that the trend toward mass casualties is real and threatening. However, he appears to be more skeptical regarding religion as a primary cause for this. Rather, the author suggests that the real risk of mass-casualty terrorism, with or without CBRN, comes from groups that have evolved beyond or rejected common "social mores" and are "non-adaptive" to basic social constraints - of which the author believes there has been only one real case (Aum Shinrikyo). Similarly,
groups that form on an ad hoc basis may also be dangerous, primarily due to their secrecy and difficulty to track and penetrate. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topic 1:** CBRN Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** CBRN Counterterrorism Policy

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(252.) **Marlo, Francis H.** "WMD Terrorism and US Intelligence Collection." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 11, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), 53-71.

This article focuses mainly on the benefits and shortcoming of the various intelligence disciplines as they apply to efforts to detect chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. The author cites some of the reasoning behind the growing threat of CBRN terrorism, including the spread of information and technologies and the changing nature of terrorist groups in recent years. Marlo then outlines a five-stage process that he believes terrorists would follow in order to launch a CBRN attack: (1) deciding to obtain and use WMD; (2) acquiring the necessary expertise, production equipment, and material; (3) producing the weapon; (4) testing the weapon; and (5) planning and conducting an attack. Using this process as the baseline, the author then looks at several intelligence disciplines (signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, other technical intelligence, human intelligence, and open source intelligence) and how effective they might be in detecting terrorist WMD aspirations in the various stages of the process. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topic 1:** CBRN Counterterrorism Policy  
**Topic 2:** National Terrorism Policy

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In the first chapter of this section, David Rapoport provides a comparative analysis of patterns and organizational similarities among militant fundamentalist movements and groups (particularly those profiled in the remaining chapters). The next chapter, by Ehud Sprinzak, explores Jewish fundamentalism in Israel to describe three models of religious violence. Oliver Roy's chapter on the Islamic war of resistance in Afghanistan is followed by chapters on militancy and religion in contemporary Iran (by Nikki R. Keddie and Farah Monian) and on Hizballah (by Martin Kramer). The next chapter, by Faye Ginsburg, profiles Operation Rescue and their crusade against abortion. This is followed by Stanley Tambiah's chapter on Buddhism, politics and violence in Sri Lanka. In their concluding chapter, the editors observe that fundamentalism has played a major role in state conflicts where the public-private distinction has not been written into the constitution and protected by laws and judicial hearings. In other words, in polities where some form of church-state separation has been adopted, fundamentalism seems less likely to dictate the course of national self-definition.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict

**Countries/Regions:** Israel, Afghanistan, Iran, U.S., Sri Lanka

This book covers a relatively short period - 1980 through 1987 - in the fight against terrorism. The authors (successful journalists who have covered terrorist events for their respective news agencies) examine a number of events, including the aborted attempt during the Carter administration to rescue fifty-two hostages in Tehran, the 17-day hostage crisis of TWA 846, the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the Achille Lauro hijacking, and the Iran arms-for-hostages scandal during the Reagan administration. In their epilogue, the authors raise a number of compelling questions about assassination campaigns against terrorist leaders and the role of the law as an indispensable weapon in the war against terrorism. They conclude that the best laid diplomatic, economic, legal, and even military plans will only contain terrorism, not defeat it.

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy  
**Topic 2:** Counterterrorism Instruments  
**Countries/Regions:** Libya, Iran, United States


This book recounts the story of Jewish zealots during the 1940s and their efforts to block the peace process. The first formal attempt to mediate the dispute between Jews and Arabs began in late spring of 1948. It was derailed four months later when four Jewish zealots ambushed and gunned down a Swedish nobleman (UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte), convincing a stunned UN to abandon the peace process. The story centers on a terrorist organization called LEHI (the Hebrew acronym for Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), also known as the Stern Gang (after its founder Avraham Stern), who believed the outside world had no business interfering with their independence.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 2:** Religious Ideology  
**Countries/Regions:** Israel


Mathews explores how increasing globalization is affecting the world environment, asserting that globalization is fueled by a computer and technological revolution that has drastically scope and number of actors in the global community. Information is no longer regulated by governments, and thus governments must pay heed to both domestic and international sentiment. Mathews believes that the hierarchical nature of governments paralyze their ability to effectively act in the current community, and that NGOs are steadily rising to take their place. Mathews offers two possible scenarios in which the disenfranchisement of nation-states will escalate or decrease acts of violence and affect the order of the political system.

**Topic 1:** Global Environment

Although this article does not address the issue of CBRN terrorism specifically, it is of potential utility in the context of a frequent refrain: that particular religious groups may be among the most likely to turn to CBRN. The author examines violence in religious and cult groups, identifying different types, directed against internal or external threats. He then examines past cases, outlining lessons learned about religious violence, including the assertion that while apocalyptic thinking in a group "creates an atmosphere conducive to the legitimation of violence and - in some cases - terrorist actions," such views in-and-of themselves are not an indicator of violence and may be less important than other internal or external factors. The author also argues that low levels of violence by such groups usually precede more serious acts, a factor that may be useful to intelligence and law enforcement agencies. A chart depicting the author's various factors (based on his case studies) suggests that groups which lean toward terrorist attacks tend to see the world as black and white, contain conspiracy theories in their basic ideology, and perceive real or imaginary assaults against the group. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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This brief report provides a summary of the February 2001 testimony given by alleged former al-Qaeda member Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl at the trial of the persons involved in the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. During the course of his testimony, al-Fadl discussed his role in an alleged attempt by Osama bin Laden to obtain uranium in Sudan in late-1993 or early-1994. According to al-Fadl, he participated in the early meetings to arrange the sale of a quantity of uranium to al-Qaeda for $1.5 million. However, after his initial role, al-Fadl was cut out of the negotiation process and was unaware as to whether or not the transaction was actually completed. The report also includes a brief chronology of significant events that highlight bin Laden's interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, including several attempts by bin Laden aides to acquire nuclear materials or complete weapons. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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Originally published in 1983, this book was updated to include events such as the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the October 2000 suicide attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden, and the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The text is written for a younger audience, with brief chapters and a relatively jargon-free discussion of terrorist acts and organizations. Topics covered include the Russian Revolution, Ireland, Al-Qaeda, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and domestic terrorism in the U.S. A short list of study guide questions and a bibliography are also provided.

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Historical Context  Case Studies

Countries/Regions: Russia, Ireland, Germany, Middle East


In this chapter, Merari examines the factors that contribute to suicidal terrorist attacks. He acknowledges some problems inherent in the study (i.e. knowing whether a given suicide bomber meant to be killed, or was duped into thinking that he/she would survive the intended attack); yet believes that cultural (including religious), situational, and personality factors, combined with indoctrination motivate this type of attack. Interestingly, he believes that cultural/religious factors only provide an emphasis for one whose personality was already disposed towards suicide: he does not believe that these factors alone can persuade such martyrdom. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: Middle East


Merkl describes the RAF (Red Army Faction) Baader-Meinhof group of the seventies and their impact on successor terrorist movements of the eighties and early nineties. The author describes the government's reaction to terrorist acts in terms of investigations, arrests and imprisonment, as well as the struggle with civil liberties maintenance in a country that abolished the death penalty after WWII. His main points are: (1) There are considerable differences between the various West German terrorist groups. No organizational history united them all, and each carried a different set of political and ideological orientations and goals. (2) The RAF was never willing to discuss its goals and answer questions, undermining their use of violence to promote change in a democracy. And (3) major change in the late 1960s, when new chancellor Willy Brandt invited young leftist to join his reform administration and work from within the system, had a greater impact on political change than RAF or other terrorist movements. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: Germany
This chapter seeks to provide historical context to modern justifications for non-state terrorism. A culture of political violence was prevalent in all Western societies at the beginning of the 20th Century, with a relatively high number of violent terrorist acts targeting heads of state and elites throughout Europe. Early European anarchists and revolutionary terrorists viewed these acts as "necessary killings of unjust rulers," a notion that lies at the heart of the modern justification of terrorism and that can be found in political treatises throughout the centuries (p. 29). Miller reflects on the work of German radical Karl Heinzen (1809-80), whose "doctrine on terrorism" argues for violence as a justified response to unjust rulers. "From an examination of the uses of political violence by ruling parties in history, Heinzen comes to the conclusion that it is not the absolute value in the act itself that is condemned (as it should be), but rather that the acts are relativized in value depending on who is judging the intent", and thus political violence and the tactics of terrorism can be justified. Miller also points to other prominent publications of that era - including Freiheit (Most, 1884) and Reflections on Violence (Sorel, 1906) - which have influenced the global debate on political violence for over a century. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** Revolutionary Terrorism  **Topic 2:** Historical Context  **Topic 3:** Secular Justifications

**Countries/Regions:** Germany, Europe

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This edited volume of essays provides "an assessment of many political groups and movements which have resorted to means of violence and individual terror in order to press certain political or economic demands upon reluctant governments, regardless of whether they were authoritarian, constitutional or democratic." Chapters cover various historical examples of political violence in Germany, Britain, Russia, Spain, Ireland, France, Italy, and Austria. In their comparative analysis of these events (a concluding chapter titled "Non-Legal Violence and Terrorism in Western Industrial Societies"), the editors offer a typology of violent movements with social, nationalist, proletarian or fascist connotations, highlighting the features they have in common. Mommsen argues that during the last two centuries most European states gradually succeeded in eliminating open, violent conflicts by opening up legal channels to solve them. Given the modern comprehensive legal systems of industrially-developed societies, lessons can thus be drawn for modern approaches to terrorism.

**Topic 1:** Mobilizing Forces  **Topic 2:** National Terrorism Policy  **Topic 3:** Case Studies

**Countries/Regions:** Europe

The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute presents four key findings regarding the threat of biological terrorism. First, "a key relationship exists between the degree of risk and the level of casualties desired in an attack." Second, there is still cause for concern, even though the likelihood of catastrophic biological terrorism remains small. This is due to uncertainty regarding the point at which the response system becomes overburdened, and the psychological impact and social disruption that could result from an attack. Third, among terrorist groups, those with connections to state governments and those "outside the traditional scope of governmental scrutiny," such as religious groups, right-wing groups, millennial groups, deserve particular attention. This is because state-sponsored groups would have access to the resources, skills, and materials to carry catastrophic attacks, while the latter groups tend to lie outside the spectrum of government surveillance. While they are most likely incapable of executing large-scale attacks, smaller-scale events would be within their purview. Fourth, the "environment of uncertainty surrounding bioterrorism will remain." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


Moyano describes her book as an attempt to explain how and why, after the initial reasons for an armed revolutionary struggle were no longer valid, Argentine guerillas continued to formulate policies and execute military operations devoid of any apparent political rationality. Why did they choose to intensify their violent activity and emulate the regular armed forces instead of turning to conventional political action? She explores the theory of "the worse, the better" - a concept embraced by many of the Argentine paramilitary movements, that armed operations by guerrilla groups would provoke an official, repressive response by the state, which in turn would increase popular support for armed struggle. Her research suggests that participants who initially joined guerrilla groups for political objectives came to develop strong affective ties with their comrades that made "not letting the others down" the primary consideration. Over time, group identity (and the imperative of its survival as an armed organization) fueled the guerillas more than other motivating factors; ideological deviation from the group's chosen orthodoxy became treason, and conformity was rewarded with promotion through an increasingly complex and hierarchical structure.


This article addresses the definition of "weapons of mass destruction," in particular challenging the classification of chemical and biological weapons in this category. The authors then propose the inclusion of economic sanctions as a weapon of mass destruction, citing the case of UN sanction against Iraq as evidence. The authors contend that economic sanctions against Iraq have killed more people than all the combined uses
of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The authors make several brief mentions of terrorism, holding that it is mainly a law enforcement issue that can be handled (but not necessarily eradicated) by judicious and determined police work. With regard to CBRN terrorism, the authors allow that some terrorist groups and rogue states may "in the future" overcome the difficulties associated with the development and effective use of biological weapons, but state that the historical record for the use of such weapons is not encouraging for such groups. The authors seem to agree with the conclusion of David Rapoport that "terrorists and rogue groups tend to be more effective when they use familiar, conventional weapons because decisions about their use are easier and because accidents are less likely to happen in conditions of great uncertainty." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topic 1:**
**CBRN Terrorism**

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This paper examines the use of suicide bombings as strategic weapons by the political leadership of certain groups, focusing on two leading Palestinian dissident organizations - the Islamic Resistance Group (Hamas) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The author concludes that the choice of suicide bombings makes sense as a strategy which does not aim at a military victory but takes aim at sowing the greatest amount of mistrust among Jews and Palestinians. The randomness of the attacks inculcates a deep and universal sense of insecurity in the country. The two radical groups also succeed in deepening the worst suspicion and prejudice held by the Jews about the Arabs, which makes any possibility of a compromise nearly impossible. This analysis also concludes that Israeli countermeasures have largely failed to stop suicide bombings and, perhaps, have even exacerbated the situation. Finally, the results of this study indicate the need to draw Hamas into the larger negotiation process.

**Topic 1:**
**Religion and Conflict**

**Countries/Regions:** Middle East, Israel-Palestine

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This edited volume addresses "the roles of public opinion and mass media in international policymaking." Combining the research expertise of leading European and American scholars, the book provides a comparative view of the interconnections between the mass media, public opinion, and foreign policymaking. Policymakers in liberal democracies are aware of public opinion in their countries, although the influence of public opinion is conditioned by a mediating framework of variables, including specific political interests, community values, ideological and religious commitments, the quality of information that the public receives, and how well the issue is articulated by the government officials or opposition. From their analysis, the editors suggest that public officials can exert considerable influence in framing the foreign policy agenda, as they face a public that is more detached from foreign policy issues and has less information and fewer attitudinal predispositions than in the 1980s.
Topic 1: Terrorism and the Media  Topic 2: Historical Context

Countries/Regions: U.S., France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Europe


Despite its subtitle, this book deals primarily with international terrorism and how this kind of political violence exploits the linkages between the mass media, public opinion, and governmental decision makers. The author contrasts the news coverage of anti-American terrorist events outside and inside the United States, and addresses the relationships between terrorism and foreign policy, public opinion, political events and leaders - as well as how all these relationships are represented in the media. Originally published in 1994, the book presents the idea that international terrorists are quite able to exploit the U.S. media for their purposes, when they strike Americans and America abroad, but are not very successful in this respect when they hit inside American borders. Indeed, the author concludes that when international terrorists strike on their enemies' turf, they lose the battle for publicity and are likely to be caught. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

Topic 1: Terrorism and the Media  Topic 2: Case Studies


This chapter explores the contemporary relationship between Muslims and Hindus in India. The author describes his visit to Lucknow, the site of much of the fighting in the Indian Mutiny of 1857, "the last flare-up of Muslim energy." It is now "a city of divisions." Crossing from the mixed Hindu-Muslim area into one that is purely Muslim, the author observes a significant difference in quality of life and public health. "Outside" this area was viewed by its inhabitants as outside the faith. Muslims had once ruled here; now, depleted by the middle-class migration to Pakistan, as a group they rank low. The author recounts personal stories gathered through interviews with locals, providing a useful narrative for understanding the context of being a Muslim in India and the impact of Pakistan on the world of Muslims in India.

