| First Page | Previous Page | Next Page | Last Page
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Citation | Zanders, Jean Pascal. "Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists." Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall 1999), 17-34. |
| Topic 1 | CBRN Terrorism |
| Topic 2 | Case Studies |
| Topic 3 | CBRN Counterterrorism Policy |
| Country | |
| Abstract | Zanders examines the process of proliferation to terrorists and other sub-state actors, adapting the assimilation model to this situation. The assimilation models as Zanders applies it holds that there is a dual decision making track, with military political consideration and political consideration on the other. The interactions of these two tracks, combined with material, political and societal constraints, influence how the group will proceed in its attempts to develop CBW. Throughout the article, he references the case of Aum Shinrikyo as an example of this process in action. Zanders concludes that terrorist acquisition of CBW (he makes a distinction between CB materials and CB weapons, the latter referring specifically to warfare agents developed for military purposes) is feasible, but that there are significant obstacles along the path that reduce the likelihood of such proliferation. He questions whether or not a future group will be able to replicate Aum's accomplishments, given that few terrorist organizations will have access to the resource that Aum possessed. Also, he argues that the technical hurdles to developing CBW make it unlikely that military-grade agents will constitute the main threat, suggesting that some groups may instead to focus on first generation chemical weapons that would be easier to manufacture or on lesser-known toxic compounds. (Abstract from Center for Counterproliferation Research "CBRN Terrorism" literature review, 31 May 2002) |
Page 410 of 411
Please contact james.forest@usma.army.mil for updates or corrections.