Topic 1: Religion and Conflict  Topic 2: Ethnic Separatism

Countries/Regions: India, Pakistan


This chapter discusses scope and limits of secularism in India. Nandy argues that secularism is a European import, embraced by members of the middle class and state structures in the region, but has become increasingly incompatible with the somewhat fluid definitions of the self with which many South Asian cultures live. Within this context, the author discusses the scope and limits of the ideology of secularism in...
India and its relationship with the new forms of ethnic violence seen throughout the region. He argues that "to accept the ideology of secularism is to accept the ideologies of progress and modernity as the new justification for domination, and the uses of violence to sustain these ideologies as the new opiate of the masses." Finally, his analysis indicates that secularism does not adequately address the deep roots of ethnic intolerance and violence, and thus there is a need to emphasize the dimension of tolerance found in South Asian religions.

**Topic 1:**
Religion and Conflict

**Countries/Regions:** India

(272.) **National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.**
http://www.mipt.org/library.asp

Recommended website (particularly the online library resources) for terrorism and counterterrorism.


Neier observes a number of defects in President Bush's order for military commissions to try suspected al-Qaeda members or supporters. One important example is that it lumps together at least four categories of persons who have distinct sets of rights under either domestic or international law. As written, the order violates, in different ways, the rights of all four categories and recalls Clemenceau's famous comment about the Dreyfus case that "military justice is to justice as military music is to music."

**Topic 1:**
Strategies to Respond and Defeat Terrorism

**Topic 2:**
Counterterrorism Questions in Society

**Countries/Regions:** United States


Written from the perspective of a former leader of the radical racist group Christian Identity (one of several right wing extremist movements in the U.S.), this brief passage of Chapter Six describes how such extremist movements justify violence, hatred and murder. In justifying their hatred of "the other", the author notes that the primary theological doctrine is rooted in identity - a doctrine that claims that the white, Anglo-Saxon people are the true Israel of the Bible and that the Jews are a counterfeit race, descendent from the devil itself. This doctrine permeates much of the literature of the right-wing movement, offering "scriptural reasoning for war and the Christain Army of God" and conveniently ignoring scriptural references to living in peace, which subsequently provided justification for crimes like the Oklahoma City bombiing. The author observes that the religious belief system of the terrorist-oriented right wing movement should not be underestimated any more than the religious beliefs of those in the Middle East.

**Topic 1:**
Religion and Violence

**Topic 2:**
Religion and Conflict

**Topic 3:**
Religious Ideology

This monograph addresses the question, "How can the United States best develop security cooperation within the Americas?" The author argues that it is time for the United States to employ strategic restraint and reassurance of allies to develop a new security architecture that is effective and efficient, while reflecting our values and interests. This requires recognition of the "soft power" and liberal peace realities of our hemispheric neighborhood, where weak institutions struggle to deal with terrorism, natural disasters, governmental corruption, insurgency, crime, and narcotrafficking. Many of these problems transcend borders, further complicating matters. Colonel Nunez argues that the United States is the only country that can provide the new direction for security cooperation, but must rely upon Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to develop the consensus for change and materially contribute to the creation of standing multinational units. Issues such as state sovereignty and the role of the Organization of American States must figure significantly in the overarching security structure, and that these new brigade-sized units must be able to rapidly deploy to handle missions immediately, not after the fact in an ad hoc and disorganized manner.


This essay describes the rationale for (and complexities involved in) establishing a new Office of Homeland Security. Nye observes how a national complacency in the 1990s and the absence of a guiding strategy, concept, or program architecture undermined the nation's ability to provide its own security. His argument centers on three main problems: complacency; an unwillingness to spend money; and the fragmented bureaucratic structure and procedures of our government. He notes that the first two problems disappeared after 9/11, but the third continues to pose challenges, even with the establishment of a new Office of Homeland Security. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

This book describes the evolution of the IRA's political and military strategies, framed by a personal narrative of the period which produced modern Irish republicanism. The author argues that the central aim of the armed struggle has been to create conditions which render an internal Northern Ireland settlement impossible, thus forcing a progression towards Irish unification as apparently the only option for peace seekers. In essence, the armed struggle has been a form of political protest, effectively a veto on an internal settlement. In this view, the IRA campaign cannot be seen as defensive (in the sense of protecting the lives of people within its support community) but rather, as offensive (in the sense of being part of a territorial war).

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The focus of this chapter is on political violence in Northern Ireland since the late 1960s. O'Halpin discusses the evolution of the Provisional IRA, their ability to sustain an adaptive military strategy (enabling them to respond to shifts in tactics by the British and Irish security forces), and their relationships with various internal and external organizations (including the Soviet Union). He also explores a series of political splits and reformations which have been "integral to Irish republican politics." The movement's gradual engagement with politics, beginning in the mid-1980s and contributing to the IRA's ceasefires of 1994 and 1997, must be seen against the broader backdrop of the modernization and internationalization of the Irish economy, and of the transformation of the country's relations both with the United Kingdom and with continental Europe. The state's response to contemporary threats from paramilitary forces has led to the construction of bilateral Anglo-Irish legal understandings, and an increasing recognition of the validity of the legal framework provided by a number of European conventions on extradition, on the suppression of terrorism, and on human rights.

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Blamed for over 20,000 killings, thousands of disappearances and billions in property damage, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) originated in a region heavily populated by Native American Indians, but is not based on any ethnic cleavage in Peruvian society. The author describes the early history and growth of the organization, the social and geographic context of its development in the historically impoverished Ayacucho region, the role of the University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in promoting the teaching of Marxist principles, and the leadership of a charismatic activist and professor, Abimael Guzman Reynoso. The author also examines the
Shining Path's strategy and long-term objectives, the organization's impact on voting patterns, and the responses of different Peruvian governments, from the Belaunde administration to the Fujimori administration. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: Peru


Suicide terrorism is rising around the world, but the most common explanations do not help us understand why. Religious fanaticism does not explain why the world leader in suicide terrorism is the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a group that adheres to a Marxist/Leninist ideology, while existing psychological explanations have been contradicted by the widening range of socio-economic backgrounds of suicide terrorists. This study of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1998 to 2001 (188 in all) shows that suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions. In all but one case, the terrorists' political cause made more gains after the resort to suicide operations than it had before. Thus, Western democracies should pursue policies that may have more to do with improving homeland security than with offensive military action. Includes an Appendix: Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980-2001, indicating dates, weapons used, location/target, and casualties.

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Parachini compares six cases of mass-casualty terrorism involving the use of conventional (high explosives) and unconventional (CBRN) weapons as a means of testing the assertion that the new wave of terrorists will be drawn to CBRN weapons as part of their desire for large numbers of casualties. Cases examined include: the Rajneeshee use of salmonella, the use of chlorine gas by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack, the World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the U.S. embassies bombings in Africa. The first three used unconventional weapons, while the latter three used conventional high explosives. Parachini compares the motives and outcomes in each case, arguing that the cases of mass casualty terrorism using high explosives were examples of symbolic violence, while the instances of CBRN usage were more of an operational or instrumental nature in which religious ideology played little role (for example, the LTTE used the chlorine gas as a first round in a renewed military offensive, and Aum launched the sarin attack to head off a police investigation of the cult). With regard to outcomes, Parachini concludes that the cases involving the use of unconventional weapons, "the attacks proved much more difficult and much less effective than the perpetrators imagined," while the attacks with conventional high explosives "were spectacularly successful." The use of conventional high explosives resulted in consistently higher casualties than did the use of unconventional weapons. Parachini concludes that the cases examined call into question the notion that the new terrorists will inevitably graduate to WMD use, and calls for a assessing a better balance between threats from conventional and unconventional terrorism. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)
Parachini, John V. "Non-Proliferation Policy and the War on Terrorism."

Parachini discounts the likelihood of a mass-casualty CBRN terrorist attack, but concludes that the "consequences . . . could be so catastrophic that serious government attention is warranted." With respect to possible types of CBRN weapons, the author suggests that a full nuclear device would be the least likely to fall into terrorist hands or be developed by them. He further suggests that the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack may be an exception rather than a rule. Terrorists, he states, "appear more likely to use what they can readily acquire," rather than take the difficult route to a CBRN capability. Nevertheless, because of the threat, Parachini states that arms control organizations and agreements, and the U.S. government, must adapt to these new threats and strengthen nonproliferation norms. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Parachini, John. "Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective."

This article addresses the potential threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack with chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons. A complex of factors shape a group's propensity to acquire and use these unconventional weapons. Although religion in an important factor - particularly providing a dangerous motivating component - the greatest danger occurs when the group also has technical capabilities, easily exploitable opportunities, and a minimum of restraints. Groups need technical capacity, including knowledge, skill, critical weapons material, production equipment, and sometimes even sheer serendipity, to acquire and use unconventional weapons. While eliminating all possibility of terrorist groups or individuals using CBRN weapons is impossible, his analysis of the threat supports several recommendations. He argues that a range of diplomatic, economic, and military policies to shore up weak and failing states are crucial to reducing the terrorist threat. Further, the U.S. should publicly declare that state sponsors who transfer unconventional weapons capabilities to nonsovereign, subnational groups will be in violation of a fundamental norm of the international system and will run the most severe risks to their security.


This report attempts to summarize events related to sub-national actors and CBRN materials during the calendar year of 2000, and is a follow-on to a similar chronology for 1999. The report breaks the events down...
by region, type of event (actual use, threat of use, acquisition, hoax, etc.), general type of agent used (chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, unknown), specific agents used or possessed, and motivations (political/ideological, criminal). The authors of the report also attempted to determine trends regarding actors' motivations. The authors reported that the number of politically or ideologically motivated incidents, compared to criminally motivated (which were predominant in 1999), had begun to increase. Of particular note, the authors also suggest that while the data "reflect a trend towards the increased use of CBRN materials by sub-national actors," the current threat from CBRN terrorism will be "characterized primarily by 'low-end' agents, delivery systems, and incidents." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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The annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. This summary pertains to the 2002 report (released April 2003) which reviews recent War on Terror achievements of the last few years in the areas of diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, finance, and military. The report also describes four policy principles which guide U.S. counterterrorism strategy. First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. And fourth, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance. The report then suggests that the ultimate success of this effort to stem terrorism "will hinge in large part on two factors - sustained international political will and effective capacity building."

**Topic 1:**
National Terrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions:** United States


Pedahzur rejects the widespread belief that the 1999 Israeli national elections confirmed the decline of the political parties on the extreme right. She asserts that old definitions that separated the right and left on the basis of hawkish and dovish tendencies alone are too narrow. She argues for a new definition of the extreme right as one that embraces nationalism, racism, antidemocracy, and xenophobia in addition to hawkish beliefs, and shows how two parties that promote those policies (Israel Our Home and Shas) gained significant strength in the 1999 elections.

**Topic 1:**
National Terrorism Policy

**Topic 2:**
Religion and Conflict

**Countries/Regions:** Israel

This book provides an analytical history of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (MRO) and its Bulgarian counterpart, the Supreme Macedonian Committee. The author suggests that the MRO emerged because of a new class of Slavo-Macedonian schoolteachers and their students. Schools gave both teachers and students a new awareness of how life was in the West, and a few of them came to believe that something was terribly wrong in their Macedonian homeland, "that the squalor and misery in which their people lived could be the result only of a foreign and barbaric rule." In the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman authorities insisted on the retention of their control, even if that required the use of terror. Meanwhile, the MRO felt that liberation should come at any cost, even if it meant terrorizing their own people. Peasants of the region, illiterate and superstitious, were not initially supportive of a revolution. But according to the strategy of the MRO, they had to be forced by terror to decide which they preferred: terror by Ottoman occupiers or revolution against them.

**Topic 1:** Mobilizing Forces  
**Topic 2:** Case Studies  
**Topic 3:** Revolutionary Terrorism

**Countries/Regions:** Macedonia

Perry, William J. "Preparing for the Next Attack." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 2001), 31-45.

Early in his article the author notes that, "Nuclear or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists or rogue states constitute the greatest single danger to American security - indeed, to world security - and a threat that is becoming increasingly less remote." For Perry, the trafficking of fissile or radioactive material and the unique attributes of biological weapons would make them attractive to terrorists. He also notes that any attack is likely to be covert rather than overt. While Perry stresses the need to improve intelligence, consequence management, and nonproliferation efforts, he does not delve in any detail into the phenomenon of terrorism or the characteristics of group, their motivations, or likely methods of attack. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

**Topic 1:** CBRN Counterterrorism Policy  
**Topic 2:** CBRN Terrorism


When by the end of 1914 the Ottoman Empire joined World War I on the side of the Central Powers, a fatwa was issued by the Shaykh al Islam, the highest religious authority and state mufti. It affirmed that the war was legal according to the Sharia and that jihad had become an individual duty on the strength of the general mobilization by the Ottoman Sultan. This fatwa also demanded the support of the Muslims of India, Central Asia, North Africa, and the Balkans, stating unequivocally that they were obliged to come to the rescue of the Ottoman Empire and attack their non-Muslim rulers. This open and undisguised appeal to religious loyalties was feared, but ultimately overrated, by leaders of the Allied states.

In this chapter, Peters introduces the concept of jihad (meaning to strive, to exert oneself, to struggle) and describes the origin of this concept as the written reflection in the Koran of the wars fought by the Prophet Mohammed. He argues that the concept was influenced by the ideas of war among pre-Islamic Northern Arabic tribes. Although Sunni and Shiite theories of jihad are very similar, Shiites hold that jihad can only be waged under the leadership of the rightful Imam, unless as defense against attack. The most important function of the doctrine of jihad is that it mobilizes and motivates Muslims to take part in wars against unbelievers, as it is considered to be the fulfillment of a religious duty. Another function has been to enhance the legitimacy of a ruler. And a final function of jihad doctrine stems from providing a set of rules governing relationships with unbelieving enemies and behavior during actual warfare. Apart from this classical interpretation of jihad, radical fundamentalists (like Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-Mawdudi) call for jihad as a means to spread their brand of Islam, and some of these call for the use of violence in order to defeat established governments.


This final chapter of Peters' book deals with the political role of jihad in Egypt under Anwar Sadat (1970-81), focusing on the application of jihad doctrine (when is violence permissible and against whom?) within two frameworks. The first is a debate on the application of the rules of jihad to the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel. The other revolves around the question of whether jihad against the Egyptian government is allowable under certain circumstances. The author notes that jihad is a concept with a wide semantic spectrum, and its actual meaning differs from organization to organization. Even if there is limited agreement among some groups that jihad signifies armed struggle only, these groups disagree on strategy and the immediacy of the struggle. The concept and doctrine of jihad do not give clear and unambiguous directives. The interpretation and application of jihad depends very much on the political and strategic positions of the Islamic groups which use it to enhance the loyalty and devotion of their followers.


In this selection from Chapter 8, Peters compares classical and modern Jihad literature. In general, differences between these two derive from differences in function. Treaties and fatwas, whose main function is mobilization, hardly differ from period to period. On the other hand, there is a clear difference with regard to
writings with an instructive character. For example, as economic and social changes required the introduction of western codes, the supremacy of the Sharia was no longer self-evident, and thus scholars of Islamic legal subjects were forced to find justifications for applying the Sharia. Modern writings are less legalistic, emphasizing more the moral justifications and the underlying ethical values of the rules, instead of the detailed elaboration of those rules. The most important strains of debate in modern jihad literature cover the following topics: (1) the definition of jihad (which includes not only the act of fighting itself, but also everything that is conducive to victory, like contributing money to provide for military equipment); (2) the principle of peaceful relations between Islamic and other states; (3) the legal aims of jihad; (4) early Islamic military history; (5) women and jihad; and (6) the strategic and tactical lessons of the Koran.

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Philpott argues that with few exceptions, international relations scholars have long assumed the absence of religion among the factors that influence states. Thus, religious extremists (such as adherents to radical Islam) directly challenge the authority structure of the international system. After reviewing the roots of secularization in the practice and theory of international relations, the author observes that a growing number of analysts have documented a rise in the influence of religion on politics. Three separate trends have been identified. First, religious organizations are growing in their power to shape public debate and the policies of governments. Second, religious organizations exercise a transnational influence upon the politics of outside states. Third, even more powerfully, religion shapes not only the policies of states but also their very constitutions, thus becoming "the law of the land." The author contends that if international relations scholars are to understand the violence of September 11, then they must come to understand how religious movements like radical Islamic revivalism, acting on their political theology, challenge the Westphalian synthesis, the fundamental authority structure of the international order.

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Written prior to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., Pillar focuses on the analytic shortcomings of U.S. counterterrorism policies. He suggests that "what may seem to be the strongest counterterrorist policies are not always the best at reducing terrorism without damaging other U.S. interests. According to the author, the book is "intended as a guide to constructing and executing counterterrorist policy," and he argues that "counterterrorist policy must be formulated as an integral part of broader U.S. foreign policy." According to Pillar, "most of the issues underlying terrorism are to be found overseas, as are most things the U.S. can do to combat terrorism." Further, he states, "most progress in the fight against terrorism ultimately depends on the perspectives and behavior of foreign governments, groups, publics and individuals." Thus, he argues, U.S. foreign policy has significant effects on counterterrorism. Framed by this central argument, this book reviews recent successes and challenges of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, highlighting the linkages between crime, terrorism, and the need to consistently disrupt terrorist organizational operations. Chapters cover important issues such as the capabilities of U.S. counterterrorist instruments and why the U.S. is a prime target of terrorists. The author contends that in the global fight against terrorism - in which our counterterrorism
policies are largely centered on preparing for attacks that could cause many American deaths - there is no room for compromise, and no substitute for victory. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: United States


In this chapter, Pomper provides an historical analysis of populist movement and terrorism in Russia from the mid-1800s through first two decades of the 20th Century. Beginning with relatively low-level student nihilist-related terrorist movements - and growing in response to state repression following the assassination of Alexander I - Russia became a site of massive revolutionary terrorism, led by groups such as the Bolsheviks, the Narodnaia Volia (People's Will), the Combat Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party, and an assorted collection of anarchists. Together, the terrorist movements and incidents that took place in Russia through nearly a century provide "a virtual laboratory for the study of a great many varieties of revolutionary expression, including terrorism." From his analysis, the author draws a handful of conclusions about the appearance and role of terror during the cycles of revolutionary violence in Russia. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: Russia


Post argues that terrorists have particular psychological natures that drive them to commit acts of violence, but admits that they are not psychopathic. He believes that terrorist actions stem from a need to satisfy this internal drive, and that ideological belief and justifications are used to cover up their wholly personal acts of violence. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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In two complimentary articles, the authors provide a framework for the analysis of group risk for terrorism. They discuss a series of critical variables - internal and external, as well as interactions between them and the
group under examination - that are understood to increase the risk for escalation toward political violence. In the second article, a subset of observable indicators for each of the 32 variables within the integrated framework is presented. Group characteristics, processes, and structures are consistently rated as highly important. Overall, this framework provides the basis for the rigorous analysis of a radical group’s risk for terrorism.

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Post argues that political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit. The polarizing and absolutist "us versus them" rhetoric of terrorists reflects their underlying views of "the establishment" as the source of all evil, and provides a psychologically satisfying explanation for what has gone wrong in their lives. The fixed logical conclusion of the terrorist that the establishment must be destroyed is driven by the terrorist's search for identity, and that, as he strikes out against the establishment, he is attempting to destroy the enemy within. Post suggests that the most effective way of countering terrorism is to reduce external support, facilitate pathways out of terrorism, and reduce the attractiveness of the terrorist path for alienated youth. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Propst examines the question of whether or not the early 21st Century is seeing the emergence of a new breed of terrorists, as suggested by some observers. He examines both the "old" and "new" terrorists, developing general definitions of both. The "old terrorists," according to his typology, tended to be social-revolutionary leftists or nationalist-separatist groups, more politically motivated. The "new terrorist" is likely to be one of five types of terrorists, Propst argues: "a religious, extremist terrorist; a transnational terrorist; a 'new religions' terrorist; a right-wing terrorist; an isolated, rogue terrorist from a shared 'community of belief.'" In general, Propst sees the new terrorists as more religiously than politically motivated, less constrained in their use of violence, and more likely to strike for shock value rather than symbolic or didactic reasons. With regard to terrorist attack means, Propst argues that "a continuation of terrorism by 'conventional' attack means is more imminent and most likely" (emphasis in original). He bases this argument on an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of conventional and CBRN attack means, a historical review of terrorist attacks, and views from "professionals" (media, academia, public figures, and terrorists). He concludes that there is a "definable" new terrorist emerging, and argues that attack means - conventional versus CBRN - is not an either-or proposition. These new terrorists, in his view, are more likely to use CBRN than old terrorists, but the immediacy of that threat is uncertain and it is more likely that the new terrorists will continue to use conventional means but in a much less constrained manner than their predecessors. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

The authors describe a 5-part "grand strategy" of FARC: 1) consolidate control of coca-growing regions in southern and eastern parts of the country; 2) expand the theater of operations to the entire country, forcing the government to disperse its forces; 3) expand into economically strategic areas, including corridors to the Pacific coast and to northeastern Colombia for rapid movement of troops, arms and supplies; 4) isolate Bogota and other major cities; and 5) move to large-scale offensive operations, culminating in a general uprising. The long-term objectives of both the ELN and FARC are compatible, and they have joined forces in some instances. However, while FARC has had a variety of success against Colombian military, ELN prefers an "economic strategy" (attacking the power grid and communications infrastructure) over military confrontations.


This chapter describes the evolution of the guerrilla movements in Colombia. The patterns of armed conflict in the country were put in motion after the assassination of Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on April 9, 1948 and the subsequent Conservative victory in 1949 (an election which the Liberal Party boycotted). In the years that followed, both parties mobilized armed supporters in the countryside in an undeclared civil war that claimed 200,000 lives. The authors provide a thorough overview of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, now thought to be 15,000-20,000 strong), the ELN (National Liberation Army, with approximately 3,000-5,000 members), and other groups, including the EPL (People's Liberation Army). Their coverage includes the organization of units, funding sources, geographic distribution, issues of leadership, and the development of linkages with the illegal drug industry in the 1990s.

This chapter describes the origin and expansion of the illegal self-defense organizations (a.k.a. paramilitaries) dedicated to eradicating the insurgency in Colombia. Some groups were originally legal civil defense units to support the army, while others are comprised of bodyguards of drug traffickers and other criminals. As legal units developed links with criminal ones, the government eventually outlawed the self-defense units, but they continued to grow and expand. Eventually, the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, estimated strength of 8,000) was established as an umbrella organization, providing some degree of central coordination, funding, and coherent doctrine for these groups. The AUC has had some success driving FARC out of former strongholds, resulting in the current power struggle between FARC and AUC in several regions. The author concludes that whether the paramilitaries should be treated as political actors (and given a seat at the negotiating table) or as criminals, they are undoubtedly another competing power center challenging the state's frayed authority.

**Countries/Regions:** Colombia

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This study examines the sources of instability in Colombia; the objectives, strategies, strengths, and weaknesses of the major Colombian actors - government, guerrillas, and paramilitaries - and the balance of forces among them; and the impact of the U.S. assistance program. Drug trafficking and political disintegration in Colombia could confront the United States, if present trends continue, with the most serious foreign and security policy crisis in the Western Hemisphere since the Central American wars of the 1980s. U.S. policy toward Colombia has been driven to a large extent by counter-narcotics considerations, but the situation is a national security as much as a drug policy problem. The study concludes with possible scenarios for Colombia and the implications of these scenarios for the security and stability of neighboring states and U.S. regional security interests.

**Countries/Regions:** Colombia, United States

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These two chapters provide a general overview of Islam's early development. In "Muhammed," Rahman provides a brief description of the prophet's early life, experiences and beliefs, the struggle of preaching in the face of strong opposition from the religious oligarchy in Mecca, his strategy to spread the word of the Qur'an to the Meccans (eventually incorporating military means) once he had gained the support of the people of
Medina, the role of Muslim-Jewish relations in the region, and the various military campaigns that helped ensure the spread of Islam throughout the Arab World. The second chapter describes the Qur'an as a book of religious and moral principles. Rahman discusses the Qur'an's teachings, its emphasis on prayer, its portrayal of man's moral struggle and legal interpretations and pronouncements that have historically been tied to this struggle.

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This book describes the founding of Hizb'Allah, its command leadership and relationship with Iranian clergy and institutions. Ranstorp then examines various hostage crises between 1982 and 1992 and responses by Western countries, the relationship of these events with internal Lebanese, regional, and international events, and the interaction between Hizb'Allah, Iran, and Syria. He argues that Western crisis management techniques were poorly adjusted in timing and direction to the actual crisis environment, ignoring the opportunities and constraints in the fluctuating relationship between Syria and Iran as well as the Hizb'Allah. He concludes with a set of suggested requirements for future crisis management responses, including: recognizing the inability to achieve one's maximum political objectives; limiting the means employed in pursuit of those objectives; accurately identifying (and gathering ample intelligence on) one's adversary; maintaining effective communication with the adversary; developing and maintaining a crisis-management machinery, adaptable to the changing dynamics of crisis situations; cultivating domestic and international support for the measures taken in a crisis; and considering the possible precedent-setting dimension of various options (legally and in terms of maintaining relationships with other countries) before adopting them as a solution. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: Lebanon, Middle East


Rapoport details the known history of three ancient terrorist groups: the Thugs, the Assassins, and the Zealots-Sicarii. Through his analysis, he refutes the claim that "modern" terrorism differs from more dated forms merely in terms of available technology and scope. He asserts that the three ancient groups were holy terrorists, focused mostly on how some form of deity would receive their acts, while modern terrorists have developed an altogether different form of terror, one more focused on how people, not gods, can achieve desired political ends. To Rapoport, modern terrorism is defined by it's constantly changing nature and to the many different ends towards which it can be applied.

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Rapoport argues that sacred terror has important differences from terrorism undertaken with secular intentions, and uses terrorist means as his focus of attention. He believes that terrorists undertaking action for religious means (whom he terms "scared terrorists") always look to the past, at the beginning of a religious tradition, to justify their actions and dictate the means they shall use, while secular terrorists allow themselves to follow any and all successful paths. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Countries/Regions: Middle East

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Religious repression under the Soviet Regime, according to Rashid, including punitive campaigns to eliminate the practice of Islam in Central Asia, depicted as a reactionary, mullah-led impediment to national progress. Mosques were shut down and converted into workshops, Muslim worship and ceremonies were banned, women were forbidden to wear the veil, and children were not allowed to read the Koran. Islam was thus forced underground - people ran madrassahs in their homes, joined together to pray and perform religious ceremonies at night or under cover of national holidays, and secretly published religious literature. With the decline of the Soviet Union, emerging political leaders in Central Asia faced challenges from Islamic leaders now free to speak openly, and their response of political repression and censorship only deepened the crisis between religion and state.

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Countries/Regions: Soviet Union

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In one of the case studies in his book, Rashid describes the founding of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the increasingly effective attacks orchestrated by its leader, Juma Namangani. IMU demanded that Uzbekistan be declared an Islamic state and more mosques and madrassahs be opened, and the national leaders' reluctance to do so led the group to seize the headquarters of the Community Party of Uzbekistan and launch a jihad against the secular government. According to several observers, Namangani is considered a guerilla leader, not an Islamic scholar, and is held responsible for several bombings, kidnappings and other terrorist activities throughout Uzbekistan over the past decade. Through external links (with the heroin trade in Afghanistan, Islamic parties in Pakistan, Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia, among others), IMU has become one of the most powerful militant organizations in the region.

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Countries/Regions: Uzbekistan
According to Rashid, one of the most intriguing questions about Islamic movements in Central Asia today is how a highly secretive, pan-Islamic movement that originated in the Middle East and largely does not even address pertinent issues of public concern in Central Asia has become the most popular, widespread underground movement in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. There are more members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir (or HT, a group dedicated to uniting Central Asia, Xinjiang Province in China, and eventually the entire Islamic world community under a caliphate) in Central Asia's prisons than those of any other movement. This chapter describes the origin, structure and beliefs of the HT, suggesting that while few real links to Al Qaeda or other militant Islamic groups are known, the likelihood of HT moving from an educational to a militant jihad is growing amid the economic and political chaos of Central Asia.


In one of the case studies in his book, Rashid describes the bloody civil war in Tajikistan as Central Asia's first experience of a political coup by a homegrown Islamicist movement. The fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent state independence in Tajikistan enabled a rapid resurgence of Islamicists. Between 1990 and 1992, a thousand new mosques opened throughout the country, and when the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was registered as a political party in December 1992 it already claimed twenty thousand members. Political struggle turned to civil war throughout the 1990s, and when United Nations intervention eventually led to a fragile peace, several IRP commanders joined with Juma Namangani (the founder of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) in a guerilla war against secular state authorities throughout the Fegana Valley region.


Rashid explains the genesis behind the Taliban regime as an extremist (and uneducated) blend of Deobandism and Wahhabism and illustrates the cross-national ties that helped to place the Taliban in a ruling position. He details the drug trafficking, smuggling, and terrorism sponsoring activities that the regime uses to support itself, and argues that these activities threaten the Central Asian states, Iran, China, and Pakistan. He argues that the U.S. must pay attention to the problems posed by Afghanistan and try to bring stabilization to this volatile region.

This important and accessible book, written by a veteran reporter, explores several Islamic movements in Central Asia. Considerable focus is given to the Fergana Valley, one of the "hottest danger zones" in the world (according to Anthony Lake), yet largely unknown to most scholars and analysts in the West. Chapters cover a brief history of the main conflicts between Islamic militants and the repressive governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan - states which Rashid feels are now "ripe for social, political and economic upheavals [that] will be bloody and unpredictable, and will almost certainly alter the strategic balance in the region." A paperback edition (published by Penguin Books) includes a new preface on the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan following the September 11th attacks.

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Countries/Regions: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,


Dr. Record examines three features of the war on terrorism: (1) the administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political, fiscal, and military sustainability. He finds that the war on terrorism - as opposed to the campaign against al Qaeda - lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul. He calls for downsizing the scope of the war on terrorism to reflect concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American military power. He also criticizes the Bush administration's decision for war in Iraq, arguing that this has diverted attention and resources away from the security of the American homeland against further assault by al Qaeda.

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Countries/Regions: United States


From an analysis of research fallacies like generalization, reductionism, and ignorance of state terrorism, Reich identifies common weaknesses in current terrorism scholarship. He then suggest methods by which researchers can avoid these mistakes. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

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Pursuant to the 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85), a report on government-wide spending to combat terrorism is provided to Congress annually. This report covers Executive Branch spending, programmatic initiatives, and priority terrorism-related areas for FY 2002 through FY 2004. The information is derived from data gathered by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) from involved departments and agencies. The report also covers significant achievements and challenges in several key mission areas of homeland security, including intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, and emergency preparedness and response. The report indicates that the most significant challenge facing emergency preparedness and response is measuring actual improvements in the nation's readiness level, and the balance between the relative threats of attacks and disasters and available resource requirements. The Department of Homeland Security, in cooperation with other agencies, must therefore establish readiness measures and standards that contribute to a more thorough assessment of federal, state, and local capabilities. These standards will be incorporated into terrorism and emergency preparedness exercises, and grant programs.

**Topic 1:**
National Terrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions:** United States

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This State Department website is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Major reports available on this site include Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designations (1997, 1999), Patterns of Global Terrorism (1995-1999), and Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans (1995-1998), along with a variety of policy statements from 1996 through 2001.

**Topic 1:**
National Terrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions:** United States

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This monograph argues that Islamic radicalism is a political response to the deepening economic, social, political, and cultural crisis in the Muslim World. Rapid demographic growth, educational changes, government policy failure, and rapid urbanization are among the causes of high unemployment, and increasing poverty, which, together with other forces, have alienated large sectors of Muslim youth. The incompetence and authoritarianism of many Muslim and Middle Eastern governments strongly fosters Islamist radicalism. These governments are overwhelmingly unelected, unaccountable, and corrupt; they provide no legitimate outlet for youth discontent. The author calls for a long-term strategy that includes a recognition of the limits of American power, concrete steps to resolve the Palestinian problem, and improved
intelligence and police cooperation with Arab, EU, and other governments in the struggle against al-Qaeda and like-minded jihadi salafist terrorists. He concludes that since the necessary institutional changes must come from within Arab and other Muslim societies (and particularly the youth of these societies), we must accept that genuinely democratic Arab and Islamic polities will include strong representation of Islamists.

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy  
**Topic 2:** Global Environment  
**Topic 3:** Political Islam  

**Countries/Regions:** United States, Middle East


In this article, Richardson looks at the transnational nature of terrorism. She asserts that the U.S. is too quick to assume that all terrorist groups must be backed by state sponsors in a simplistic system in which the states dictate the terrorist activities. Richardson maintains that there are many different relationships between states and terrorist groups, and that states often are not in full control. She advocates further study in order to understand better how terrorists and states work together as a way to develop effective counterterrorism strategies.

**Topic 1:** State Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** Terrorism’s New Model  
**Topic 3:** Global Environment


In this chapter, Richardson offers a brief historical overview of thirty years of conflict between Protestants and Catholics, describing a pattern of violence that escalated rapidly from 1968-1972, was sustained until 1976, and then followed by a prolonged 25 years of low intensity conflict. She argues that both exogenous and endogenous factors explain this pattern. The important exogenous factors include the increasing skill and intelligence capacity of the security services. The important endogenous factors include the military organization of the IRA and the nature of their ideology. Similar patterns are observed in the evolution of the peace process, where various cease-fires and negotiated agreements built and sustained momentum over the long haul which - combined with war weariness and maturing political institutions - eventually created a context within which a settlement to the conflict could be considered. Overall, the original impetus for the peace process was an endogenous one - the IRA eventually realized its goals could not be achieved through violence - and supported, nurtured and encouraged by exogenous players such as the EU and the U.S.

**Topic 1:** Religion and Conflict  
**Topic 2:** Case Studies

**Countries/Regions:** Northern Ireland

Roach provides a critical examination of the consequences for Canada of September 11 in the areas of law, democracy, sovereignty and security. He assesses a broad range of antiterrorism measures including the (Canadian) Anti-terrorism Act, the smart border agreement, Canadian participation in the war in Afghanistan, changes to refugee policy, the 2001 Security Budget, and the proposed Public Safety Act.

### Topic 1: Strategies to Respond and Defeat Terrorism

Country/Regions: Canada

### Topic 2: National Terrorism Policy

### Topic 3: Case Studies

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In military operations involving action against terrorists, the relevance of the laws of war, often now called international humanitarian law, is problematical. Roberts discusses whether the law is applicable to the US-led 'war on terror', whether it should be applied in situations different from what was envisaged in treaties and if detainees are prisoners of war. A difficulty in applying the law is that governments usually view terrorists as simply criminal.

### Topic 1: Counterterrorism Questions in Society

### Topic 2: Counterterrorism Instruments

### Topic 3: Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective

Country/Regions: United States

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This book suggests that current assessments of CBRN terrorism are made of nearly equal parts of "hype" and "reality." While future terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons are not inevitable, "Catastrophic" attacks are less likely than low-level attacks that would produce casualties only equal to or less than conventional bomb attacks. Bruce Hoffman and Joseph Pilat argue that large-scale attacks depicted in movies and in some scenarios are unrealistic given the technical proficiency of most groups and the historical record. Terrorist groups most attracted to CBRN will probably be millenarian or religiously-based terrorist groups. According to James Campbell, groups that combine religious fanaticism with "closed-cell" networks detached from the larger society and under the control of a charismatic, megalomaniacal leader pose the largest risk. Shoko Asahara and his Aum Shinrikyo cult fit this profile, yet, as Milton Leitenberg points out, they failed in their quest for an effective CBRN capability. Most authors remain skeptical of the potential for peacetime sponsorship of terrorist organizations with CBRN weapons, but Brad Roberts notes that in times of crisis or war a rogue state could employ such weapons in terrorist-style attacks against the United States - attacks that could either be denied or conducted in such a way as to suggest an alternate perpetrator. Of the types of weapons considered, nuclear weapons are viewed as the least likely to be used in a terrorist attack, while some authors contend the chemical weapons will be the most likely. Should they be used, Paul de Armond suggests that a transition away from conventional explosives and toward CBRN probably will be incremental as groups imitate the tools and tactics of others. Finally, almost all authors stress that low-tech, low-level attacks,
which they hold most probable, nonetheless deserve "appropriate" governmental concern. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002) (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

Roberts, Brad, ed. Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses. Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997.

This edited volume examines the threat of chemical and biological terrorism in the wake of Aum Shinrikyo's March 1995 sarin gas attack. Joseph Pilat argues that the prospects for CBRN terrorism have been exaggerated because of low likelihood of terrorist groups combining the necessary technical skills, materials and motivations. James Adams focuses on proliferation and "porous borders," concluding that "terrorist groups are more likely to acquire their WMD from friendly nations than they are to develop them." Brian Jenkins argues that three sets of factors influence the likelihood of CBW terrorism: technical factors, policy factors (actions governments take to limit vulnerabilities), and political factors (terrorist motivations). He then examines how terrorist motivations acted to limit the level of violence in the past and suggests that the technical constraints of obtaining, manufacturing, storing, and effectively disseminating large amounts of CBW means that if such terrorism does occur, it will most likely involve chemical rather than biological weapons, will be a small-scale attack, and will more likely involve an agent readily available in an industrialized society (such as cyanide or rat poison) than "more exotic" chemical or biological weapons. Karl Lowe argues that production and effective dissemination of biological weapons is not as easy as conventional wisdom suggests, and terrorist groups are not likely to possess the required mix of technical, scientific, and military skills to carry out an effective BW attack. The group most likely to do so, Lowe argues, is one that has state sponsorship and access to that state's BW efforts. Ron Purver examines several of the purported reasons and constraints that were alleged to have restrained past CBW use and argues that several key constraints - including lack of a precedent, disinclination toward mass casualties, and a reluctance to experiment with new weapons - have eroded. Anthony Fainberg argues that the U.S. can (as of the time of the writing in 1997) expect such an attack within a few years, probably from right-wing, neo-fascist groups or religious cults. Jonathan Tucker sees groups with extremist ideologies or religious fanaticism as those most likely to turn to CBW weapons, and mentions Russia as a possible source for terrorists seeking such weapons. Frank Young argues that the ability to predict CBW terrorism is low, and that with the spread of information on the Internet and other resources terrorists will be less reliant on state sponsorship. In the conclusion, Brad Roberts examines whether or not 1995 was a watershed year with respect to the alleged taboo against the use of chemical or biological weapons. He argues that, in making this judgment, one must take into account differences between traditional terrorists (who might consider such a level of violence too risky or counterproductive) and new terrorists (who would not be as bound by such constraints). He concludes that the CBW terrorist threat is real and will continue, but the likelihood of attacks might remain low (as indicated by the relative lack of use of such weapons in the past). Nevertheless, the U.S. government should take steps to deal with evident vulnerabilities that exist. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)
Rosen describes his book as an exploration of the relationship between violence and religion, particularly in relation to the Bhagavad Gita, the world's oldest and most enduring religious classics. The Gita, as it is called, has contributed to discussions of violence and religion for millennia. In this introductory chapter, Rosen provides a contextual overview of the violence alluded to in the Gita. Krishna and Arjuna are on a battlefield, and must decide what to do. Arjuna is seen as the noble warrior meant to give protection to the people. His cause is just and to execute it is his duty. Krishna explains that everyone can attain the highest level of consciousness by following the prescribed path of his own natural duty while being conscious of God. Religion is simply the science of learning how to do this. The Gita's central teaching is that one can act passionately and dispassionately at the same time, on God's behalf - something Christian leaders have called 'holy indifference.' The secret is to recognize oneself as an instrument of a higher power, recognizing God as the ultimate "doer" behind each act. The path to God thus demands acting on his behalf, even if this means resorting to violence. All other duties are secondary.

Rosenau examines Aum Shinrikyo's extensive efforts to acquire and use biological weapons with the aim of identifying the reasons for the cult's failures and to see if those reasons can be applied on a more general level. Rosenau briefly outlines Aum's program, which was the most sophisticated ever established by a non-state entity, and covers the numerous attempts by cult members to deliver botulinum toxin and anthrax against a variety of targets. He then presents three arguments for why the cult's program failed to achieve its ends: "1. the challenge of acquiring sufficiently lethal strains of botulinum toxin and anthrax bacilli; 2. the difficulty in preparing those agents for dissemination, and dispersing them; [and] 3. the limitations imposed on Aum's biological weapons effort by the nature of the organization itself." From these arguments, Rosenau hypothesizes that the difficulties in carrying out a bioterrorism attack may be greater than portrayed. He acknowledges that terrorists and other individuals have acquired biological agents, but argues that certain hurdles - such as dissemination - remain. He also argues that the Aum case can provide a profile of sorts for law enforcement and intelligence personnel to identify such groups. Yet he also suggests that the groups seen as most likely to consider using biological agents, "[c]ult-like terrorist organizations . . . may be least suited to meet the complex demands associated with a bioweapon program." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

This article presents the discussions that took place during a roundtable following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The discussion covered a wide range of topics, including CBRN terrorism. According to Jonathan
Tucker, the threat has been downplayed in the past because relatively few terrorist groups were interested in causing mass casualties and because of the technical hurdles that would have to be overcome. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, he believes that this perception has changed, and he cites two factors for that change. First, "the group that attacked on September 11 seemed to differ in its characteristics and methodology from other groups that we have seen in the past." He points out the dedication and fanaticism of the attackers, as well as their methodical preparation and mastery of tradecraft. In his view, the latter suggests "they were receiving assistance from some state intelligence agency that has a good understanding of how the United States collects its information and can give them good advice on counterintelligence." Second is "the possibility that the bin Laden group network may have, if not state sponsorship, then association with a state that can provide technical assistance." He suggests that such assistance could allow a group such as bin Laden's to overcome the technical hurdles that have been perceived as limiting the threat of CBRN terrorism. Tucker also points out "a clear congruence between a number of states that support terrorism and states that have WMD programs." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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In these two chapters of his book, Roy asserts that the Western state model has failed within the Islamic world. He believes that this failure has led towards the Islamist movement, which seeks to join the Islamic world into a single, religiously focused model. Thus, this Islamist movement has become joined with neo-fundamentalism. However, Roy notes that this movement is only relevant in the socio-cultural realm; it leads to the mistaken belief that a larger, utopian Muslim society once existed, and that modernization (and thus, Westernization) is the culprit that destroyed that society. While this belief has negative effects on Middle East culture, Roy concludes that it will not affect the political reality, in which a pan-Islamist movement is subordinated to national strategic decisions.

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Countries/Regions: Multinational


This article presents a discussion on Steve Simon and Daniel Benjamin's earlier article about the "New Terrorism." Hoffman perceives that a new trend toward religiously motivated terrorism has fewer constraints on the use of violence, but does not believe that this trend will necessarily result in a large-scale shift toward the use of CBRN weapons. Aum's difficulties suggest that even well-developed organizations will face serious hurdles in the acquisition and employment of CBRN weapons; religious zeal and a desire to inflict mass casualties will not by themselves overcome the technical challenges of these weapons. Reuven Paz focuses on the motivational and ideological side of the new terrorism, discussing the roots of Muslim fanaticism and their relationship to increasingly deadly terrorism. He sees the perception of "a state of constant war" against the infidel West as a key motivator for many Muslims that could be used as justification for the "new" terrorism. In their response to Hoffman and Paz, Simon and Benjamin argue that CBRN terrorism cannot be dismissed just because of a lack of previous or contemporary attacks. The technical barriers are weakening,
they suggest, which means the U.S. must be ready to face this likely future threat. Further, declarations such as bin Laden's 1998 fatwa (advocating the killing of Americans) demonstrate a clear intent to cause mass casualties without restraint - for which CBRN weapons are well suited. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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**Topic 1:**
**CBRN Terrorism**

**Topic 2:**
**Religious Ideology**

**Topic 3:**
**Terrorist's Movements and Psychology**

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This chapter addresses dimensions of culture - identity, values, norms, ethos, world view, and sense of place in history and in the world - which impact the conflict in Northern Ireland. The authors trace the development of cultural conflict in the region, arguing that cultural inequality is related to the struggle for political legitimacy: nationalists in Northern Ireland push for the region to appear and feel culturally Irish, while unionists push for the region to appear and feel culturally British. This struggle involves a variety of symbols and other dimensions of culture, including songs, flags, rituals, monuments, names, and language. Cultural inequality between Protestants and Catholics has important consequences for life-chances and personal and social experiences - the likelihood of getting a job or being promoted, being treated well or badly by the security forces, being able to express oneself with confidence in a public setting, hearing one's culture spoken of with respect in public, and so forth. Their historical review of this struggle indicates that the terms of public debate over cultural inequality have shifted over the past several decades, and will likely remain in a state of flux for the near future.

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**Topic 1:**
**Historical Context**

**Topic 2:**
**Case Studies**

**Topic 3:**
**Terrorist Movements and Psychology**

Countries/Regions: Northern Ireland

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This article profiles the Palestinian terrorist Qeis Adwan, who died in April, 2002 during a military raid by Israeli troops. The author reviews the suicide bombings and other acts for which he was responsible, including at restaurants in Haifa and Jerusalem in 2002, and details the characteristics and biographical details (including his military training) which made him dangerous to Israel. His public image among Palestinians is described, along with the importance of martyrdom among terrorists.

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**Topic 1:**
**Case Studies**

Countries/Regions: Israel-Palestine, Middle East

The author traces the religious and intellectual background behind the terrorist attacks on the United States, arguing that they were carried out by men driven by an amalgam of traditional Islamic concepts (such as "jihad") and extremist ideas adapted from European leftism, fascism, and anarchism. However, after 9/11, hundreds of Islamic scholars around the world condemned the attack, stating that the concept of jihad (meaning "struggle", often translated as "holy war") can never justify Muslims attacking civilian targets. The greater jihad, following the teachings of the prophet, is the struggle against evil. The lesser jihad, armed struggle, only applies to Muslim self-defense. The balance of educated Islamic opinion, reflected in statements throughout the Islamic world, was thus unequivocal in condemning these atrocities as contrary to the laws of Islam. The author discusses the classical and historical conceptions of jihad, as well as the limitations and the rules of war. This chapter lays the groundwork for a subsequent discussion on Sayyid Qutb, whom the author calls "the intellectual father of modern Islamist terrorism," and "the inspiration behind September 11th."

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In this book, Said takes issue with what is presumed to be fair, balanced, responsible coverage of Islam, yet is often based on material that is less than objective. He notes that in striving to produce a consensus of what Islam "is", Islam is too commonly represented as a particular menace to the West. He notes that for those on the right of the political spectrum, Islam represents barbarism; for the left, medieval theocracy. For all, it seems agreed that even though little enough is known about the Islamic world, there is not much to be approved of there. Said argues that "we must be able to see the connection between what the West has been saying about Islam and what, reactively, various Muslim societies have done." He analyzes a pattern of back-and-forth between the West and Islam, a pattern that underscores the close relationship between language and political reality. The historical discourse and knowledge on Islam has been too closely tied to conquest and domination. These ties must be severed completely, using common sense and critical assessment.

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Countries/Regions: United States


In this article, Sartori examines the limitations of comparative political analyses, noting that universal categories are needed, applicable to any time and place. Thus far, he argues, the discipline has largely followed the line of least resistance, namely "conceptual stretching." As a result, the very purpose of comparing is defeated, and "we are left to swim a sea of empirical and theoretical messiness." He calls upon scholars in this field of inquiry to 1) develop the discipline along a medium level of abstraction with better intermediate categories, and 2) maneuver, both upwards and downwards, along a ladder of abstraction in such a way as to bring together assimilation and differentiation, a relatively high explanatory power and a relatively precise
descriptive content, macro-theory and empirical testing. A disciplined use of terms and procedures should yield informative and useful propositions.

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This chapter provides a brief historical overview of key events and individuals in the struggle for Palestinian nationalism, addressing two questions: (1) Why did the Palestinians continue to emphasize the need for military action so vehemently and consistently, and for so long? And (2) What were the primary achievements of the Palestinian armed struggle in the decades following its formal launch by Fatah, the dominant Palestinian group, in 1965? In retrospect, Sayigh argues, the armed struggle formed an integral part of the process of Palestinian nation-building. It revived and reinforced national identity, defined common goals, made possible the mobilization of human and material resources and provided the context for the conduct of internal politics and for the emergence of new leaders and organizational structures. The struggle enabled them to gradually assert the concept of a separate Palestinian entity.

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This book provides an extensive review of the Palestinian national movement, from the establishment of Israel at the end of the British Mandate of Palestine in 1948, to the PLO-Israel accord of 1993. When originally published, this book was considered the first extensive academic history of the Palestinian national movement. The author's main goal is historical (rather than a political sociology or an analysis in the context of international relations), and he draws extensively on PLO archives, official publications and internal documents, and over 400 interviews conducted by the author with PLO rank-and-file. The author also describes the role of terrorism and its significance in the emergence of this movement, and analyzes the workings of various bureaucracies during the transformation of the PLO from a national movement in exile to a governmental apparatus.

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This chapter provides "a few lessons from President Chandrika Kumaratunga's 1994-95 peace initiative," focusing primarily on what the government was trying to accomplish, what it did well, and what it might have done differently. The author argues that the most detrimental obstacle to the peace process stems from the electoral arrangements in Sri Lanka's parliament, where representation configurations make it virtually impossible to amend the constitution. She concludes with suggestions for future peace initiatives: planning for a multi-stage process, using each stage as a means of gaining confidence and experience, and relying less on words and more on actions in the negotiations. Also, a serious effort must be made to build understanding and communication among Sri Lanka's ethnic groups at the unofficial level, particularly in educating the Sinhalese majority to appreciate and combat the daily discrimination experienced by the Tamil minorities.

Countries/Regions: Sri Lanka


Schmid examines the threat of CBRN terrorism, attempts to determine whether the threat is growing, and suggests a possible course of action in response. The author argues that trying to assess the risk of CBRN terrorism is a difficult task, walking a fine line "between fear and paranoia on one hand and prudence and disbelief on the other." But he points out that, apart from the efforts of Aum Shinrikyo in this area, "uses of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons by terrorists are still rare, with hoaxes outnumbering actual deployments by far." Schmid seems to focus on the threat of nuclear terrorism over chemical and biological terrorism, discussing the proliferation/leakage threat in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union and citing some instances of terrorist and rogue state interest in Russian nuclear materials. More generally, he discusses inhibitors and facilitators of CBRN terrorism, concluding both that a number of traditional inhibiting factors are weakening even as the number of factors that might facilitate this brand of terrorism appears to be increasing. (Yet he also cautions that "one must be aware that the current threat exaggeration is apparently being fuelled by an industrial-advisory complex in this area.") The author raises what he concludes to be a principal cause for CBRN terrorism, desperation: "Desperate people and their leaders might indeed do desperate things. Desperation is certainly an issue towards which we must look above all else when trying to assess from where the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction is most likely to come." From this premise, the author proposes a method for dealing with such threats: "Continuous constructive dialogue and pragmatic compromise with actual and potential political opponents at home and abroad." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Drawing on a number of key documents and interviews of former counterterrorism policy and planning officials, the author offers nine "mutually reinforcing, self-imposed constraints" that prevented the use of special mission units in hunting down and destroying the al Qaeda terrorist network prior to September 11th. Defining terrorism as a crime made it the responsibility of the Justice Department, rather than the Department of Defense, and with the resulting lack of legal authority few Pentagon officials were willing to see terrorist attacks as grounds for war (and the deployment of military forces). The Somalia syndrome and other dimensions of risk aversion led Pentagon leaders to obstruct and intimidate civilians who promoted a more aggressive military response to terrorism. Further, essential intelligence requirements were defined so narrowly as to make pre-positioning and other counterterrorism operations virtually impossible. Schultz offers these observations as lessons we have hopefully learned, so that similar mistakes are avoided in the future.

**Topic 1:** Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective  
**Topic 2:** Counterterrorism Instruments  
**Countries/Regions:** United States


Schwartz provides a three-piece framework for trying to develop scenarios about what the future might bring. In his model, societal, political, technological, economic, and environmental forces work together with predetermined elements and critical uncertainties to impact how the future will develop. Swartz advocates this model not as a way to predict the future, but rather as a method to open managers' mindsets to the possibility of unpredictability and to developing alternatives to meet those changes.

**Topic 1:** Future of Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** The Framework  
**Countries/Regions:**


In this chapter, Haggai describes how Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan attempted to ensure that the Dome of the Rock (a Muslim holy site located in the center of the Temple Mount) would remain a Muslim place of worship, despite the desires of some members of the military to take it over completely. The fear was that once photos of Israeli army officers occupying this site were circulated throughout the Arab world, a violent jihad would be launched against the Israelis. However, the author notes that assertions of Muslim views toward Jerusalem were misrepresented by Israeli politicians - in fact, the Koran makes no mention of the holy city, and Jerusalem and the Temple Mount became sacred to Muslims only during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. Jerusalem thus became a focal point for both Zionists and Muslims only when it was occupied by someone other than themselves. The chapter then describes how two men - Yehuda Etzion and Yeshua Ben-Shushan - came to decide that blowing up the Dome of the Rock was a necessary act of Jewish
redemption in reclaiming the Temple of the Mount.

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This chapter describes how two men began planning to destroy the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, soliciting support from senior religious leaders (such as Rabbi Kook and Rabbi Yehuda) who at the very least did not discourage them. This conspiracy to "cleanse the Temple Mount" of the Muslim presence was diverted by a massacre at the Beit Hadassah. Overall, the book describes the actions and motivations of key players in the ultra-conservative, or extremist, Jewish underground movement during the late 1970s.

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In this chapter, the author describes the role of Menacham Begin, following the Likud's electoral victory in the national Israeli elections of 1977, in trying to stem the expansion of Jewish settlements, and the resulting political conflict between Begin and the Jewish extremist groups which had initially supported him. The author describes his personal experience at a demonstration where settlers vowed to resist removal of the Sinai settlements with force. Shabtai Ben-Dov, a former member of the Lehi underground extremist movement, emerged as an influential Zionist writer who called for the dedication of a unified Israeli state toward reclaiming the holiest sites of Jewish history. He also predicted the liberation of the Temple Mount and the Western Wall, which took place during the Six Day War - part of a larger and necessary act of historical redemption for the Jewish people. He also felt that the Muslim presence in these sites could be destroyed without any negative recourse - a position not shared by the Israeli authorities.

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This chapter focuses on recent criticisms of India's secularism. The author clarifies the use of the term secular in this instance to mean a state's imperative to deal with different religions equally and with symmetry, rather than the avoidance of religion altogether. Skepticism about Indian secularism takes many forms, and the author chooses just six to address in this chapter: (1) the 'non-existence' critique, which basically suggests India is anything but secular; (2) the 'favoritism' critique, which suggests the Muslim minority is given
preference over the Hindu majority; (3) the 'prior identity' critique, which sees the identity of being a Hindu, a Muslim, or a Sikh to be politically 'prior' to being an Indian; (4) the 'Muslim sectarianism' critique, which points to an historic Muslim refusal to identify with other Indians; (5) the 'anti-modern' critique, which attacks secularism as a folly of modernism; and (6) the 'cultural' critique, which views India as a 'Hindu country', thus making it wrong to view Hinduism as simply one of the various religions of India. After addressing each of these lines of criticism, the author concludes that none of them do much to undermine the basic case for secularism in India. Thus we must see India as an integrally pluralist society, and accept the necessity of symmetric political treatment of different religious communities.


The primary aim of the Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, or ETA) is Basque independence and the return to prominence of Basque culture and language in the region. The authors provide a thorough history of ETA and a description of the organization's leaders, the main targets and effects of its violent acts, the international dimensions of this violence, and the socioeconomic and political contexts of Basque nationalism. In their discussion of the cultural context, the authors describe a "collective memory of oppression" and argue that by placing all expressions of Basque identity into the category of social transgression, the Francoist regime helped to make violence permissible - even morally justifiable - in the minds of many Basques. In their conclusion, the authors explore the relation between regime type and the effectiveness of terrorist organizations - particularly, authoritarian regimes such as Francoist Spain, as opposed to democratic regimes. In their analysis, democracies have a greater ability to lay claims to legitimacy and loyalty by providing opportunities for voicing demands and expressing dissent through peaceful means.

Shaffer, Brenda. "Is there a Muslim Foreign Policy? The Case of the Caspian." Current History, vol. 101, no. 658 (Nov 2002), 382-387

According to Shaffer, policymakers often use culture as a variable to predict future alliances and possible conflicts ("they are Muslims, therefore they will support . . ." or "they are Kurds, therefore they will align with . . ."). The author notes that this argument is challenged by many examples of foreign policies among the Caspian states, where culturally based interests are subsumed by the pursuit or defense of the state's (or other states') material interests. If Islam is the defining force in a Muslim-populated state, then these states should be willing to make significant material sacrifices and take security risks to promote their religious beliefs. When a culturally based goal collides with basic material goals of the state or the ruling elite, one would expect that the commitment to the culturally based goal overrides. This has not been the case in the Muslim-dominated nations in the Caspian region.

The chapter is concerned with the act of hostage taking for political purposes and the impact of these incidents on foreign policy decision-making. The human dimension of hostage incidents can infuse more of the personal into decision-making at the expense of the impersonal (particularly when the media and hostages' families are involved). The author argues that grand strategy, to which most other foreign policy decisions can and should be related, offers an unsatisfactory response for hostage situations. He then offers his own insights - as a member of President Carter's National Security Council, responsible for Iranian affairs during the Tehran hostage crisis - in order to "shed some light on the phenomenon and provide some cautionary tales." (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)


Siegrist argues that three elements are necessary for a biological attack to occur: a vulnerable target, a group with the capability to launch an attack, and the intent to launch such an attack. He states that in spite of recent steps to improved preparedness, the United States in still vulnerable to a biological attack. The capability of terrorists to launch attacks is increasing as well, due to the widespread dissemination of biological and technical information. Technical challenges to terrorists with regard to acquisition, production, weaponization, and dissemination remain significant, but are not insurmountable. Siegrist briefly discusses the apparent shift in terrorist intentions as seen in post-modern terrorism, chiefly the desire for mass casualties and the rise of ethnic or religious motivations that could promote such desires. Biological weapons offer such terrorists the potential to inflict mass casualties, and the fear that would result from even a small attack would also make such weapons desirable. Siegrist concludes by arguing that two of the three elements in his opening - vulnerability and capability - are already in place, but can be managed through preparedness and other readiness measures. The third, intentions, is a much harder area to manage and thus reinforces the need to reduce vulnerability. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Silke describes many of the sources from which loyalist paramilitaries raise money to support their operations. Silke tells of money derived from drinking clubs, drug dealing, armed robbery, loan sharking, counterfeiting, insurance fraud and more. Importantly, he also describes the rise and fall of such activities, making it easy to see how an organization under pressure will shift its activities as needed to stay active. He ends by highlighting how fund raising continues despite a six-year cease fire, and how it is now used as a way to justify existence of paramilitary groups.

**Topic 1:** Domestic Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** Terrorism, Money and Crime  
**Topic 3:** Secular Justification

**Countries/Regions:** Ireland


Drawing from archival research and in-depth interviews with government officials, reporters, terrorists and their victims, and others, Simon traces the government response to terrorism from the days of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates to Bill Clinton's confrontation with home-grown terrorism. He explores the psychological, political and social elements that make terrorism unlike any other conflict. Finally, he argues that living with terrorism will be an inescapable part of life in the 21st century, and calls on officials to move away from the rhetoric of defeating terrorism and to focus instead on achievable goals in combating this global problem. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy  
**Topic 2:** Domestic Terrorism  
**Topic 3:** Historical Context

**Countries/Regions:** United States


This article considers the emergence of a "new form" of terrorism. According to Steve Simon and Daniel Benjamin, this new form is religiously motivated, more technologically proficient, seeks to cause mass casualties, and desires to obtain CBRN weapons. What is more, the authors seem to suggest that the current U.S. government view - that this prospective type of terrorism is here to stay - is accurate. The article emphasizes Middle Eastern terrorism generally, and state sponsorship in particular. Although a number of states and groups are discussed, the details of their organizations generally are not, although there is some discussion of the organizational setup of al-Qaeda's loose network of groups. The authors suggest that state sponsorship is not a prerequisite for group acquisition of CBRN weapons; rather, the unique and destructive attributes of these weapons "will impel terrorists to overcome technical, organizational, and logistical obstacles to WMD use." On the subject of CBW terrorism, specific agents and the unique properties of each category are not discussed. According to the authors, these "new" religious terrorists "want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead." Therefore, use of CBRN weapons would "seem to be a natural next step for them." What is more, crackdowns on such groups are likely to harden the resolve of remaining group members and perhaps even encourage recruitment and the perpetration of further, more destructive attacks.

This article suggests that even complete success in Afghanistan will not destroy the al Qaeda terrorist threat because advances in communications and encryption - coupled with increasingly good tradecraft - will over time obviate the need for a territorial base. The authors argue that al-Qaeda has sought chemical and radiological weapons and that "as a purely statistical inference, acquisition and use of WMD by a terrorist group is a near certainty." In this kind of world, a strategy dependent upon identification and elimination of specific threats will have to be combined with one focused on remediating vulnerabilities to ill-defined threats of potentially catastrophic scope.


In this selection from the volume's introductory chapter, Smart explores seven dimensions of what defines a religion. The practical and ritual dimension includes regular worship, preaching, and prayers. The experiential and emotional dimension includes music and various types of personal 'life-altering' experiences. The narrative and mythical dimension involves the story of a religion - the historical events and struggles that are often remembered in ceremonies and rituals. The doctrinal and philosophical dimension includes an articulation (often through scriptures) of the religion's philosophical vision of the world. The ethical and legal dimension includes universally binding precepts and regulations governing the lives and behavior of the religion's members. The social and institutional dimension is embodied in the church, the umma, the congregation, and so on. And the material dimension includes the buildings, works of art, and other physical creations associated with the religion. These seven dimensions are useful for examining the relationships between religion and secular ideologies or worldviews such as scientific humanism, Marxism, existentialism, and nationalism.


Available online at: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/JanFeb02/smith.asp

This article proposes a framework to evaluate the completeness of any strategy for combating terrorist attacks. The framework divides terrorists' offensive efforts and the counterterrorist response into preparatory,
Crisis, and consequence phases, each involving a particular set of terrorist activities that demand specific countermeasures. During the preparatory phase, terrorist activities will be low profile and often difficult to link with deliberate hostile intentions. Countermeasures during this phase will focus on intelligence gathering and surveillance aimed at detecting terrorist groups and determining their motivation and intent. More proactive countermeasures would include, when possible, strike operations using air power or special operations assets. And indirect countermeasures (such as humanitarian aid programs, diplomatic and economic initiatives) would seek to shape the strategic environment by depriving the terrorists of a recruiting base. During the consequence phase of an attack, terrorists' efforts will be devoted to exfiltrating survivors, strategic and tactical repositioning for follow-on operations, exploiting any informational advantage, and evaluating the operation. Government activities during the consequence phase will necessarily concentrate initially on relief and recovery efforts. During CBRNE attacks, the scale of casualties, damage, and disruption can be reduced by effective and timely consequence management. A smooth transition to large-scale consequence management operations will require frequent rehearsal in peacetime. This analysis indicates that an extensive range of countermeasures must be available if any country is to have a comprehensive answer to the threat of modern terrorism.

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy.  
**Topic 2:** Counterterrorism Policies - Macro Perspective

**Countries/Regions:** United States


This book offers an analysis of IRA military and political thinking, and objectives from the Easter Rising in 1916 to the ceasefire in 1994. Smith describes the republican notion of the state as the highest good, and asserts that in the minds of members of the IRA, the Irish republican state has existed since 1916, although it was betrayed and crippled from time to time. Furthermore, because of the socialist world view held by the IRA, the relationship between Ireland and Britain is understood in terms of colonialism and imperialism. This perception denies equally the legitimacy of the Irish government in Dublin or the British government in the six counties of Northern Ireland. Smith notes that the IRA recognizes that they do not have the military strength to defeat British forces in conventional warfare, but by using guerrilla tactics and terrorism the IRA presumes to wear down British willingness to pay the price for its defense of Northern Ireland.

**Topic 1:** Revolutionary Terrorism  
**Topic 2:** Secular Justification  
**Topic 3:** Case Studies

**Countries/Regions:** Ireland


Smithson and Levy's monograph covers both the threat of chemical and biological terrorism from subnational groups and the numerous programs that the U.S. government has undertaken to increase preparedness for that threat. The supposedly changing nature of terrorism in the 1990s is briefly examined, as is the growth of religion as a terrorist motivation. The possible motivations for terrorist use of CBW are examined briefly, including the desire to inflict mass casualties and the increased ability to remain anonymous. Religious/apocalyptic groups, extreme single-issue groups, right wing militias, and psychopaths are mentioned.
as groups or individuals most likely to use CBW. The authors then present an assessment of the technical feasibility of terrorist acquisition, production and delivery of CBW. The view of the authors is that the equipment for production of CBW is in many cases readily available, and that the technical hurdles are substantial but not necessarily insurmountable. Nevertheless, the authors point out in the concluding chapter that "despite assertions to the contrary to the contrary, acquiring and using chemical and biological weapons in a manner that causes mass casualties is not shake-n'-bake easy, which may partly explain why no terrorists have followed in Aum's footsteps more than five years after the cult's subway attacks." Chapter 3 provides an in-depth overview of and the failures and limited successes of those efforts. The main point of this chapter is to attempt to clear up the many misconceptions that exist regarding Aum Shinrikyo's efforts in these areas. Smithson and Levy also provide a detailed chronology of Aum Shinrikyo's chemical and biological weapons efforts as well as the 1995 Tokyo subway attack and accompanying response efforts, with an eye toward learning lessons for U.S. responders and domestic preparedness efforts. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)


Sopko addresses what he considers to be the essential changes within the proliferation threat to U.S. national security. He notes changes in the actors involved in proliferation, the types of materials being proliferated, the methods for delivering weapons, the availability of information on how to develop and effective weapons, and, finally, the motivation for those who try to acquire destructive weapons. He believes that the U.S. needs to face these threats head-on through a system that focuses both attention and funding on this growing threat.


Sprinzak uses a case study of the radical Zionist group Gush Emunim to examine how political organizations can turn towards terror. He concludes that political groups founded on messianic ideology believe in their ultimate victory and are thus predisposed to turn towards violence if their aspirations are not met by the political system. Drawing on Gush Emunim’s turn towards vigilante terrorism, Sprinzak also believes that once terrorism for ideological means is accepted, it can easily be turned into professional terrorism to satisfy other means, such as revenge.

Sprinzak observes a tendency of the U.S. focusing its resources toward combating WMD terrorism, although this is a type of terrorism that has not yet been effectively used. Sprinzak points to countless examples of conventional terrorism and argues that the danger rests in terrorists resorting to the tried and true technique of using explosives on a soft target. He believes that the U.S. must reallocate its resources towards confronting the conventional terrorist threat.

Sprinzak, Ehud. "The Great Superterrorism Scare." Foreign Policy, no. 112 (Fall 1998), 110-125

Sprinzak explores the U.S. perceptions regarding the threat of a massive terrorist attack with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. He argues that "dire forecasts may make for gripping press briefings, movies, and bestsellers, but they do not necessarily make for good policy . . . As horrifying as the prospect of mass-destruction terrorism may be, the relatively low risks of such an event do not justify the high costs now being contemplated to defend against it. Not only are many of the countermeasures likely to be ineffective, but the level of rhetoric and funding devoted to fighting superterrorism may actually advance a potential superterrorist's broader goals: sapping the resources of the state and creating a climate of fear and panic that can amplify the impact of any terrorist act." Sprinzak also suggests three potential profiles, based on a review of historical evidence, of the most likely sources of a superterrorist attack - religious millenarian cults, brutalized groups, or small terrorist cells. Finally, he recommends a security program that incorporates early warning systems, preemption of tactical chemical and biological terrorism, intelligence, and a variety of international and domestic deterrence measures.


This chapter describes the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November, 1995 by Yigal Amir, a young Jewish extremist. Sprinzak attempts "to reconstruct the psychopolitical radicalization of the Israeli extreme right that paved the way for a killer like Amir and strengthened his determination to act." He provides a brief history and analysis of Amir, who convinced himself that in killing Rabin he was acting in the best tradition of Jewish zealotry. He was sure that Rabin had to die in order to save the land and the nation. The discussion also covers the struggle between Prime Minister Rabin and a host of rabbis who supported the extreme Jewish zealot movement through their rulings, letters, and pronouncements. Ultimately, Rabin's assassination was the culmination of a process of delegitimization of the Israeli government by Israel's ultranationalists.

In the wake of the first West Nile virus outbreak, Stern shows that governments are often unable to tell the difference between a naturally occurring infectious disease outbreak and one that occurred from sinister causes. She asserts that governments must improve upon or develop a number of programs, including disease surveillance, laboratory analysis, and secure communication between various health officials.


Stern describes the various dimensions of al Qaeda that pose significant challenges to the U.S. in the War on Terrorism. Its increasingly decentralized organization is constantly evolving, and employs a "virtual network" concept learned from American right-wing extremists, which makes it harder to detect and destroy. Its willingness to adapt its mission enables it to forge broad alliances with other terrorist organizations and attract new recruits (including women). Its ability to secure coordination with other like-minded groups (like Hezbollah) and its links with organized crime (a crime boss in India gave $100,000 to Mohammad Atta, the 9/11 hijack leader) underscore the advanced stages of organization (professionals sharing ideas, cross-training, resources, joint planning, etc.) that al Qaeda has achieved. Stern concludes that Al Qaeda remains among most significant threats to U.S. national security because of its protean nature.


Stern comments on the threat and harmful effects of biological weapons, expressing particular concern over the construction of these weapons and the limitations of current international law governing biological weapons. However, she argues against placing too much emphasis on this threat. Clearly, biological weapons are invisible and silent killers. According to the author, "anyone with a biology degree, a crop duster and a grievance could kill you in your sleep along with millions of your neighbors, we are told . . . However, even sophisticated terrorists - such as the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan - have had a hard time making good on the threat of biological terrorism."

Stern provides a detailed case study of the Christian militant group The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord. She provides the ideological basis of this group, explaining how their pre-millennial and Christian identity beliefs were used to justify terrorist tactics. Her work also shows the loose network formed between most American Christian groups of this kind, a feature which may increase the threat posed by such groups.

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Stern, Jessica. "Will Terrorists Turn to Poison?" *Orbis* (Summer 1993), 393-410.

Stern takes an early look at the possibility that terrorists may turn to chemical and biological weapons as a new form of attack. She concludes that two new threats are emerging: first, the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons, precursors, and information; and second, terrorists increased willingness to use such weapons. She advocates developing new ways to deal with this threat, stressing the benefits of a multilateral approach.

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<th>Topic 1: CBRN Terrorism</th>
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In this short excerpt, Stern gives some historical context on the roots of terrorism and three early terrorist organizations, and then touches on how terrorism evolved throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. She then discusses ethical considerations in war, describing the tenets of jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war) and showing how terrorists may have sufficient reason to go to war, but fail to conduct their conflict ethically.

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In this article, Stevenson observes that there is general transatlantic agreement about what is required in Africa: institution-building, peacekeeping, and outright nation-building is necessary to prevent the continent's failing states from becoming lawless havens for radical Islamic groups like the Taliban or transnational terrorists organizations like al-Qaeda. However, these are precisely the strategic areas in which U.S. policymakers feel least suited to act and, by implication, most inclined to yield authority and responsibility to partners. He argues that the combination of transatlantic policy consensus and American operational deference could make sub-Saharan Africa an ideal locus of strategic cooperation in which to start rehabilitating transatlantic links in the wake of the Iraq crisis. It is also a suitable proving ground for the
external ambitions of the EU and NATO. On balance, Africa may be riper for major-power involvement than it has been since Cuban troops landed in Angola in 1975.

**Topic 1:**
**Global Environment**

**Countries/Regions:** Africa

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Within ten days of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush proclaimed: 'our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated'. Despite the sweeping cast of the 'Bush doctrine', however, the qualification 'with global reach' gave him the leeway to circumscribe the operative definition of terrorism. Practical considerations require a policy that does so. The counter-terrorism effort against al-Qaeda alone will require diverse and sustained military, law-enforcement and intelligence resources that will stretch the capacities of the United States and its allies. The U.S. and its allies enjoy greater leverage over some terrorist groups, and less over others. The upshot is that different policies will fit different terrorist groups and sponsors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This book provides an in-depth history of Tamil militancy and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The author draws on more than 100 interviews throughout India, Sri Lanka and London (as well as documentary evidence) to describe the movement's evolution from the 1970s through the early 1990s. The book covers a variety of bombings and other terrorist events, and the various LTTE and state leaders involved in the history of Tamil militancy. He is critical of India's involvement in Sri Lanka (both in arming and training the Tamil militants and in direct military involvement during the late 1980s), noting that before his assassination (by the LTTE) former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi envisioned renewing his country's intervention in Sri Lanka's affairs after returning to power. He also notes that Sri Lanka will never be able to militarily defeat the LTTE, and thus if the Tamil ethnic conflict is to end amicably, the Sri Lankan government will have to announce a package that satisfies Tamil sentiments and then try to build a national consensus around it.

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**Countries/Regions:** Sri Lanka, India

Tambiah examines the extent to which Buddhism as a religion, espoused by Sri Lankans of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has participated in the current ethnic conflict and collective violence in Sri Lanka. The chapter begins with an exploration of the "Buddhist revival" that began in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The author then covers a century of Sri Lanka's history from the 1880s to the 1980s, focusing on how Buddhism was interwoven with the changing politics of the island. Various protest organizations and movements, made up of varying numbers of members of political parties, Buddhist monks, and concerned laymen were being formed not only to support the war against Tamil separation but also to protest any tendency on the part of the UNP government to negotiate a peace with the Tamil insurgents on the basis of a devolution of powers to provincial councils. This historical account reveals how Sinhala Buddhism and nationalism has played a varying role in the Sri Lankan conflict.

**Topic 1:**
Religion and Conflict

**Countries/Regions:** Sri Lanka


Testas argues that although the existing literature on Algeria's civil conflict recognizes the role of religious and ethnic violence in the crisis, it does not sufficiently explain the various reasons behind it. This article thus aims to fill this gap to some extent by examining the main factors determining the emergence of armed religious and ethnic groups in this country. The basic conclusion to emerge from the analysis is that, although such factors as the closure of the country's political space, state repression, and the growth of atavistic sentiments remain important in explaining Algeria's religious and ethnic violence, economic collapse, religious spending, and diversionary politics are variables that should not be ignored when addressing the sources and sustainability of such violence.

**Topic 1:**
Role of Religion

**Topic 2:**
Religious Conflict

**Countries/Regions:** Algeria


Transnational threats - including terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal alien smuggling, smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), widespread environmental degradation - pose a variety of security challenges for the U.S. This chapter focuses primarily on terrorism, international organized crime, and drug trafficking. Thachuk argues combating transnational threats requires a proactive policy that identifies anticrime initiatives, antidrug operations, and action against terrorism, along with other low-intensity mission categories. Also, the key to countering terrorism, international criminal activity and the drug
trade will be the effectiveness of other countries' law enforcement, intelligence collection and analytical capabilities. Better international cooperation could be obtained by strengthening Interpol and other such mechanisms, so they can provide more assistance to weak governments. Countering terrorism could be improved by ratifying and making more effective use of the 11 existing treaties and conventions on various terrorist crimes. The presence of bilateral and multilateral experts in planning also makes a positive contribution to increased awareness and effectiveness. This includes surveillance and acquiring information on identities, locations, travel, and financing of terrorists and terrorist groups. Greater use of arrest and extradition is another important weapon. In certain cases, economic and other sanctions against governments that support or shelter terrorists can be useful, especially if approved by the U.N. Security Council.


This book explores an ancient hatred in the Muslim world that targets Western values, lifestyle, and freedoms in general, examining its history, and the religious sources upon which it draws. Author and journalist Kenneth Timmerman contends that, besides Islam itself, the core unifying force in the Muslim world is a virulent strain of anti-Semitism that postulates the existence of a Jewish conspiracy to take over the world, with the support of a seemingly invincible and monolithic America. He documents the ubiquity and intensity of a new anti-Semitic message as it is conveyed by the official government-sanctioned Arab media, from the streets of Egypt, London, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Paris, and Gaza, and in the mosques where impassioned clerics quote verbatim texts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a pillar of anti-Semitic hatred that originated in czarist Russia. Timmerman warns that to misunderstand the ferocity of that belief is to vastly underestimate the resolve of the Muslim world to repel America, Israel, and all things Western.


This chapter argues that Sri Lanka's failure to lay down the constitutional foundation of a multi-ethnic society based on equality, ethnic pluralism, and the sharing of power has exacerbated the ethnic conflict. The constitutional reform proposals of 1995 represent the boldest efforts so far toward ethnic reconciliation, but critics argue that they fall short of four principles advanced by all of the major Tamil groups: (1) the recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality; (2) the recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and guarantee of its territorial integrity; (3) recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation; and (4) recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils, who look upon the island as their country. The quest for a political resolution within a united Sri Lanka must therefore relate more to the substantive issues regarding the exercise of political power than to abstract formulations of political identity. NOTE: The author was murdered in Sri Lanka, 29 July 1999, before completing this chapter.
Kevin Toolis, a British journalist of Irish heritage, provides a personal account of the IRA as he visits the homeland of his ancestors. His book offers a variety of personal accounts and direct quotations from members of the IRA and their relatives. He retells a personal interview with IRA leader Martin McGuinness, and describes the suffering of families under the Ulster regime, when (as Toolis argues) the occupying forces trampled on the rights of the Irish and taunted the family members of slain IRA freedom fighters. While the author's personal feelings sometime result in a rather one-sided discussion of the Irish troubles, the book informs a better understanding of the conflict.

Townshend asserts that political violence has been a recurrent element in Irish public life. The author describes the multiple tiers of organizations that came into existence throughout the 1800s, and traces their linkages between this "informal terrorist polity and the central conspiratorial revolutionary organization of the later nineteenth century, the Irish Republican Brotherhood." (p. 321) The author then explores the events of the 1900s, including the republican rebellion of 1916 and the short-lived civil war of 1922-23, which set the stage for the divided Ireland that exists today. This is coupled with a review of various terrorist acts (and government reprisals) and the social contexts in which they took place, leading up to the direct British rule of Northern Ireland since 1972. In his concluding remarks, the author argues that the political complexities that exist in this region - particularly in meeting the demands of the minority population without alienating the majority - create a sense that the British-supported state is partisan and illegitimate, a perception that plays into the hands of groups like the IRA. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

In this chapter, Tucker reviews and assesses the U.S. government's efforts to deal with terrorism from the early 1970s through the mid-1990s. Topics include: White House responses to interagency failings in Washington; the role of sanctions; counterterrorism raids; and differences in the approaches (and different levels of aggressiveness) through different White House administrations (Bush's approach was to keep counterterrorism at a low profile, Clinton was more aggressive, but much less so than Reagan, and Carter was the least aggressive, and perhaps least effective). He argues that countering terrorism does not require...
massively different force capability, but it does require an approach to political violence and a strategy different from those we have traditionally pursued. He concludes that an assessment of counterterrorism efforts depend on the definition of terrorism. If we view terrorism as criminal activity, then we will tend to combat it with legal means. If we view terrorism as a kind of warfare, then we will wage war against it. But a mismatch will surely fail - that is, waging war against criminal activity, or combating a kind of warfare with legal means, does not appropriately match effort with the need.

(379.) Tucker, David. "What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?" 
_Terrorism and Political Violence_, vol. 13, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), 1-14.

This article examines the theory that recent terrorism represents a "new" form of terrorism, different from that of earlier decades. Tucker compares the "new" and "old" terrorisms, focusing on the networks that supposedly characterize the new variant. The author concludes that there is in fact little that is new about the "new" terrorism. A brief mention is made of the prospect for CBRN terrorism: "It is possible that terrorists could get a hold of a CBRN weapon and devastate a city. Without minimizing the damage this would do, especially the possible political damage, we must conclude that this is not the greatest threat posed by terrorism." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

_Emerging Infectious Diseases_, vol. 5, no. 4 (Jul-Aug 1999), 498-504.

In this article, Tucker presents a summary of an open-source database of publicly-known cases where international and domestic criminals or terrorists attempted to acquire or use CBRN materials during the period 1900 through 1999. The article presents some of the major findings relating to the motivations of such groups to attempt to acquire or use these types of weapons. He suggests four major motivations: 1) to promote nationalist or separatist objectives; 2) to retaliate or take revenge for a real or perceived injury; 3) to protest government policies; and 4) to defend animal rights." He also argues that the motives of terrorists have shifted over time, with nationalist/separatist objectives and retaliation/revenge overtaking protesting against government policies as the predominant motivations. However, despite evident motivations, Tucker argues that most groups lack the requisite technical skill and resources to effectively create and use biological weapons. For this reason, and based on the historical record, Tucker suggests that future incidents of bioterrorism "will probably involve hoaxes and relatively small-scale attacks, such as food contamination." Tucker concludes the article with a brief examination of seven selected bioterrorist incidents, summarizing the motivations, ideology, targets, agents, delivery means, and outcome of the incidents. These cases are covered in greater depth in the monograph Toxic Terror, also edited by Tucker. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

This article primarily examines the emerging threat of biological agents and infectious diseases from the perspective of medical and government response efforts. The authors argue that both naturally-occurring and human-created diseases pose serious challenges to the national security of the United States, and suggest that bioterrorism is a lesser-included case. In their view, a small terrorist group probably will lack the necessary know-how, equipment, and agents to unleash a large-scale BW attack, except with the assistance of a state sponsor. Should one occur, however, a bioterrorist attack may go undetected for some time, particularly if it were a naturally-occurring pathogen and the vector was food-borne or via water contamination, rather than aerosol dissemination. Finally, the authors argue that much more needs to be done to strengthen government response efforts in the context of emerging infectious diseases. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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This book examines twelve case studies of real CBW terrorist incidents and hoaxes from 1946 to 1998, including the Rajneeshees and R.I.S.E. (Seth Carus), Aum Shinrikyo (David Kaplan), and the Minnesota Patriots Council (Jonathan Tucker and Jason Pate). Particularly useful are the three case studies of "successful" CBW employment - the post-Holocaust Jewish group DIN, and the religious cults of the Rajneeshees and Aum Shinrikyo - although the abject failure or only limited success captured in the other nine cases is itself telling as to the traditional difficulties encountered by terrorists in acquiring, developing, producing, weaponizing, and effectively disseminating CBRN agents. Throughout the case studies, the motivations of individual groups are assessed, as are their technical proficiencies in the chemical and biological fields as well as their attempts to obtain necessary equipment, agents, and know-how. Tucker concludes that while CBW must not be ignored as a threat, "only a tiny minority of terrorists will seek to inflict indiscriminate casualties" with CBW and "few if any of them will succeed." Groups that will make the attempt, however, tend to have certain traits that could be used to alert U.S. intelligence and law enforcement authorities to possible danger. These include: apocalyptic ideology, innovation in weapons and tactics, paranoia and grandiosity, charismatic leadership, defensive aggression, and other characteristics. Also, Tucker warns that "mass destruction" may not always be the goal of groups willing to employ CBW - specifically targeted, discriminate attacks could be a form of future CBW terrorism. More than anything, it may be the difficulty in developing effective delivery systems that is most limiting for well-funded and organized groups seeking to kill large number of people with CBW. As a result, says Tucker, "crude delivery methods are likely to remain the most common forms of CBW terrorism." (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)
Written from the viewpoint of a former chief of the CIA, this book explores how democracy affects and is affected by what we do to deter terrorism. He argues that our counterterrorism options must always consider the constraints imposed by our political system, and offers ten observations: 1) assassinations are neither an appropriate nor an effective counterterrorist tactic; 2) punitive military attacks are a remedy we should use but sporadically; 3) covert actions should be undertaken, but judiciously, because the probability of success is low; 4) rescue operations have a role but will continue to be highly risky for the United States; 5) improved intelligence, especially human, is always desirable but difficult to achieve; 6) restraint of the media could be helpful, but modest self-restraint is the most we can expect; 7) economic sanctions should be used against state sponsors of terrorism, even if they take a long time to be effective; 8) defensive security is unlikely to receive sufficient attention or money; 9) deals are an option we cannot rule out; and 10) legal recourse is the option most compatible with American values.

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy  
**Topic 2:** Counterrorism Policies- Macro Perspective  
**Countries/Regions:** United States

This report reviews the scientific and practical aspects of a terrorist carrying out large-scale chemical or biological attacks on U.S. soil. Specifically, it examines the technical ease or difficulty for terrorists to acquire, process, improvise, and disseminate certain chemical and biological agents that might cause at least 1,000 casualties (physical injuries or deaths) without the assistance of a state-sponsored program. According to this study, the ease or difficulty for terrorists to cause mass casualties with an improvised chemical or biological weapons or device depends on the chemical or biological agent selected. The report recommends that the FBI produce an authoritative threat assessment of the more likely chemical and biological agents that would be used by domestic-origin terrorists working outside a state-run laboratory infrastructure. It also recommends a national-level risk assessment to help guide and prioritize appropriate countermeasures and programs designed to combat chemical and biological terrorism.

**Topic 1:** CBRN Terrorism  
**Countries/Regions:** United States
sponsored program. It also addresses the need to use intelligence estimates and risk assessments to better guide and prioritize appropriate countermeasures and programs. In most cases terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges to successfully make and release chemical or biological agents of sufficient quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people without substantial assistance from a state sponsor. The report also notes that the intelligence community has not produced comparable estimates of the domestic threat, and recommends that the FBI prepare such estimates and use them in a national-level risk assessment that can be used to identify and prioritize the most effective programs to combat terrorism.

**Topic 1:**
CBRN Terrorism

**Countries/Regions:** United States


This document explains the process that the United States government uses to determine whether to designate a group as a foreign terrorist organization. It also explains the legal ramifications of this designation, and lists the organizations that were picked to compose the list as of May 2003. This list must be reworked every two years, and organizations may be added to or removed from the list at any time, so it is suggested that users also look at the counterterrorism website (www.state.gov/s/ct/) for the most recent updates. Users should also look into the most recent "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report, available through the same website, for descriptions of each designated organization including their activities, known strength, area of operations, and available external aid.

**Topic 1:**
Defining Terrorism

**Topic 2:**
New Threats

**Topic 3:**
National Terrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions:** United States


This document provides a 209-page transcript of a series of court proceedings involving terrorist Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, indicted for his participation in the August, 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Tanzania and his November, 2000 assault on a prison guard while awaiting trial. The document describes his motivation, contacts, training in light weapons (including guns, rifles, surface to air missiles and wiring bombs), and the acts of terrorism for which he is accused. The document is unique in providing very extensive details of the life of a terrorist foot soldier.

**Topic 1:**
Terrorist Movements and Psychology

**Topic 2:**
Counterterrorist Instruments

**Countries/Regions:** United States, Tanzania

The author suggests that a solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict guaranteeing the minimum conditions for peace and reconstruction would require two measures: (1) termination of the present war between the state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) through an agreement between them; and (2) a political agreement on the nature of ethnicity-based power-sharing and its satisfactory implementation. One key problem, however, is the absence in Sri Lanka of strong defenses against ethnic exclusivity in politics. This solution necessitates a futuristic political vision of an ethnically heterogeneous political association shared by the three main ethnic groups: Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims.


This article suggests that the roots of most violent Muslim vigilante groups in contemporary Indonesia can be traced to two relatively 'indigenous' Muslim political movements which date back to the 1940s - the Darul Islam movement and the Masyumi party - and to a number of more recent transnational Islamic networks. The author describes the evolution of Masyumi and Darul Islam during the 1950s and 1960s, the emergence of 'campus Islam' in the 1980s, and the empowerment of Islam in the final years of the Suharto regime. He then examines Islamic politics during Suharto's downfall and in the 1999 elections, and describes the recent involvement of radical Muslim groups in street politics.


The author describes a "principal dilemma for Hindu nationalists." If the members of the political extremist right succeed in making the ruling BJP its appendage, it will kill the party's chances to stay in power. If it does not, the BJP will do better, but Hindu nationalism will edge increasingly toward center-right, compromising ideological purity. Either way, a takeover of Indian politics by the Hindu nationalist ideology is unlikely. The discussion centers on electoral and ideological trends of the last decade, covering the rise of power of Hindu nationalists in late 1990s, and how their ideology - focused on Muslim disloyalty to India - did not triumph. To end their political isolation, the Hindu nationalists eventually resorted to coalition-forming, which required fundamental ideological compromises with the programs of other parties not wedded to Hindu nationalism. The author also draws on examples of how different cities and areas participate in very different ways in the changing national political climate to demonstrate the divergence between the national and the local. In this context, one must keep in mind how localized Hindu-Muslim violence is, and how autonomous local civic structures can be.
### Topic 1: Religion and Conflict
### Topic 2: Religious Ideology
### Topic 3: Political Islam

**Countries/Regions:** India


Varshney explores the relationships between civil society and ethnic conflict. Two types of civic networks are identified - interethnic and intraethnic - and two more types that combine elements of both. Different roles are played by interethnic and intraethnic networks of civic engagement in ethnic conflict. The author suggests that there is a higher likelihood of ethnic violence in communities that are organized only along intraethnic lines.

### Topic 1: Role of Religion
### Topic 2: Religion and Conflict

**Countries/Regions:** India


Vegar's article draws on interviews with a range of terrorism and CBRN specialists (including Brian Jenkins, Bruce Hoffman, Ron Purver, Brad Roberts, Amy Smithson, Kyle Olson, and others) to argue that a "new breed" of terrorists has evolved that may be more willing to use CBRN weapons. Unlike previous, "traditional" terrorist groups, these "new" terrorists are generally fundamentalist or extremist organizations, with religious or racist ideologies and lack a "constituency" among the broader public. According to the author, "these religious terrorists operate in a political vacuum. They do not seek converts or the favor of a sponsor nation." As a result, according to Bruce Hoffman, they "see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving, but as outsiders and therefore seek vast changes in the existing order." In order to achieve this change, terrorists are likely to become more willing to consider using CBRN weapons to carry out mass-casualty attacks. Those interviewed generally agree that because this new breed of terrorists is not responsible to a specific state, a particular external constituency, or constrained by widely accepted moral concerns about CBRN weaponry, they pose a unique and serious threat. However, they differ on whether or not groups will be able to acquire CBRN weapons, a likelihood that varies for chemical, nuclear, biological and radiological weapon acquisition. Similarly, those interviewed are divided over the prospect of sponsorship of CBRN terror by states. Ron Purver believes this is more likely, particularly if a state was seeking a way to deter or blackmail an adversary and lacked other means to do so. Jenkins is more skeptical because of the unpredictability and unreliability of independent terrorist groups. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

This book examines the 1978 Red Brigades kidnapping and assassination of the Italian politician Aldo Moro, with particular focus on the ways in which this event was presented to the Italian public during the fifty-five days of his captivity. The author draws on written reports, photos and film to argue that any attempt to understand contemporary terrorism must confront the highly structured way in which news of terrorist acts, hostage reactions, government positions and the rationales for positions, and public response reaches us - the audience of a ubiquitous mass mediation. Aspects of dehumanization (the Red Brigades were branded as monsters by the Italian government) and melodrama (spectacularization of the event in the media which overshadowed the real tragedy of Moro’s death) in the negotiations process are explored in various points throughout the book, ending with the authors’ conclusion that we live in a mediated world and therefore must accept the interpreted quality of the reality that reaches us.

**Topic 1:** Terrorism and the Media

**Countries/Regions:** Italy


Wallace describes India as a "rising middle power", having survived beyond the typically dangerous formative years of any state and achieving some semblance of a unified state identity, and asserts that "movements involving political violence, therefore, are less likely to pose an insurrectionary challenge to the unity of the state than to serve as a vehicle for extremists expressing particular demands and frustrations." (p. 353) A primary source of the tension in the Punjab region of India, involves the clash of identity between the state and the ethnic Sikh community, neither of which appears willing to negotiate a shared conception of identity. Wallace suggests that after decades of violence, the terrorist problem in Punjab remains rooted in the search for a political solution in the context of an enhanced Sikh identity. The author calls for a "patient rebuilding of a political process" involving compromises that will permit the development of conceptions of identity that are not mutually exclusive. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)

**Topic 1:** Ethnic Separatism

**Topic 2:** Case Studies

**Topic 3:** Religion and Conflict

**Countries/Regions:** India


This article provides a summary of the various religious views that shaped the doctrine of the Aum Shinrikyo sect. The author also provides a chronological development of the group as it evolved towards an apocalyptic cult bent on mass murder of innocent civilians. The article provides an interesting insight and excursion into the group, but it does not seem to draw any general conclusions or present any general characteristics that can be useful in identifying those terrorist groups most likely to use CBRN weapons. Indeed, the author (writing
in late 1998) states that it is possibly still too early to reach such conclusions about Aum. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

Topic 1: Case Studies  Topic 2: CBRN Terrorism
Countries/Regions: Japan


This article profiles Osama bin Laden eighteen months before the attacks of 9/11. Weaver describes how in February 1998, he had called on his followers to kill Americans around the world, and following the August bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam he was declared Washington's most-wanted fugitive. The author argues that as bin Laden's international image and stature increase, along with support (both ideological and financial) from elites of Saudi Arabia and other states in the Persian Gulf, more and more disaffected citizens of these countries will flock to join their local militant Islamist underground-one of the most worrisome consequences of America's obsession with one man. She concludes that the House of Saud, among others government leaders, appears quite willing to transform what was formerly considered a complex Islamic challenge to the state into a simpler conflict that pits bin Laden and his followers against the United States.

Topic 1: Terrorist Movements and Psychology  Topic 2: Religion and Conflict
Countries/Regions: Saudi Arabia, United States


Weber explores how religions have evolved over time as the political, social and economic contexts surrounding religions have changed. For example, an evolving rationalization of the role of sexuality in social life, driven by increasingly powerful economic divisions between clans and classes, led to the evolution of restrictions and regulations which have influenced modern limitations upon sexual relations, including those encouraged by religions. He also explores the conflict between religion and politics (which has led either to martyrdom or to passive anti-political sufferance of a coercive regime) and the relationship between religion and economics (the path to salvation involved performing your best at the work appropriate for your position in life). He argues that the religious devaluation of art has been intensified by the rational and literary character of both priestly and lay education, thus images and likenesses have become less important than the written word. The systematic prohibition in devout Jewish and Puritan circles of uninhibited surrender to the distinctive form-producing values of art has effectively controlled the degree and scope of artistic productivity in these circles, and has tended to favor the development of intellectually rational controls over the pattern of life.

Topic 1: Religion and Violence  Topic 2: Religion and Conflict  Topic 3: Historical Context

Wechsler describes the various means by which al Qaeda moves its money around the world - made easier by the Internet, off-shore banking, and the hawala underground banking system. The financial network that Osama bin Laden helped develop to fund the Afghan mujahideen raises money in four basic ways: legal businesses and investments; criminal schemes, drug smuggling, fraud, etc.; donations from rich Muslims who share his goals; and (perhaps most important) mass fund-raising through charitable and nongovernmental organizations. The diversity of al Qaeda's fund-raising sources and money movement mechanisms has made it very difficult for the U.S. and its allies to shut them down. Other challenges include inter-agency cooperation in the U.S., international legal cooperation, intelligence gathering, and a lack of political will and effective financial regulation among Middle East and South Asia countries. (This book is available in the Combating Terrorism Center Library.)


Weiner addresses the question of whether the United States should try to assassinate terrorists and tyrants. In 1976, an executive order stated that "no person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." The ban followed a national revulsion at murder plots hatched by the White House against people like Fidel Castro. However, there is renewed debate over this issue, driven by an increasing terrorist threat. This article outlines a number of reasons why the ban on assassination has been widely supported by virtually everyone in the executive branch, from the military through the CIA's clandestine service. The problem is how to fight terrorism without acting like terrorists.


This article, written by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, describes the role of New York's Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF), founded in 1980 to address a rash of unsolved bombings carried out primarily by domestic terrorist groups operating in the United States. Drawing from several cases of international terrorism prosecuted by her office, she explores the challenges for the prosecution, judges and juries, including the predominance of circumstantial evidence and the lack of eyewitnesses in the first World Trade Center bombing, the reliability of the informant in the Day of Terror case, and the reliance on foreign intelligence and evidence in the Manila Air trial. Finally, she offers three implications from her experiences: 1) there is a continuing need for strong, global, international law enforcement investigations and prosecutions of international terrorist organizations; 2) tackling international terrorism requires a global effort that naturally calls upon the United States to exercise a leadership role; and 3) we must recognize that arrest and prosecution are only two of many tools to combat international terrorism.
Topic 1:
Counterterrorism Instruments

Countries/Regions: United States


In this chapter, Whyte examines a number of religious and social institutions, and evaluate their role in segregating Northern Ireland into two communities. He observes that some are less important than others, like residential segregation, segregation at work, voluntary social activities. Clearly, the churches and the Orange Order have helped divide Protestants from Catholics, but they also divide Protestants from each other. He concludes that the two factors which do most to divide Protestants as a whole from Catholics as a whole are endogamy ('marrying within the tribe') and separate education. According to existing research, the lack of intermarriage between members of the two communities is the most powerful single factor in maintaining the divide, followed closely by the maintenance of different schools for Protestants and Catholics. He argues that the Catholic Church bears the brunt of responsibility for the continuation of this division - they have most consistently maintained the right to develop their own school system, and have made mixed marriages a divisive issue by insisting that all children of such marriages be brought up as Catholics. Religion thus serves as a basis for segregating the population into two communities, whose ignorance of each other can lead to prejudice and stereotyping, which can translate into an actual cause for conflict because of a clash of values and interests related to religion.

Topic 1:
Religion and Conflict

Countries/Regions: Northern Ireland


This chapter addresses France's official response to terrorism from the late 1960s through the 1980s. Until the 1980s, French counterterrorist activities were grounded in two main principles: first, domestic terrorism was considered to be subversion, and second, the scope of international terrorism was minimized. Firm law enforcement was the response to politically-oriented domestic terrorism, while the response to international terrorism was described in the "sanctuary doctrine" - isolating the country from international terrorism by making French soil as neutral as possible. International terrorist groups would, the policy suggested, know they have nothing to achieve and nothing to fear in France, where their members would be neither detained nor arrested. This policy would only hold as long as the terrorist's activity neither aims at French interests nor seeks to alter French policy. This waiving of the rule of national as well as international law in order to avert terrorist escalation eventually failed. The policy lost support of the France's public during the 1980s, as international terrorism grew more complex and French citizens and interests became victims of terrorist acts.

Topic 1:
Case Studies

Topic 2:
National Terrorism Policy

Countries/Regions: France

This book attempts to evaluate and compare the roles of (a) politics, diplomacy and the prevention of violence; (b) law enforcement and the criminal justice system; and (c) the military, in helping democracies to meet the challenges of terrorism. Wilkinson argues that it is possible to derive some valuable general principles and lessons from past experience in shaping an effective response to terrorism which is fully compatible with democratic principles, the maintenance of the rule of law, and respect for human rights. These principles are: (1) no surrender to the terrorists, and an absolute determination to defeat terrorism within the framework of the rule of law and the democratic process; (2) no deals and no concessions, even in the face of the most severe intimidation and blackmail; (3) an intensified effort to bring terrorists to justice by prosecution and conviction before courts of law; (4) tough measures to penalize the state sponsors who give terrorist movements safe haven, explosives, cash, and moral and diplomatic support; and (5) determination never to allow terrorist intimidation to block or derail international diplomatic efforts to resolve major conflicts in strife-torn regions, such as the Middle East. The book also contains a useful glossary of terrorist groups, a list of international conventions pertaining to terrorism, and a list of websites and bibliographies for further study.

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This chapter addresses the counter-terrorism mechanisms established by the U.S. between 1970 and 1990, and what impact they have had on American democracy. Key topics include: the president's influence in setting counterterrorism policy frameworks; legislation; negotiations with terrorists despite adopting a "no concessions" policy; intelligence; military and para-military activities; target-hardening (improving airport security); and international cooperation. The author concludes that counterterrorist efforts have had some impact on democracy in the U.S., particularly in the form of personal searches at airports, foreign relations with other states, and domestic politics (e.g., Carter losing the presidency after the Iran hostage crisis). Wilson also observes that despite the actions taken by the government to combat terrorism, there have been few instances where these measures impinged on the rights and values of the nation, or groups within it.

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In this chapter, Wilson argues that creating a new organization involves discrete and perhaps unique acts representing a break in a prior pattern of behavior. He discusses the concept of associational entrepreneurship as one of several reasons why rationally self-interested men become charter members of a
group that, in embryo, could offer them nothing at all. Those organizations that survive and prosper generally undergo an important transformation. The process of institutionalization involves establishing a distinctive competence or identity. In general, there appear to be at least three different causes of organizational change and three corresponding strategies. The first cause is an uncertainty in the flow of resources - an episodic, boom-and-bust pattern of membership affiliation and resource availability. The second results from scarcity; not simply a condition of having insufficient resources, but of having a declining resources base. Finally, organizational change can also result from a condition of abundance.

**Topic 1:** Mobilizing Forces

**Countries/Regions:**

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In this chapter, Wilson describes four types of incentives that help understand organizational dynamics: material incentives (tangible rewards, like money), specific solidarity incentives (intangible rewards, like offices, honors, and deference), collective solidarity incentives (intangible rewards created by the act of associating that must be enjoyed by a group) and purposive incentives (intangible rewards that derive from the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause). These four kinds of incentives differ in two important respects. First, they vary in the precision with which they can be used to constrain or direct individual behavior. Second, they vary in the extent to which they implicate the stated purposes, if any, of the organization. Wilson's chapter suggests how these differences shape the character of those organizations that rely primarily or exclusively on one or the other inducement.

**Topic 1:** Mobilizing Forces

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This report offers the findings of an Independent Task Force on India and South Asia, cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society. The Task Force offered several recommendations for improving U.S. relationships with three of the principal countries of South Asia and for protecting U.S. foreign policy interests in the region, including: 1) strengthening and consolidating the U.S.-India relationship in the economic and security realms; 2) making Pakistan's evolution to a moderate Muslim state a top foreign policy priority, and tying the level of U.S. assistance to Pakistan's undertaking specific economic, political, and foreign policy reforms; 3) taking a more active American role in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute and securing peaceful relations between Pakistan and India; and 4) bolstering the hand of the Hamid Karzai government in Afghanistan, ensuring an Afghanistan where terrorists can never again find shelter.

**Topic 1:** National Terrorism Policy

**Countries/Regions:** U.S., India, Pakistan, Afghanistan
This paper provides an update on the campaign against international terrorism following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It examines the main developments since the end of October 2001, including the ongoing military campaign, the Bonn agreement on a new interim administration for the country, and the humanitarian situation. The paper then looks at the state of al-Qaeda three months after the attacks of 11 September and discusses possible options for the next phase in the broader campaign against international terrorism.

**Topic 1:** Terrorism and State Formation

**Topic 2:** Counterterrorism Instruments

**Countries/Regions:** Afghanistan

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This appendix offers a multidisciplinary analysis of the factors that contribute to or inhibit the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) by terrorist organizations and the way these factors may influence the consequences of an attack with such agents. The authors conclude that while the domestic development, manufacture and use of highly lethal chemical or biological agents (such as sarin or anthrax) by a terrorist organization has the potential to cause mass casualties, only vertically organized, highly integrated and ideologically uniform groups (such as a religious cult) are able to carry out large-scale CBW production in secrecy. Also, if the material base (number of members, financial assets, property owned and infrastructure) of a terrorist group is restricted it may only be able to produce a limited quantity of high-quality chemical or biological warfare agents. While loosely structured and cell-based terrorist groups or loners can manufacture small quantities of such agents, they are unlikely to cause mass casualties. Thus, the most catastrophic scenarios involving mass casualties, though possible, are not likely to occur. Nevertheless, because of the potential consequences for the targeted society of a terrorist attack with CBW, governments must be prepared for such an attack. The key issue is thus to devise and execute balanced policies. Overreaction can lead to country-wide anxiety and paranoia. In a climate of fear even hoaxes or the threat of the use of toxicants or pathogens may achieve the terrorists' goals.

**Topic 1:** CBRN Terrorism

**Topic 2:** CBRN Counterterrorism Policy

**Topic 3:** New Threats
interactions of these two tracks, combined with material, political and societal constraints, influence how the
group will proceed in its attempts to develop CBW. Throughout the article, he references the case of Aum
Shinrikyo as an example of this process in action. Zanders concludes that terrorist acquisition of CBW (he
makes a distinction between CB materials and CB weapons, the latter referring specifically to warfare agents
developed for military purposes) is feasible, but that there are significant obstacles along the path that reduce
the likelihood of such proliferation. He questions whether or not a future group will be able to replicate
Aum's accomplishments, given that few terrorist organizations will have access to the resource that Aum
possessed. Also, he argues that the technical hurdles to developing CBW make it unlikely that military-grade
agents will constitute the main threat, suggesting that some groups may instead focus on first generation
chemical weapons that would be easier to manufacture or on lesser-known toxic compounds. (Abstract from
Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002)

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During the early 1980s, Libya was implicated as a sponsor of terrorist attacks against Western interests. In
1985, simultaneous attacks in Rome and Vienna by the Abu Nidal group, which Qaddafi called "heroic acts",
killed twenty people, five of them Americans, including a 9-year old girl. The Reagan administration
responded with a policy that would utilize coherent and escalating political, economic, and military pressures
in an attempt to end Qaddafi's sponsorship of international terrorism. There were three phases to this
strategy, involving peaceful pressure (including economic sanctions), a show of force (in January 1986,
Reagan ordered the Navy to begin a week of extensive flight operations in the vicinity of Libya), and finally,
the use of force (a bombing raid on April 14, 1986, in response to a series of terrorist attacks directly linked
to Qaddafi). However, the author notes that this attempt at coercive diplomacy did not significantly change
Qaddafi's support for international terrorism. The case demonstrates that there are significant indigenous
structural limitations on the use of military force as an instrument of coercion.

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**Role of Religion**


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State Terrorism


Strategies to Respond and Defeat Terrorism


Terrorism and State Formation


Terrorism and the Media


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Shaffer, Brenda. "Is there a Muslim Foreign Policy? The Case of the Caspian." Current History, vol. 101, no. 658 (Nov 2002), 382-387

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Ireland / Northern Ireland


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**Japan, Germany**


**Latin America**


**Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay**


**Lebanon, Middle East**


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**United States, Afghanistan, Sudan**


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